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A b s t r a c t
This research contributes to understanding those factors associated with solving 
difficult murder cases and elucidating the decision-making processes of Senior 
Investigating Officers (SIOs). Relatively little has been written within this field and 
the present thesis argues that aspects of the murder itself, police investigative 
procedures and the management style of the SIOs, contributes to the solving of 
cases. Natural Decision-making provided the theoretical framework for this research 
with studies designed to flesh out the knowledge required and reasoning skills 
needed by the SIOs. The thesis explores the decision-making processes 
underpinning successful resolution of murder cases. The research used a mixed 
method approach combining qualitative accounts from 31 experienced detectives 
and quantitative analyses of their 166 murder cases, together with documentary 
analyses of historic cases to map the evolution of modern investigative practice. The 
practical outcomes of this research are its contribution to systematising police 
murder investigations. Study One explores the lessons learnt from previous murder 
enquiries and charts how mistakes have contributed to developing techniques and 
refining the methods of murder investigations. Study Two explores current practice 
in major inquiries within the Metropolitan Police Service and presents a flowchart of 
the key phases. The management style of SIOs was elucidated in Study Three and 
the concepts of starburst, phasing and investigative thinking were found helpful 
concepts in describing the investigative process. Seven broad themes were 
identified as solving strategies from which 41 individual factors were established. 
Study Four involved the secondary analysis of 166 archived cases stored in the 
Home Office Major Enquiry System (Holmes). Regression analyses of a combined 
data set showed statistically significant factors associated with both the solving of 
cases (i.e. number of police investigative tactics used and features of the murder) 
and the time taken to solve a murder (i.e. type of investigative tactics and style of the 
SIO). The discussion chapter outlines the necessary investigative processes related 
to different types of murder whilst the final chapter draws some conclusions and 
makes recommendations for good practice.
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C h a p te r  1: In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  C h a p te r  S u m m a ry
1.1 Introduction
This research is concerned with the decision-making styles of Senior Investigating 
Officers (SIOs) on Metropolitan Police Murder Commands and their effectiveness in 
murder investigations. This study looks particularly at the solving factors associated 
with Category A and B murder inquiries, i.e. the “hard to solve" investigations. Police 
investigative work has often lacked empirical research to assist practitioners. Clearly 
there is a need for research to support the development of good practice. The Core 
Investigative Doctrine by the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) (2005:57) 
states that “flawed decision-making has been responsible for failed investigations 
and miscarriages of justice” whilst the Royal Commission (Hirst: 1993: Study 21) 
commented that the most common type of error in crime investigation was that of 
decision-making.
The aim of the present research is to evaluate the characteristics of investigative 
decision-making within major inquiries and show how they impact on the success of 
those inquiries in terms of finding and charging a suspect. Sherman (1998:4) notes 
the importance of “evidence based policing” emphasising the fact that there is little 
empirical evidence to guide most policing practices. This thesis will examine the 
stages of decision-making within major inquiries and probe the investigative styles of 
SIOs to see to what extent these are associated with the successful outcome of an 
enquiry. Heirs (1986:16) is of the view that the modern manager “needs to perform 
competently both as a thinker and a manager of thinkers”. He adds "that the 
professional manager will now confront far more occasions when a right or wrong 
decision is crucial than were faced by a person in a similar situation thirty or fifty 
years ago.” This is certainly true of SIOs upon whom accountability for decision­
making and management of murder investigations has greatly increased over the 
last several decades.
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The chosen crime as the focus of this study is murder because it is the “most serious 
of all violent crimes” and “the reduction and detection of murder is of major concern 
to both the police and public” (HMIC report Policing London 2000). Bitner (1992:37) 
has repeatedly observed how there has been inadequate attention paid to the “craft” 
of policing. Whilst Russo and Schoemaker (2002:52) conclude that “many people 
believe that good outcomes necessarily imply that a good process was used”. This 
maxim can be applied to British murder inquiries where the majority result in a 
conviction and there is relatively little reflection of the investigative process itself.
Wilson and Clinton-McClaren (1977:67) declare that “no area of law enforcement is 
in greater need of improvement than criminal investigation” and that “the 
management of criminal investigation moreover is less effective on the whole than 
the management of other police activities.” This is an area that remains ripe for 
empirical study. Keppel & Weis (1993:14) note that there was virtually no empirical 
research on solvability factors. Analysing solving factors in homicide cases should 
lead to a clearer understanding of how inquiries are conducted and contribute to the 
systematising of investigative methodology. Relatively little in-depth research exists 
on decision-making in real life circumstances involving stressful situations. The 
research in the present thesis is carried out by a practitioner and this marks a 
distinctive element to the project. In particular, this facilitated access to archived 
cases and to individual SIOs who make up the respondent population of the study.
The research utilises a mixed methodology combining qualitative accounts from 31 
experienced detectives managing investigations and quantitative analyses of 166 
murder cases archived within the murder database Home Office Large Major Enquiry 
System (HOLMES) together with documentary analyses of historic cases to map the 
evolution of modern investigative practice.
The thesis presents analysis of
• the development of current murder investigation procedures and practices;
• patterns and activity periods in hard to solve murder cases occurring in the 
Metropolitan Police from the period 2001-2003;
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• the management style of SIOs and the role these play in the speed and 
success of charging a suspect in murder cases;
• the decision-making processes of SIOs and what model of decision-making 
they used to complete their cases;
• And, how the murder cases themselves determine the successful conclusion.
The research focuses on Category A and Category B murders and highlights the 
protracted nature of Category A (hard to solve cases) cases. The categorisation 
terminology used by the Association of Chief of Police Officers (ACPO) is based on 
the early objective assessment of the scale, gravity and complexity of the offence 
under investigation. Category A murders are major crimes of grave public concern, 
for example, if the victim is a child or the murder is of a Police Officer. Category B 
refers to routine major crime where the offender is not known. Category C is a major 
crime where the identity of the offender is apparent.
The research undertaken in this thesis analyses how and the speed with which 
murders within the Greater London area are solved and identifies the characteristics 
associated with this success from the points of view of the SIOs investigation style 
and the decision model used. In addition historical analysis adds a further analytical 
element to the understanding of procedures developed in current investigative 
practice.
1.2 Objectives
This research seeks to discover the key investigative processes associated with the 
successful apprehension and charging of a murder suspect within a naturalistic 
decision-making framework. By interviewing SIOs and examining 166 hard to solve 
murder cases within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) between 2001 and 2003 
the research seeks to demonstrate the decision-making process of senior 
investigating officers and, in particular, will focus on the following:
a) Research objectives
1. Evaluating the solving factors in “hard to solve” homicide cases.
2. Describing the decision frame for Category A and B murder cases.
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3. Establishing the “phasing” patterns of decision-making in hard to solve 
inquiries, notably the starburst levels of great activity.
4. Elucidating the decision-making styles of SIOs and what models of decision­
making they used.
5. Demonstrating the contribution of investigative processes and SIO style to the 
resolving of crimes and length of time taken to resolve cases.
6. Establishing the different types of murder cases and how the theme of the 
murder case itself defines the solving factors.
b) Practice objectives
1. Establishing principles of good practice.
2. De-constructing key elements within the complexities of investigations of 
Category A and Category B cases.
3. Indicating the relative efficacy of differing SIOs management styles.
4. Characterising successful SIOs.
This will be undertaken by:
• Reviewing historic cases and subsequent public inquiries to ascertain the 
developments in investigative practice. (Study One).
• Mapping current murder investigative practice by reference to investigative 
doctrine and interview with an experienced SIO (Study Two).
• Interviewing SIOs to elaborate the experiential qualities, skills and 
competencies of murder investigators (Study Three).
• Secondary analysis of archived cases to extract factors that contributes to 
successful charging of a suspect. (Study Four).
1.3 Overview of the Chapters
Chapter 2 Decision Making
There is presently a lack of empirical research on how complex murder cases are 
solved and the decision-making process around them. Moreover there is little 
debate on developing or expanding the level of theory required to advance 
investigative practice. This Chapter reviews different theoretical approaches to
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decision-making and opts for Naturalistic Decision-making (NDM) as the most 
appropriate vehicle to employ as the conceptual formulation most suited to expound 
on the high stakes, complex decisions made by SIOs in murder investigation. 
Traditional methods of decision-making along with heuristic processes are also 
explored. Critical to the theoretical formulation of this thesis is the idea of a decision 
frame. In the present case this is important in identifying solvability factors that are 
associated with the successful arrest and charging of a suspect. The relevant 
literature is reviewed in order to identify candidate variables contributing to the 
successful solving of cases. This includes police investigative strategies and 
techniques along with the style of the SIO as the key decision maker.
Chapter 3 Methodological Considerations
This chapter discusses the methodology used in this thesis and argues for a mixed 
method approach on the grounds that a range of available methods are best utilised 
and exploited to answer the different emphasis of the research questions. The 
chapter explains the data capture on SPSS and the subsequent analysis of the 
quantitative data and discusses the necessity for detailed qualitative interviews and 
the importance of documentary sources. The mixed method approach is described 
and strengths and weaknesses are articulated. The issue of informed consent from 
the SIOs is also discussed. The use of semi-structured interviews are detailed and 
the benefits of this type of interviewing are shown.
Chapter 4 Study One: Documentary Analysis of Historic Inquiries
This chapter looked at the key inquiries and reviews of high profile murder cases 
over the last 40 years. The research examines the repetitions and mistakes made 
and the following issues are critically examined:
• Systematic failures
• Lack of clarity/leadership within Senior Management Teams.
• Leadership/Supervision.
• Information management.
• Skills of SIOs.
• Individual investigative strategy failures.
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• The role of the MIR.
• Phasing.
The consequences of recommendations from these inquiries were established in 
order to trace the developments and origins of contemporary murder investigative 
practices.
Chapter 5 Study Two: Current Police investigative Practice
This chapter draws upon the preceding historic analysis and identifies current 
practice when investigating murder. Details of codes of good practice are discussed. 
In addition a detailed account is given of the Metropolitan Police Service’s (MPS) 
procedures. A flowchart of key steps in the investigation and crucial personal 
decision-making involved in inquiries is provided as well as charting the role and 
responsibilities of the Senior investigating Officer (SIO). The MIT (Major Incident 
Team) model is described along with the main murder database (HOLMES).
Chapter 6 Study Three: Senior Investigation Officer Study
This is an account of the qualitative interviews with 31 MPS SIOs. They were 
questioned about their decision-making process and the solving factors for individual 
cases. A thematic content analysis was conducted on the interview material and 
Multi Dimensional Scalogram Analysis (MSA) was employed to derive facets of 
management style. Seven broad themes were identified as solving strategies from 
which individual tactics were established. These were police strategies, technical 
strategies, media strategies, intelligence strategies, suspect’s behaviour and the use 
of outside experts. Individual solving factors within these themes were identified. 
Facets of the SIOs management style related to the dichotomies of reactivity/pro­
activity; democratic/autocratic; rote/imaginative decision-making.
Chapter 7 Study Four: Holmes Secondary Analyses
Secondary analyses of the 166 cases researched on the Holmes database are 
described and an account of the descriptive statistics given. The quantitative 
analysis was undertaken by means of SPSS. The notion of the phasing of inquiries
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is developed and the composition of investigative strategies identified. Multivariate 
statistical analyses included variables from Study Three and Study Four data sets in 
order to determine the critical contributory factors leading to early and successful 
identification and charging of suspects.
Chapter 8 Discussion
This chapter provides an overview of the findings in the light of the research aims 
and identifies the key phases within inquiries where resources should be phased to 
provide full investigative response. Differences are noted between the decision 
making in Category A and Category B murders. The utility of Naturalistic Decision­
making as a conceptual formulation is discussed as is the utility of a mixed methods 
approach. The differing decision-making styles of the SIO are related to the theories 
presented in Chapter 2.
Chapter 9 Conclusion and Practical Recommendations
The final chapter identifies good practice in line with the practical aims of this thesis. 
Results of the analyses are distilled and practical implications are drawn out. The 
chapter looks at the critical elements in the solving factors and discusses future 
directions for research.
1.4 Legal Context
Law Defining Murder
The European Convention on Human Rights sets out the right to life in Article 2 and 
in particular it placed a positive obligation on the State to protect the lives of its 
citizens. Murder has been defined within both common law and criminal law within 
the United Kingdom. Murder is defined (Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2003) in 
common law as:
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“Where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any 
reasonable creature in being and under the Queen’s Peace, with intent to 
kill or cause grievous bodily harm”.
Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (2003 section B1) provides the definition of murder 
as:
“When a person unlawfully kills another human being under the Queens 
Peace with malice aforethought”.
Unlawful killing means actively causing the death of another human being without 
justification and includes acts of omission. A conviction for murder carries a 
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. The Homicide Act 1957 provides for 
special defences and allows for a conviction of voluntary manslaughter instead of 
murder.
The special defences are:
• diminished responsibility (impairment of mental responsibility), and
• provocation where a reasonable person may have been felt to have lost self- 
control
Manslaughter was defined by Lord Salmon in DPP v Newbury if it is:
“proved that the accused intentionally did an act which was unlawful and 
dangerous and that act inadvertently caused death and it is 
unnecessary to prove that the accused knew that the act was unlawful 
or dangerous”.
Ashworth (2003:58) comments on the inclusionary approach to defining the offence 
of murder as a deterrent effect and ensuring public safety. The exclusionary aspect 
(i.e. reducing the labels to manslaughter) “must consider the circumstances in which 
the killing took place and other matters bearing on the culpability of the killer”. 
Homicide covers not only the offences of murder and manslaughter, but also other 
occasions where a person causes, or is involved, in the death of another. In all 
cases of homicide the general criminal conduct (actus reus) is the same, the killing of 
another person, but there are often complex arguments over causation.
Actus reus is the essential characteristic of a criminal offence and it must be shown 
that the defendant acted in a particular way or failed to act in a particular way 
(omission) and this brought about a state of affairs. The defendant’s state of mind
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(mens rea) must be shown at the time of the offence. There is no need for that state 
of mind to remain unchanged throughout the entire commission of the offence. Once 
the actus reus has been proved, a casual link must be established between it and 
the relevant consequences. In R v McKenzie 1992 Crim LR 194 the defendant 
attacked the victim, who was already suffering from a serious ulcer, causing him 
brain damage. The brain damage prevented doctors from operating on the ulcer 
which eventually ruptures killing the victim. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
conviction for manslaughter holding that the defendant’s criminal conduct had made 
a significant contribution to the victim’s death.
There is also a rule which states that defendants must take their victims as they find 
them. Therefore if a victim has a particular characteristic such as a thin skull which 
makes the consequences of an act against them much more acute, that is the 
defendant’s bad luck. Robinson (1999:208) states that the “culpability requirements” 
of homicide serve as a grading function. The three grades of homicide include 
homicide murder (purposeful or knowing killing), manslaughter (reckless killing) and 
negligent homicide. Robinson states that they “define the conditions for 
distinguishing between grades of offences with identical objective elements”.
During the period of research, 2001-2003, the Metropolitan Police were responsible 
for charging suspects in murder cases. This has changed and the Crown 
Prosecution Service now charges murder suspects. The prosecution bears the 
burden of proving the existence of all the essential ingredients of the offence 
charged.
Murder traditionally required “malice aforethought”. This term now amounts to:
(a) an intention to kill any person, or
(b) an intention to cause grievous bodily harm to any person.
Case-law with respect to intention is plentiful but decisions are sometimes 
inconsistent and there is a degree of uncertainty. The following propositions are 
however generally established:
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• a result is intended when it is the accuser’s purpose to cause it.
• a court or jury may also find that a result is intended even though it is not the
accuser’s purpose to cause it, when
• the result is a virtually certain consequence of that act and
• the accused knows that it is a virtually certain consequence.
Transferred malice is where D shoots at P, intending to kill P but kills Q by mistake, 
D is guilty of murder. His "malice aforethought” is deemed to be transferred from P 
to Q. The harm caused must however be of the same kind as the harm intended. If 
a Police Officer shoots at P in self-defence but kills an innocent bystander, he will not 
be guilty of murder nor of manslaughter.
Provocation is defined as:
"some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man... which would cause 
in any reasonable person, and actually caused in the accused, a
sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so
subject to passion as to make him for the moment not master of his 
mind”. Duffy 1949.
Provocation reduces murder to manslaughter but is irrelevant on the issue of guilt in 
all other crimes. Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 provides:
"Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find 
that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things 
said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the 
provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be 
left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury 
shall take into account everything both done and said according to the 
effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man”.
The jury should be directed that before they consider the issue of provocation the 
Crown must have proved beyond reasonable doubt that all the other elements of 
murder were present, including the necessary intent. “Suicide pact” means a 
common agreement between two or more persons having for its object the death of 
alt of them, whether or not each is to take his own life, but nothing done by a person 
who enters into a suicide pact shall be treated as done by him in pursuance of the 
pact unless it is done while he has the settled intention of dying in pursuance of the
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pact: S4(3) Homicide Act 1957. Suicide itself ceased to be a crime under the 
Suicide Act 1961.
It is deemed manslaughter, and not murder, for a person acting in pursuance of a 
suicide pact between him and another to kill the other or be a party to the other ... 
being killed by a third person. S4 (1) Homicide Act 1957.
Complicity in another’s suicide, contrary to S2 of the Suicide Act 1961, carries a 
penalty of 14 years (compared with life imprisonment for manslaughter). The 
distinction between the two crimes can be very fine. Complicity is an alternative 
verdict in this type of manslaughter.
Attempts to Murder
The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, Section 1 defines attempts to murder as “If with 
intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which 
is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of 
attempting to commit the offence”. On a charge of attempted murder, the 
prosecution have to prove an intention to kill - R v Whybrow (1851).
Conspiracy to Murder
There is no specific offence of conspiring to murder. A person can however be guilty 
of conspiring to commit a criminal offence by virtue of Section 1, Criminal Law Act 
1977:
1(1) If a person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct 
shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with 
their intentions, either:
a) will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or 
offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement; or
b) would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of 
the offence or any of the offences impossible,
he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences in question.
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Murder rates in England and Wales have shown a slow, but steady increase in the 
period between 1986 and 2006, with approximately 11 people per million murdered 
in 1986 compared with approximately 15 people per million in 2006.
The increase in homicide rates in England and Wales mirrors increases in other 
developed countries such as Sweden and Australia. However, when comparing 
individual city’s homicide rates, London has a lower average homicide rate than the 
EU average (2.4 per 100,000 people, as opposed to 2.71 per 100,000 people). The 
percentage change in London between 1990 and 1997 has also remained relatively 
stable, with the anomaly of a slight decrease in homicide in 1996. Between 1999 
and 2003, London’s homicide rate still remained stable ranging from 191 to 196; 
peaking at 202. However, for England and Wales as a whole, the homicides 
recorded increased from 766 to 1,048; an increase of 27%.
The overall conviction rate in England and Wales is approximately 80%, with the 
majority being convicted for murder, with others having their charge reduced to 
manslaughter. Approximately 20% of cases result in acquittal. The greater majority 
of victims in England and Wales are aged between 16 and 50 years of age; with 
76.5% of victims being male (1976-2005) and 79% of victims being of white ethnicity. 
However, if a woman is the victim she is most likely to be killed at home as a result 
of a domestic dispute. When comparing the age of suspect and victim, the minority 
of homicides are committed between people of the same age; in exception to 10-17 
years and 50+ years (40% and 66% respectively). More likely there is a discrepancy 
in the ages of victim and offender with the latter either being younger or older than 
their victim.
When comparing the relationship of the victim to the suspect, a murder is more likely 
to be committed by an acquaintance, friend or family member. However, the 
occurrence of murders by strangers is proportionately higher in England and Wales, 
when compared to the USA. There are also differences when considering gender; 
with males more likely to be killed by a stranger or acquaintance, and women more 
likely to be killed by their son, daughter or (ex) partner. The dominant motive for
1.5 Murder Rates in the U K
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murder in England and Wales is a quarrel, with the highest proportion of murders 
attributed to it between 1995 and 2005. However, quarrels leading to murder are 
more likely with acquaintances than with strangers. When the motive is gang- 
related, the suspect is mentally disturbed, or the murder involves theft a murder is 
most likely to be committed on a stranger.
The most likely murder weapon in England and Wales is a sharp instrument, 
followed by physical trauma as a result of kicking or hitting. Shooting, as a method 
of murder, is still relatively uncommon in England and Wales with approximately 10% 
of murders being attributed to this means. However, gun-related homicide is 
significantly higher in the USA (70%) compared to England and Wales; with knives 
preferred in the latter. This can likely be attributed to guns being relatively easy to 
obtain in the USA, compared to the UK. Whilst these analyses provide a useful 
thumbnail of the demographic characteristics of offenders and victims, the frequency 
approach has its limitations. Francis et al (2004:21) states:
“Although the frequency approach can be insightful and is a good first step 
in predicting offender characteristics, statistical modeling (i.e. the use of 
sophisticated statistical models to predict offender characteristics will 
provide predictions by detecting important patterns in the data between 
the victim characteristics and the offender characteristics”.
In addition to this Nichol et al (2004) also indicate that investigative practice is critical 
in detecting murders. In their review they pinpoint six themes of such weaknesses 
(investigative response, forensic management, record keeping, information 
management, staffing and resourcing, communication) which are associated with 
successful case outcomes. Both these aspects are the subject of subsequent 
chapters.
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C h a p te r  2 : T h e  N a tu ra l is t ic  M o d e l o f  D e c is io n -M a k in g
2.1 Introduction
This research is concerned with the real life decision-making of SIOs in the stressful 
situation of a murder enquiry. The research explores the types of decision choices 
made by SIOs and their styles in managing an enquiry and further explores how 
these impact on the successful arrest and charging of a suspect. Of importance too, 
is the decision-making environment and the length of time taken to solve the case. 
SIOs make decisions in situations that are often hostile, ambiguous and uncertain. 
They do so in a situation which is framed by law and codes of good practice. The 
notion of solvability is explored as a criterion of success in murder investigations. 
Cronin et al (2007:24) note that surprisingly “very little research has been conducted 
into how police policies, procedures and tactics influence the effectiveness of 
homicide investigations”. Furthermore, there has been little systematic evaluation of 
factors associated with the solving of cases. They note (p27) “every homicide case 
begins with a different level of solvability and a different probability of arrests. Some 
cases are easier to solve (e.g. those in which the offender is still at the crime scene 
when the officers arrive) while others are more difficult or almost impossible to solve 
(such as those where there are no witnesses, no evidence and no suspect can be 
identified). This chapter looks at conceptual frameworks that may help to explicate 
decision-making processes and inform the research design.
2.2 Decision-Making Theories
The different theories of decision-making are explored in this chapter. The main 
types are described beiow and how they relate to SIO decision-making.
Heuristics
The term heuristic means to find out or discover. It is now used to refer to how the 
human mind uses heuristics to think about things that would otherwise be quite 
complicated. Heuristics provide a description of the successive stages of a decision
26
process and are defined by Polya (p115) as “reasoning not regarded as final and 
strict but as provisional and plausible only whose purpose is to discover the solution 
of the present problems”.
In a study by Eland (in Gigerenzer, Todd 1989:164) people responded to time 
constraints by more frequently using simple decision strategies. SIOs, like other 
decision makers operating within time constraints, selects strategies that require 
considerable effort but offer a higher probability of a correct decision. Shanteau 
(1998) stated that experts often adjust their initial decisions and they try to learn from 
the successes and failures of earlier decisions. They accept small errors but avoid 
large mistakes. Baron (2000:302) states that heuristics become perilous when "we 
become overconfident of their value so that we reject superior procedures or when 
we become committed to them as methods in themselves without understanding that 
they are tools of convenience”. The use of heuristics can, however, systematically 
lead to poor judgements where small samples are less representative than large 
samples.
Anchoring is a cognitive heuristic in which decisions are made based on an initial 
“anchor”. Anchoring - reflects the degree to which the initial judgment about an 
event or situation prohibits one from deviating from that position regardless of new 
information to the contrary. Insufficient adjustment due to anchoring can lead to 
mistakes. Sometimes reasoners hold fast to some piece of information and ignore 
the consequences of additional information. If the SIO “anchors” their decisions 
upon the information received early in the investigation they may reduce the 
opportunity to consider the relevant solving factors. The SIO must treat each 
situation individually and not curtail any activity in light of previous experience. 
Anchoring is the tendency to place too much reliance upon information received 
early in the decision-making process.
Availability is a heuristic in which a decision maker relies upon knowledge that is 
readily available rather than examine other alternatives or procedures. Availability is 
a useful clue for assessing frequency or probability. However, availability is affected 
by factors other than frequency and probability. The recognition heuristic claims that 
when making a judgment about two items, an individual who only recognises one of
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the items will consider the known item to have a higher value. Humans use 
recognition processes that largely obviate the need for further information.
There are no optimal strategies in many real-world environments. It is 
acknowledged that the use of heuristics are beneficial in the time imperative 
situations that the SIOs find themselves, however their use can lead to errors and 
shortcomings. As Beach (1977:92) states that heuristics “remain merely hypothetical 
processes and not very well defined processes at that”.
Descriptive Models of Decision-Making
Normative models defines the norms for the processing of relevant information by 
assuming that decision makers strive to do what is best for themselves or the 
organisation. Normative theories are based on principles that serve as standards for 
how decision makers should make decisions. They describe rational behaviour and 
what decision makers “should do”. Within this formulation individuals are assessed 
in terms of how they choose possible actions under ideal conditions. The model tries 
to define the best thinking for achieving the thinker’s goals and, as such, evaluates 
thinking and decision-making in terms of the personal goals of the thinker or thinkers. 
Normative models specify an ideal standard and results from imposing an analytical 
framework on reality and working out implications of that framework (Baron 
2000:49). Prescriptive models (i.e. prescribing what should be done rather than on 
describing what decision makers actually do) are simple models that prescribe or 
state how we ought to think. Beach (1997:6) states that “prescriptive theory almost 
always focuses on choices among options and seldom focuses on either diagnosis 
or implementation”. These are models are designs or inventions (Baron 2000 p33) 
“whose purpose is to bring the results of actual thinking into closer conformity to the 
normative model”.
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979:263) prospect theory explains how and why choices 
deviate from the normative model of expected utility. Theirs was an attempt to build 
on the normative expected value theory while “psychologising” it in order to produce 
a theory that more accurately describes human choice behaviour. It is concerned 
with the behaviour of decision makers who face a choice between two alternatives.
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Decisions subject to risk are deemed to signify a choice between alternative actions, 
which are associated with particular probabilities (prospects) or gambles. Unlike 
much psychology, prospect theory has a solid mathematical basis making it 
comfortable for economists. However, unlike expected utility theory which concerns 
itself with how decisions under uncertainty should be made (a prescriptive 
approach); prospect theory concerns itself with how decisions are actually made (a 
descriptive approach). Prospect theory can also be seen as “giving us hints about 
the heuristics that people use to make decisions under uncertainty” 
(Baronl 998:258).
This theory is descriptive and explains how and why choices deviate from the 
normative model of expected utility theory. Kahneman & Tversky (1979:263) 
attempted to build on the normative expected value theory while “psychologising" it 
in order to produce a theory that more accurately describes human choice 
behaviour. It contends that decision makers “edit” gambles before they evaluate 
them for comparison and choice. They were concerned with the behaviour of 
decision makers who face a choice between two alternatives. They argue that 
decisions subject to risk are deemed to signify a choice between alternative actions, 
which are associated with particular probabilities (prospects) or gambles. However, 
unlike expected utility theory, which concerns itself with how decisions under 
uncertainty should be made (a prescriptive approach), prospect theory concerns 
itself with how decisions are actually made (a descriptive approach). Prospect 
theory can also be seen as “giving us hints about the heuristics that people use to 
make decisions under uncertainty” (Baron 1998:258). People tend to simplify their 
thinking about probability into categories of certain, possible or impossible. Ellsberg 
(1961) found that subjects violated the axioms of expected utility theory by seeking 
to avoid risks associated with situations in which the probability is, or appears to be, 
unknown. Ritov and Baron (1990) report evidence that the appearance of missing 
information makes people reluctant to choose an option with uncertain outcomes. 
Baron argues (2000:271) that the ambiguity effect is “another kind of framing effect” 
and that we can make any ambiguous situation into an unambiguous one by 
imagining it as one of a sequence of repeated trials. This is what an expert SIO 
does using the framing technique of previous cases to form his/her decision-making 
process.
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Naturalistic Decision-making (NDM)
Beach (1997:9) states that “naturalistic theory is very much influenced by the need 
for practical knowledge about real world making”. It is seen as a way of keeping 
events moving along in a suitable direction rather than as maximisation. This is 
based on the work of Herbert Simon. Simon (1945) emphasised that the behaviour 
of people in organisations is constrained by the position he or she holds in that 
organisation. Simon concluded that decision-making in organizations is influenced 
by the structure and norms of that organization. It therefore follows that decision 
makers make their decisions with an incomplete array of options that an outsider 
might consider available. Manning and Hawkins (1989:139-156) assert that 
naturalism assumes the necessity of examining decisions as they are made within 
organisations and within the pre-suppositional framework of those who make them. 
Their research considered, from a naturalistic perspective, police decision-making as 
merely one species of legal decision-making. They discuss the critical features 
within police decision-making as involving:
• consequentially,
• degree of generality,
• visibility and
• complexity of task
The first of these, consequentiality refers to the characteristics of police decisions in 
that they are “extremely consequential for the individuals who are the subject of the 
decision”. Police Officers, including SIOs, (Manning & Hawkins 1989:142) “screen 
people and events for further processing”. This is a means of controlling access to 
scarce resources. The screening decision “thus becomes the first of a potentially 
lengthy series of decisions to be made in the further handling of a case”.
Manning and Hawkins (1998:139) then discuss the difference between case 
decision-making and policy decision-making. Case decision-making centres upon 
the judgment of individual SIOs. The SIO has to move from the very active phase to 
the design and implementation of actions being cognizant of the “consequences” for 
suspects, the victim’s family and police resources. These case decisions are made
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alone and without consultation. All these decisions are “visible” and this third feature 
of police decision-making is variable in its nature. A decision made to arrest a 
suspect will be visible to the enquiry team and to the victim’s family but decisions to 
mount a surveillance operation will be visible only to the Police Officers involved. 
Manning and Hawkins then describe the last feature of police decision-making as 
complexity of task. There is a “complexity of choice” that is affected by the use of 
information and intelligence and the social organisation of police decision-making.
Consequentiality can also be seen as a moral response. This refers to the influence 
of moral obligations and commitment on human behaviour. Decision makers 
evaluate their options in light of moral and ethical considerations above other 
considerations. They use their emotions and value judgements to reject courses of 
action that are compatible with the expectations of their reference group (social view) 
or weighing costs and benefits and select a course of action that promises the 
greatest net utility. As Klockars (1985:82) states; detectives see themselves on a 
“moral mission”. He comments that “the classical detectives live by a morality of 
means.... They would be called “deontologists” as opposed to “consequentialists” 
who believe in the morality of ends, that the use of any means can be judged only in 
terms of its consequences”.
Zsambok and Klein (1997:5) described naturalistic decision-making as “the way in 
which people use their experience to make decisions in field settings”. This 
approach has four features:
• dynamic and continually changing conditions
• real time reactions to these changes
• ill defined goals and ill structured tasks
• knowledgeable people.
Pious (1993) asserts that decision makers have a tendency to seek more information 
than is needed to make a good decision. When too much information is sought the 
delay could impair the effectiveness of the decision or solution and information 
overload will occur. Randel, Pugh and Reed (1996:579) helpfully differentiate 
between traditional approaches to decision-making and delineate the characteristics 
of decisions made in natural setting. These are summarised in table 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 Differences Between Traditional and Naturalistic Decision Making
Naturalistic Decision-making Traditional Decision-making
III structured problems Well defined problems
Uncertain dynamic environments Not static simulated situations
Shifting, ill defined or competing 
goals
Stable goals
Action feed back loops Single decision event
Time constraints Ample time for tasks
High stakes Not decisions devoid of true 
consequences for the decision maker
Multiple players involved Individual decision-making
The influence of organisational 
goals and norms
Decision-making in a vacuum
The decision environment that SIOs operates within is a complex, rapidly changing 
milieu. The environment is similar to that experienced by naval commanders 
described by Cannon - Bowers and Salas (2000:18). They face “multiple information 
sources with incomplete conflicting information with evolving scenarios”. There is a 
time pressure coupled with performance pressures. Certainly the situation that an 
SIO finds him/herself in mirrors the features listed under naturalistic decision making 
settings. A murder has many unknowns at the early stages of the investigation. The 
environment is certainly dynamic and shifting as more information comes into play. 
The links between actions, results and analysis represents a feedback loop that 
develops further actions as a consequence. As will be described in Chapter Six, the 
Murder Investigation Teams comprise multiple roles and players. The investigation 
is conducted within the requirements of the law and good practice guidance as well 
as responding to organisational pressures to maintain budgetary control and gain an 
early outcome. Thus the more traditional decision-making models do not appear to 
apply in the study of the decisions made by SIOs and therefore the approach that
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informs the present study is naturalistic decision-making (NDM). This research is 
concerned with the type of decision-making models SIOs actually use.
NDM asks “how experienced people working as individuals or groups in dynamic 
uncertain and often fast paced environments identify and assess their situation, 
make decisions and take actions whose consequences are meaningful to them and 
the larger organisation in which they operate” (Zsamok & Klein 1997:67). 
Naturalistic Decision-making is thus concerned with how real decision makers make 
decisions.
Unlike normative approaches, NDM emphasise recognitional processes. 
Recognition Decision-making (RDM) is at the heart of successful decision-making 
although other processes and structures may be crucial for success. Klein (1997) 
describes how decision makers make decisions based on their experience and 
training. The model contains two functions, "simple match” and “evaluating a course 
of action”. In the case of a simple match the decision maker recognises a situation 
and a course of action is generated. The second phase is taken during more 
complex cases where the decision maker conducts a mental simulation to ascertain 
if the action taken will meet any difficulties and establish how they will be overcome. 
Simon defined intuition as the recognition of patterns stored in memory. Recognition 
Primed Decision (RPD) strategy was effective because it took advantage of the Fire 
Commanders tacit knowledge in the research carried out by Klein, Calderwood , 
Clinton & Gracco (1986) on how Fire Commanders make decisions under 
uncertainty.
Beach (1997:143) states that “recognition is implicit in any theory of decision­
making”. The decision maker must be able to interpret ongoing events in “terms of 
his or her past experience and existing store of knowledge”.
Simon (1979) described the role of standard operating procedures as a response to 
specified situations as a form of decision making. The matching process requires 
discretion as real life situations seldom fit to a standard specification. In 
psychological terms the prescription for responding is called a “policy” where a broad 
class of situations cannot be defined in sufficient detail. This happens at the start of
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murder investigations where the SIO is unsure of the theme of the murder and 
cannot start a feature by feature match against future solving factors.
RPD models are concerned with the critical decision-making points in events. The 
purpose is to identify the available options, then consider the options actively, assess 
important information and determine the goal of the decision and determine the 
strategy used to make the decision. Klein showed in his research that depending on 
the expertise of the decision maker between 40% and 80% of the decisions involve 
recognition in the early stages. As Beach states (1997:145) “the more experience 
the decision maker has in the area in which the decision arises the greater the role of 
recognition”.
The NDM approach is particularly relevant to how SIOs are required to operate in the 
first phase of an enquiry. Cannon -  Bowers & Salas 1998:61). The US Navy built a 
model called TADMUS (Tactical Decision-making Under Stress) and they found that 
the attitudes held by people were important and it was the more democratic, open, 
questioning individuals who were unafraid to accept suggestions who were the most 
successful in decision-making. Decision-making is a recursive process in that most 
decisions are made by moving back and forth between the choice of criteria. An 
ideal decision environment would include all possible information, all of it accurate 
and every possible alternative. However both information and alternatives are 
constrained because time and effort to gain information or identify alternatives are 
limited.
Heirs & Farrel (1987) sees this as a cyclical process and he comments that no 
stages are more worthy than others and neither are they linear. The entire process, 
or part of it, may have to be repeated several times. This is reflected in the research 
which shows that SIOs have to consider many of the factors that may contribute to 
solving the murder (Mouzos & Muller 2001:www.aic.gov.uk). They established 12 
solving factors that contributed to the charging of a suspect in Australian murder 
cases. These had to do with characteristics of the incident and the victim. This 
means that the SIO has to stay in touch with the process at every stage for it may be 
necessary to go back to a prior stage. Heirs’ philosophy on decision-making echoes 
that used by most SIOs. Heirs is concerned that a managers task will not be “to
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accumulate information but rather to assemble the people who have the relevant 
information and experience and to make sure that each contributes to the decision­
making process"
Bhushan & Rai (2004:11) state that “decisions made in an ad hoc, unstructured or in 
a semi structured manner, based on only a subset of the decision-making group has 
a high probability of being not just sub optimal but utterly wrong”. The single criterion 
decision-making requirements of the past have given way to “highly complex 
decision problems involving multitudes of variables which can be stochastic, fuzzy or 
at worst unknown”. They define a generic decision-making problem as consisting of 
the following activities:
• Studying the problem
• Organising multiple criteria
• Assessing multiple criteria
• Evaluating alternatives
• Ranking the alternatives
• Incorporating the judgements of multiple experts
The increasingly complex backdrop involved in decision-making means that the 
decision maker must be aware of the rising number of social, political, environmental 
and legal consequences of their decisions. This is coupled with the growing 
complexity of the information and assumptions that need to be considered before a 
decision can be made and the ever increasing rate of change. Heirs & Farrel (1987) 
points out that:
“The single most important step we can take is to improve the quality of 
our decisions is to improve the quality of the thinking that precedes them"
The SIO is relied upon to exercise judgment and discretion in their enquiries. Simply 
to round up the “usual suspects” could exacerbate a local community or minority 
sensitivities. The SIO enjoys “decisional autonomy” thus Society must leave the 
police room for professional judgement. This can be assisted by rigorous training 
and high professional standards. Davis (1996) states the police differ from other 
professions in that they have little time for deliberation in critical incidents. Theirs is 
an immediate response to difficult situations. Davis states they must depend on 
“instinct, habit or memory”.
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Proficient decision makers must try to fill gaps in the information gathering process 
and assess the reliability of assumptions. As Shaw states (1977:51) NDM is “what 
will happen”. In the mid 1980’s applied psychologists began to take an interest in 
decision-making in changing conditions and required real life reactions which are 
summarised in table 2.2.
Figure 2.2 Summary of Key Aspects of Naturalistic Decision Making
Components of decision­
making
Examples
Fill the Gaps Filling gaps in the information gathering 
process (Heirs 1987)
Experience Case Decision-making (Klein 1987 )
Social context/environment Social Organisation of Police Decision Making 
(Manning & Hawkins 1989)
Emotional Use of emotional intelligence in effective 
decision-making Sosa, and Megerian (1999)
Cognitive Thinking Complexity of Choice (Manning & Hawkins 
1989)
Intuition Use of heuristics (Pious 1993)
Adaptive skills A continuing cycle of thinking (Donnelly 1985)
Review Feedback (Randel, Pugh and Reed 1996)
Reasoning Problem analysis (Bhutan and Rio 2004)
As Blanco, Lewko and Gillingham (1996:5-11) discuss, any investigation of decision­
making around an incident must be expanded to include aspects of the organisation. 
Errors can snowball through an organisation and there is a need for them to learn 
from each incident. “Continuous improvement requires learning from experience and 
removing differences of interpretation”. Chapter 4 of this thesis describes the 
organisational learning and historical lessons for the Police Service from 40 years of 
public inquiry. Bhushan and Rai (2004:12) state “decision-making can be 
considered as the choice, on some basis or criteria, of one alternative among a set 
of alternatives”. They argue that “it is a lack of adequate quantitative information
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which leads to dependence on the intuition, experience and judgment of 
knowledgeable persons called experts”.
Barker (1996:28) discusses the implications of managing the decision-making 
process. He describes the five C’s of decision-making, considering, consulting, 
committing, communicating and checking and he sees these as part of the decision 
cycle. Bhushan and Rai (2004) also discuss the process of decision-making (p131) 
and that it includes response generation, response evaluation and response choice 
under the constraints of limited time and limited information in crisis situations. This 
describes the broad decision-making process of SIOs particularly in the early stages 
of an enquiry. Vroom and Yetton’s (1973) model of managerial decision-making 
holds that an organisation’s members can participate to different degrees in 
managerial decision-making and that the leaders task is to select the right level of 
member involvement in light of the characteristics of the decision problem. These 
levels are as follows:
• First level - excludes other members of a team
• Second level - allows the other members to merely contribute information
• Third level - provides management with information about the problem
• Fourth level - other members of the team provide management with
information
• Fifth level - all information about the problem has been obtained and
a group has been convened
The management style of SIO’s is discussed in Chapter Six and the successful SIOs 
were those that incorporated the fourth and fifth level of decision-making shown 
above.
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Processes involved in NDM
Models of naturalistic decision-making place a high premium on situation 
assessment, priorisation and strategic action (Klein: 1989). This research 
demonstrates that people solve problems by selective, heuristic search through large 
problem spaces and large databases, using means-ends analysis as a principal 
technique for guiding the search. Proficient decision makers must first try to fill gaps 
and explain conflict and only then assess the reliability of assumptions. They try to 
construct complete and coherent situational models. The requirement for SIOs to 
use meta recognition skills to assist with situation assessment is discussed. Cohen, 
Freeman and Thompson (1997) state that metacognitive skills are also crucial (p5) in 
two phases of intuitive decision-making:
• Construction of a situation model or plan when recognition is uncertain
• Verifying the results of recognition.
They describe the metacognitive process composed of three stages, the quick test, 
critiquing and correcting. The quick test is similar to Klein’s idea of “satisfying” (i.e. 
doing the best in a limited timeframe). NDM models assume that the decision 
situation is usually embedded within a broader environmental and organisational 
context. Adaptive expertise entails a “deep comprehension of the conceptual 
structure of the problem domain”. Once there appears to be other issues or risks or 
there are unreliable assumptions then the “correcting” stage is entered where more 
information needs to be collected. This stage requires the collection of additional 
data to resolve ambiguity. This stage is tied into the decision nodes described in 
Chapter Six. The decision nodes will be activated when enough knowledge is 
acquired. Metacognitive skills are needed in “the interpretative process of evaluating 
and revising assumptions”.
A “frame” is a mental construct consisting of elements and the relationship between 
them. Initial framing may be fairly swift but, when the stakes are high, individuals 
seldom settle for the first impression. After initial framing a iot of time is invested in 
fleshing out and understanding of the situation and making judgements. The 
decision maker can use recognition process to deal with previously encountered 
situations, if the situation is substantially different from previously encountered 
situations, they set about formulating an action plan that deals with its uniqueness
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embedding observed events in a context in order to give them meaning is called 
“framing”. Frames are mental structures that guide understanding of a complex 
reality. Russo and Schoemaker (2002) state that “everyone must inevitably adopt 
some kind of simplifying perspective”. Frames are rooted in our experience and the 
decision maker must find the most appropriate frame. Every decision is embedded 
within a frame and guides thinking in complex situations. However, frames can filter 
what we see.
“Satisficing” is another way of reducing the information flow and it assumes that the 
decision maker has a minimum set of standards that an option must meet. Simon's 
vision of bounded rationality has two interlocking components: the limitations of the 
human mind, and the structure of the environments in which the mind operates. 
Heller (1988:39) states that “the more turbulent the environment the more likely that 
participative methods of decision-making are used”1. Heller comments that “the 
uncertainty created by a turbulent and complex environment leads a manager to 
conclude that his own knowledge and experience alone are insufficient to make a 
high quality decision”. The research also found that the higher the skills and 
educational qualifications of managers the greater the degree of participative 
decision-making. Crego (2002:261) states that NDM focuses on “experts making 
decisions in real world environments, these are typically characterised by time 
pressure, high-risk dynamic problems and inadequate information”. He states that 
Klein’s RPD model describes decisions made within high stakes environment and a 
short time frame for action, the retrieval of patterns of typicality within the critical 
incident that the decision makers recognise from their previous experience. Their 
selection of a course of action becomes a rapid response.
Flin and Arbuthnot (2002:278) argue because of the stakes in critical situations it is 
necessary to ensure that decision makers are trained to deal with situations beyond, 
as well as within, their capabilities. They add that the RPD process is dependant 
upon valid experience and training. “It is the integrity and underpinning of any 
system that accepts that commanders must, at times, make rapid intuitive style 
decisions and that they will be reliable”. The Centrex Investigative Doctrine (2005) 
formulates a model on page 48 showing the stages of Criminal Investigations. This 
starts with the instigation of an enquiry, the initial investigation, the investigative
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evaluation and progresses to suspect management. This is followed by evidential 
evaluation, charge, case management and then a court appearance.
Beach (1997) states an expert can use their experience to "frame situations” rapidly 
and accurately. Experts recognise meaningful patterns of events and having 
recognised (framed) them then use them to perform the tasks that the situation 
demands. Kind (1987:128) when discussing framing states that the investigator has 
to draw their boundaries “much tighter to provide a problem which is amenable to 
investigation knowing”. He comments (p132) that the “experienced investigator 
carries in his mind a frame consisting of two parts, the inner frame and the outer 
frame. The boundary between the two may be "diffuse” or clear. The idea of frame 
in Kind’s words is “strongly associated with the idea of elimination”, that decision 
makers aim at finding solutions which are “satisfactory rather than optimal”. 
Satisfaction is achieved through simplification, including judicious use of shortcuts or 
“heuristics”. Drummond explains her concept of “bounded rationality” where decision 
makers try to make things easy for themselves by:
• Reducing problems to manageable proportions
• Concentrating upon only a few options
• Choice based upon intelligent guesswork
• Searching for a solution “that will do”
Russo and Schoemaker (2002:153) lay out a decision choosing model shown in 
Figure 2.3 that comprises of general guidelines. This table describes the different 
stages that lead to decision-making. This involves, in their words, the four stages 
where the decision maker has to progress through thinking about the decision, 
choosing the correct method and then implementing the decision made. The 
elements shown are a precis of definitions from other authors shown.
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Figure 2.3 Summary of Elements Involved in Overall Decision Making
Decision Thinking DecisionChoosing Decision-making
Decision
Implementation
The question Intuition Framing Monitor progress
The alternatives Heuristic
procedures
Gathering
Intelligence
Test and update 
assumptions j
The consequences Decision
weighting
Coming to 
conclusions
Track real time 
information
The decision Value analysis Learning from 
experience
Avoid the 
assumption train
Short, medium, long 
term consequences
Situation
assessment
Dynamic decision­
making
Satisficing
Probability estimates Mental
imagery
Constant
assessment
Maximising
Risk / reward 
calculations
Decision
Trees/Nodes
Making the right 
decision at the right 
time
assessment
Critical Decision-Making
Crego (2000) helped to introduce the “Hydra” model for the Metropolitan Police 
Service SIO training at the Crime Academy. This model is a simulation of quick 
decision-making. In a paper in 2000 he outlined some of the decision-making 
processes used in the Hydra training. Crego stated that the trainees used a mixture 
of Classical Decision-making (CDM) and Naturalistic Decision-making (NDM). 
Crego describes the characteristics displayed and how they relate to Naturalistic 
Decision-making. These were the issues of time pressure, high stakes, uncertainty, 
multiple players, and organisational goals, as shown in Klein’s 1997 research. 
Crego further comments that the participants were observed to be weighing up the 
pros and cons of the decision (CDM) “we should go in...,” “...but if we do and it’s 
wrong...we just have to patch it up and apologise...”. Individuals used CDM or 
comparative methods perhaps because they had to optimise to find the best course 
of action and they knew that they would have to justify their choice of decision to a 
complex situation where the preservation of life is the most important factor. As
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Crego (2002:267) states during Hydra training SIOs were using “satisficing goals of 
their past experiences to form a concept of a particular event so as to investigate it 
properly”. The SIO will adapt to the situation as it develops. These adaptive skills 
are “fully developed and refined in the performance environment". (Cannon - 
Bowers & Salas 2000:116). Simon (1945) commented that decision makers reduce 
information processing demands by constructing limited representations and 
intuitions because they cannot cognitively deal with a great deal of information. 
Experts can use their experience to frame situations rapidly and accurately. Experts 
recognise meaningful patterns and events and having recognised them they can use 
them to perform the tasks that the situation demands.
2.3 SIO Decision-making Processes
Brookman (2005:240) describes the homicide investigation process and breaks this 
down into the initial response and secondary enquiries. The five key objectives from 
the ACPO Murder Manual apply (p35) and are known as the five Building Blocks. 
They are:
• Preservation of life
• Preserve scenes
• Secure evidence
• Identify victim
• Identify suspects
The Centrex Core Investigative Doctrine (2005) mentions the “Golden Hour” on page 
47. This refers to the period immediately following the commission of an offence. It 
then further describes the investigation model and this is mentioned in Chapter 
Three. Sarna (2002:38) states that “the failure to address critical incident 
management needs in the early minutes of a rapidly unfolding incident may create 
problems”. He further comments that the “ability to perceive, understand and focus 
on a few key aspects of an unfolding incident “is the key to performance”. Sarna 
(2002) has created an organisational dimension graph showing capacity versus risk. 
He points out that actors in the critical incident are mindful of critical 
interdependencies. The SIO should be aware of these “critical interdependencies” in 
the early stages of an investigation
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The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Irving & Dunninghan: 1993:68) entitled 
“Human Factors in the Quality Control of CID Investigations” found that the most 
common type of error in crime investigation was that of decision-making. In their 
summary they found three general causes:
• Failure to foresee and take account of circumstances which should have been 
foreseen
• Errors in the processing of information
• Errors in communication
Their research showed that the detective used a series of cognitive skills to deal with 
the stages involved in criminal investigation. They identified 4 stages (p12) and then 
described the skills a detective required ranging from finding a lead to drawing valid 
conclusions from data to determining the level of proof needed to construct a case.
Systems Management
Irving and Dunningham (1993:13) stated that “the cultural climate of the Police 
Service and the craft attitudes of CID officers would tend to militate against the 
development of the systems view of both CID work and the administration of criminal 
justice”. The report discusses the cognitive skills displayed by detectives (p13), 
these include memory along with perceptual discrimination. Under the heading of 
Reasoning (p16) a “range of logico deductive activities which are of central 
importance to the task of constructing a strong enough case against a suspect”. The 
investigator has to make logical inferences by “sifting what is available, filling in the 
gaps and “shoring up the doubtful bits in an evidentiary chain”. They discuss the 
principle of deduction and space classification. As this moves into the field of “high 
class detective work, classificatory schema and their use, becomes rapidly more 
sophisticated”. The reasoning by analogy model described appears to work in 
harness with a more structured rule bound model of reasoning.
Irving and Dunningham (1993:51) examine the classification of error based on task. 
They give examples of the tasks that affect decision-making. Some of these are:
• Costs of breaching rules not taken into account
• Procedural shortcuts wrongly estimated
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• Alternative plans of action in an investigation not assessed before a choice is 
made
• Incompatible decisions taken with respect to disclosure of information to CPS
• Decisions made by default
Some examples were also given under reasoning where the research identified the 
following:
• Shortcomings in a chain of evidence not identified
• Crucial defence strategy not foreseen
• Consequences of breaches of PACE rules not worked out
• Probabilities of error associated with identification not assessed correctly
• Failure to correctly identify how investigative actions will appear when 
presented in court.
• Failure to hold onto alternative hypothesis in building case against a prime 
suspect.
In 1984 Brownlie posed the question “Crime Investigation - Art or Science? The 
conference and book tried to identify pathways and patterns of behaviour in modern 
crime investigation. It marks a critical time period in crime investigation post the 
Yorkshire Ripper case and pre the inception of permanent major enquiry teams. In 
the same book, Oxford (1984) highlighted certain defects in investigative systems at 
this stage of police history, post Yorkshire Ripper cases. He outlines the difficulties 
in attempting to record so much information across police boundaries (this was pre 
Holmes). Oxford stated that the SIO also has to consider media strategy, the use of 
technology and general management techniques. Oxford concludes his remarks by 
commenting, “senior detective officers must be trained in management skills required 
to conduct large scale inquiries”. Emment (1984 same book,an ACC) discussed the 
role of the Chief Investigating Officer and he felt that “One man must ultimately make 
major operational policy decisions and assume responsibility”. He was concerned 
with the leadership role of the SIO. DCC Sloan described the relationship between 
the specialist and the investigator as crucial and that communication between them 
was vital.
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Kind (1987:235) comments that in the complex field of crime investigation full 
standardisation “is not and never will be possible”. Kind felt that extensive 
standardisation would be harmful to crime investigation not only by “devaluing the 
professional decision-making function of the detective but also providing a
framework less able to carry information”. The management of investigations is
paramount in his view and there was one case where a senior officer felt the case 
would have been solved by posting in a good “Marks and Spencer’s manager”. This 
may be true in some cases where lack of investigative success is due to lack of 
managerial or administrative capability. Kind sees the SIO’s function as one of 
“information absorber, an information processor and decision maker”. SIOs have to 
make decisions which are time dependent and in many cases has to act with what 
she or he has available. Kind differentiates between detectives and investigators. 
Detectives are concerned with gathering hard evidence whereas investigators
require the ability to marshal facts, resources and information. SIOs are Senior 
Investigating Officers and by definition routinely meet these three criteria.
Morgan (1990:13) comments that it is “curious” that a subject as fascinating as 
detective skills should "have so successfully escaped any serious research”. 
Morgan (1990:53) asked the question in his research “What skills are necessary for 
an investigator to solve crime?” The responses included:
• Knowledge of the local area and local villains
• Qualities of patience, persistence and tenacity
• Objectivity
• Time to pursue enquiries
• “Gut feeling”, intuition, a “nose for it” and commonsense
• Ability to communicate
There was agreement that “CID officers were more skillful than the uniformed branch 
but this was attributed to “training, the ability to specialise and the time to pursue 
inquiries”. Experience was also mentioned, in particular interpersonal and 
interviewing skills. From nearly 400 statements made by officers there seems to be 
a general agreement that information collected from all people involved in a crime, 
local knowledge and access to this information were the most important factors
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leading to a successful investigation. Morgan concludes that “it is only in the area of 
greater data collection and improved processing both in terms of access to the 
information and the speed that it can be accessed and processed “that crimes will be 
solved”.
Maguire, Noaks, Hobbs & Brearley (1991:3) carried out research in six police force 
areas to assess investigative performance. They looked at the “skills” which defined 
“good detective work “(p23). The most common response was that a good detective 
possessed “a complex set of personal qualities”. The ideal combination of skills 
would seem to be “intelligence, commonsense, initiative, inquisitiveness, and 
independence of thought, commitment, persistence, and ability to talk to people, 
experience and some kind of innate ability”. More senior officers mentioned hard 
work and 15 out of the 26 officers most frequently mentioned the ability to 
communicate as an important attribute. These findings echo Morgan’s work and 
when asked to be more precise about the most important “tools of the trade” the 
following skills emerged:
• Knowledge (and intelligent use) of the law
• Local knowledge
• Communication skills
• Interviewing techniques
• Skill in constructing files of evidence
• Cultivating informants
• Skills in presenting evidence in court
• Ability to recognise and extract pertinent information from crime reports, 
victims, witnesses, etc.
2.4 Pressures Facing Senior Investigating Officers During 
Investigations
The increased accountability of the Police Service in the UK requires that the police 
operate in a more open and transparent manner than their predecessors. Their 
effectiveness is open to interpretation and review both internally and externally. This
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is a new period of police accountability highlighted by the creation of the Metropolitan 
Police Authority. Maguire & Norris (1992) describe “systemised review procedures” 
as one of the five limitations SIOs operate within. The third edition of Reiner’s “The 
Politics of the Police” (2000) looks at the cycles of reform from Sharman through to 
New Labour and the Macpherson Report. Riener (2000:90) talks of the 
“transformation of policing itself and this reinforces wider shifts in social order, 
political economy and culture”. The modern SIO operates in a very different milieu 
than 10 or 20 years ago. The environment in which the SIO works has “embedded 
constraints” (Kleinig: 1996) and the amount of discretion enjoyed by SIOs is limited 
by issues such as budgets legal and administrative constraints. Homicide 
investigators operate within certain limitations. Maguire and Norris (1992) list some 
of these safeguards such as legislation (The Police and Criminal Evidence Act), 
review procedures and accountable decision-making. Kleinig describes the varieties 
of police discretion and how this impacts on the ranking they give to different 
demands and on the way they choose to accomplish the tasks they undertake. The 
police are often seen as “problem busters” but they are restricted in what they can 
actually do.
2.5 The Culture of Homicide Teams and its Influence on SIOs 
Decision-Making
Reiner (2000:90) states that the core of the police outlook is this subtle and complex 
intermingling of the themes of mission, hedonistic love of action and pessimistic 
cynicism”. Manning, Hawkins (1989) states that the police represent an “absolute 
morality” and that they have accepted the role of public controllers by historical 
evolution.
2.6 What Does Success Look Like?
Mouzos and Muller (2001) suggest that there is considerable concern about the 
occurrence of homicide but relatively little attention is paid to the ability of Police 
Officers to solve murders. The solving rates for murder investigations in both
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Australia and UK are stable and high, about 80%, although in the USA homicide 
clearance rates have declined.
Maguire, Noaks, Hobbs, Brearley (1991) discuss the need for a set of indicators of 
successful performance rather than one simple statistic of clear up rates. The model 
they produced took as a starting point the ambiguity of the notion of “solving” or 
detecting a crime. There are at least four different meanings:
• Identifying (and making a prima facie case) against the suspect
• Collating and collecting sufficient evidence to charge a suspect known from the 
start
• Persuading a detained or incarcerated offender to admit to further offences
• Acting on information received or simply through presence at the scene catching 
an offender in the act of committing an offence.
Solving Factors
However the notion of solvability has been employed as criteria of success (Keppel 
& Weis 1994; Wellford & Cronin 2000; Mouzos & Muller 2001). This research 
testifies to the complexities of successful investigations. Wellford and Cronin (2000) 
examined 200 homicides from four US cities and identified those associated with 
solved crimes. Success factors were grouped as follows:
(a) Initial response where they emphasised the importance of the first officer on 
the scene to immediately notify the homicide unit, medical examiner’s office 
and crime lab, to secure area and locate witnesses. Successful 
investigations were more likely if the assigned detective arrives within 30 
minutes of being notified.
(b) If three or four detectives were assigned the murder was more likely to be 
solved than if one or two were assigned. Success was marked by detailed 
notes being taken describing crime scene, rapid follow up of information 
provided by witnesses, at least one detective attending the post mortem.
(c) The quality of supervision was also key as was the presence of outside 
review and brainstorming of ideas early in the investigation. Open
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discussions were also important as this fostered team environment and co­
operation.
(d) Other police response which included computer checks on suspects, finding 
the weapon, interviewing of witnesses, friends, acquaintances and 
neighbours of the victim and use of confidential informants.
Wellford & Cronin (2000:6) further note the importance of police personnel policies 
when the best detectives are selected they should be given the opportunity to stay in 
squads and gain experience. Latitude to work overtime and the assignment of a car 
on a 24 hour basis allowed detectives to respond directly to crime scene instead of 
signing out car. They also reported that problem solving techniques such as 
Scanning Analysis Response Assessment (SARA) to be helpful and judicious use of 
crime analysts who can conduct research and analysis (performing database 
searches, developing timelines, analysing telephone data) allowing detectives more 
time for other functions such as conducting interviews. Finally evidence 
management and prioritisation together with eye witness management were 
identified as important features of successful investigations. They describe variables 
which can be controlled such as the number of detectives assigned to a case, 
following up on witness information and the actions of the first officer on the scene. 
They felt that after adjusting for these variables the clearance rate for homicides 
could be increased. Of the 51 statistically significant characteristics identified by 
Wellford and Cronin, 37 of the characteristics were associated with police practices, 
with the remainder of the characteristics being associated with the homicide event. 
Overall they suggested “that practices and policies of law enforcement agencies can 
have a substantial impact on the clearance of homicide cases” (p4). Wellford and 
Cronin found that the majority of solving “characteristics” were police generated.
Morgan (1990:53) carried out research on how crimes were solved from the police 
practitioner’s viewpoint and the middle managers viewpoint. He states that (p53) the 
“overwhelming impression is that information and local knowledge are believed to be 
the most important factors in solving crime”. In over 400 statements from Police 
Officers he concludes that there is general agreement that information collected from
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all people involved in a crime, local knowledge and access to information were the 
most important factors in leading to a successful conclusion.
Mouzos & Muller (2001:2) propose that much of what is thought to contribute to 
successfully resolving murders is actually anecdotal information or subjective 
information relayed by experienced detectives. Their approach at addressing this 
problem is to examine factors associated with solved and unsolved offences and 
subject these to statistical analysis to determine which are significantly 
discriminating. They operationalise success in terms of an outcome defined as the 
arrest and charging of an offender. Clearly, as they point out this does not take into 
account the judicial process or whether the offender is found guilty or acquitted. 
From a police perceptive, this seems a reasonable definition and will be used in the 
present study.
Results reported by Mouzos & Muller (2001:4) revealed factors the detectives 
associated with successful investigations. These were:
• Ample time to investigate and conducting one investigation at a time
• Sufficient numbers of experienced staff in the investigating team
• Availability of resources (overtime support staff and analysts)
• Co-operation and effective communication.
They especially pointed out the need for prompt and accurate information from the 
crime scene and early identification of witnesses. Early crime scene management 
enabled preservation and collection of evidence, examination of the body in situ, 
appreciation of the vicinity and surroundings. The detectives also emphasised 
witness management and the effective management of technical and specialist 
expertise. Other technical strategies included the use of telephone intercepts, or 
listening devices. Media strategies included use of Crimestoppers and anonymous 
hotlines. Some detectives commented on the possibility of overload of information 
from all these sources. Major impediments included lack of resources, availability of 
suitably qualified staff, reluctant witnesses, and poor information flow. 
Organisational structures and lack of analytic support were also mentioned. They 
conclude (p6)
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“What seems self evident however is that all homicides are potentially 
solvable, but that some will require a disproportionate amount of time and 
effort?"
Nicol, Innes et al (2003) looked at investigative process factors in a sample of 
murders committed in England and Wales. Their methodology was to examine the 
reports of murder review teams. They observed that the majority of murder 
investigations in the United Kingdom are solved relatively soon after the offence has 
been committed and with relatively limited investigative effort. They undertook a 
study that examined issues raised in 34 murder reviews of unsolved cases. The 
study revealed six main categories in which investigative weakness had been 
identified. Investigative weakness was operationalised in terms of where the reviews 
declared a practice as being inadequate within the written commentary or where this 
was self evident from the description of the task being undertaken. They found 690 
examples of investigative weakness. These are reproduced in table 2.4.
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Table 2.1 Investigative Weakness Identified by Nicol et al (2003)
Theme Sub theme N %
Investigative response Initial actions of the scene 80 11.6
Information gathering 55 7.9
Witness/suspect management 72 10.4
Forensic issues Exhibit management 7 1.0
Submission 24 3.4
Post mortem 1 0.1
Record keeping Recording SIO policies 52 7.5
Procedure and content 102 14.7
Acquisition and storage 15 2.1
Information management Document management 90 13.0
Action administration 39 5.6
Staffing and resources Staffing levels 81 11.7
Availability of suitably trained 
team
36 5.2
Communication Internal 22 3.1
External 6 0.8
With victim’s family 8 1.1
Clearly the greatest area of weakness is record keeping. Nicol (2003) et al 
diagnosed the underlying problems as being:
• Errors of judgement by the SIO in relation to parameter setting of the 
investigation and prioritising lines of enquiry
• Inadequate knowledge generated as a consequence of failures at the 
crime scene ( identified as poor forensic awareness by inexperience 
officers first on the scene)
• Failure to follow agreed procedure and policies defined as non compliant 
informal working practices
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• Lack of resources particularly staffing levels
• Management style of the SIO particular
In addition these authors outlined good practice for the successful investigation of 
murder identified by the reviews:
• High quality briefings,
• Good communication with intelligence cell,
• Good internal communication,
• Holding of regular strategy meetings,
• Good liaison between SIO on parallel or linked enquiries.
2.7 Identifying Investigative Solving Factors
If the purpose of the SIO’s decision-making is to solve the murder, then analysis of 
the frame(s) within which the SIO works can be described by the legal, forensic and 
procedural frame. These present the legal and organisational constraints within 
which the officer is permitted to operate and the forensic capability to investigate a 
case. The solving frame is the use of available resources permitted within the legal 
and procedural frame. These are made up of the following:
• The Management of Witnesses
“Witnesses can be thought of as representing a third part in many homicide 
events expanding the dyad of victim offender roles to a triad of victim -  offender -  
witness roles” (Brookman 2005:114). Brookman further states “witnesses can 
play a variety of roles in homicide events including instigating, escalating, 
facilitating or mediating fatal violence”. The role of bystanders is likely to be linked 
to their association or the relationship to the parties involved. Stelfox (2009:110) 
talks of SIO acquiring knowledge and this comes from “those with direct 
knowledge of the offence”. Keppel (1989) recommends in his study of serial 
killing investigations that “the pursuit of witnesses must be thorough and 
unending”. Where a witness gives statements over the duration of an enquiry 
before the suspect is caught then the documentation of each interview is valuable 
in providing credibility.
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• House to House Enquiries
The House to House enquiries are used to trace witnesses and gather intelligence 
as well as reassuring the community. This technique is resource intensive and 
clear parameters need to be set by the SIO. Stelfox (2009:112) states that “clarity 
and timing” are the key features of house to house enquiries and their purpose is 
to:
• Identify suspects by establishing who lives or works in areas relevant to the 
enquiry
• Canvass for witnesses relevant to the enquiry
• Reassure the public
Innes (2003:154) describes House to House enquiries as a “fairly blunt 
instrument” which on occasions produced valuable information and on many 
others produced a “lot of irrelevant unreliable data”.
• Behaviour of First Officers at the Scene
As Tattersall & Cook (2008:71) state it is the actions taken and tradecraft used 
during the initial stages that are also critical to success. As they further state 
“these preliminary stages are usually outside the control of the SIO”. The early 
actions of officers “on the frontline” make a “huge difference” to the outcome of an 
investigation. The role of the first officers on the scene can be vital to the 
outcome of the investigation. Mouzos and Millar (2001) pointed out the need for 
prompt and accurate information from the crime scene and early identification of 
witnesses. Early crime scene management enabled preservation and collection of 
evidence, examination of the body in situ, appreciation of the vicinity and 
surroundings.
• Family Liaison Officers
The Family Liaison Officer strategy is set out in the Home Office Code of Practice 
for Victims of Crime (2005) which states that “the police must assign a Family 
Liaison Officer to any relatives whom the police consider appropriate and make a 
record of the assignment”. The recommendations from the Stephen Lawrence
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Inquiry (Macpherson Report 1999) now form part of the ACPO Family Liaison 
Strategy Manual. The Family Liaison Officer strategy should include an entrance 
and exit strategy for the FLO to avoid an overreach of the role and an over 
emotional commitment for the SIO. The FLO is an investigator and should be 
used to impart and obtain information from the victim’s family to further the 
investigation. In larger inquiries, such as Category A and Category B cases 
featured in the current research, the SIO should consider the advice of a Family 
Liaison Co-ordinator (FLC) can assist the SIO in developing tactical options. The 
National Family Liaison Advisor (is part of the National Office Large Major Enquiry 
System) was introduced after the Yorkshire Ripper Case to co-ordinate ail 
statements and details of witnesses, telephone numbers, vehicles etc (see full 
description in Chapter 4). Holmes provides a research facility as well as an 
exhibit handling package and the management of “actions”, The Holmes office 
known as the Major Incident Room becomes the heart of the investigation. It 
gives the enquiry team the ability to cross-check ail inputted data. It is, in 
essence, a good data warehouse system that is not an analytical tool “per se”.
• CCTV
The value of CCTV intelligence and evidence in major investigations is becoming 
increasingly important, as is the need to formulate early strategies to maximise 
results. Indeed, it is now a key consideration for investigators, often requiring 
dedicated resources, working within a clearly defined structure for identifying and 
securing relevant images. It is not just the identification of opportunities to recover 
evidential material that is paramount when implementing a CCTV strategy, but 
consideration must be given to how the images are to be retrieved, stored, 
evaluated, and introduced into the judicial process. Additionally, thought should 
be given to the broader intelligence gathering function that CCTV provides to the 
investigation, whilst being mindful of the need to target resources. CCTV can 
assist with the identification of:
• suspects
• witnesses
• clothing
• vehicles
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• movement and tracking of individuals
• forensic opportunities
• mannerisms / gait
• a visual record of what took place
• forensic support
Innes (2003:45) states that the police treat forensic evidence as hard evidence. 
However he describes how police sometimes “ignore” or overlook “the subtleties 
of forensic analysis and therefore they misunderstand the weight of interpretation 
that could be placed on a particular finding”.
The Home Office Report 25/04 on reviewing murder investigations state that crime 
investigation is “becoming more complex with increasingly sophisticated forensic 
technologies routinely being employed”. With these developments the police have 
the ability to solve more crimes however, there is increased potential for “serious 
oversights, mistakes and errors to be made in the preservation, collection and 
processing of vital evidence”.
The main types of forensic available to investigators are:
• blood and blood pattern analysis
• DNA
• fingerprints
• footwear impressions
• fibres
The skill of the SIO is to integrate the findings into the investigation in an 
evidential manner.
• Telephone Analysis
The role of communications data is of major importance to all modern inquiries. 
All the SIOs will appoint a telephone liaison officer who will act with the TIB at 
New Scotland Yard who act as a SPOC (single point of contact) with the 
telephone companies. The billing and usage will be analysed and cell site
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analysis will help to determine the suspects/victims exact position at the time of 
the crime.
• Automatic Number Plate Recognition System.
The management and use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition basic searches 
of ANPR data can be used to assist in any investigation where a vehicle is or may 
be involved. This is used to record number plates of vehicles in certain areas and 
can be used in a static camera or mobile camera and records all number plates in 
a given area at a given time.
• E-FIT
These are images of suspects created by a trained team of E-Fit officers who 
compose likenesses after taking a detailed statement from a witness. The E-Fit 
officers give percentage likenesses following the creation of an E-Fit.
• Use of the Media
Stelfox (2009:112). The management of the media is now an important part of the 
SIOs investigation and Fiest (1999 pv) showed that most SIOs spent between 
20% and 40% of their time dealing with the media in the first two days of an 
enquiry. Soothill, Peelo et al (2002) found two prevalent themes underpinning 
which homicides were selected. Sexual homicides were most likely to be reported 
as were homicides where there was a financial motive or a revenge motive. Innes 
(2001) observes that “poorly managed media strategies can be detrimental to the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of an investigation”. As Innes (2003:89) states 
the “rituals of display, family press appeals, reconstructions and interviews with 
the SIO are an important investigative resource”.
• BBC Crimewatch
The cases that appear on the programme always come from the police, with the 
production team working closely with officers on each appeal. Reconstructions 
are at the heart of the programme. They have proved an effective investigative 
tool and often lead to vital calls from the public
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• Crimestoppers
Crimestoppers is an independent charity with an anonymous phone number that 
members of the public can ring to give information on crime. Originally launched 
as the ‘Community Action Trust’, the charity was renamed Crimestoppers in 1995, 
by then covering the whole of the UK, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
• Intelligence
There is a “complexity of choice” that is affected by the use of information and 
intelligence and the social organisation of police decision-making. Police 
intelligence may be broken into three types, prospective intelligence (gathered in 
advance), retrospective (i.e. arrest records) and analytically developed data such 
as forensic material and inferential work.
• The Use of Outside Experts
Kind (1987) states that the SIO must keep in mind the “conditions which are 
associated with his use of specialists these include:
• formulating the problem as clearly as possible
• listening attentively and patiently to any reply
• accepting any qualifications as to reply
• accepting that the answer may not be the one the SIO wants or expects
Kind further adds that SIO’s should avoid using specialists as a “last resort” in 
unsuccessful investigations. Robertson and Vignaux (1995:195) describe expert 
evidence as an exception to the opinion rule. They pose the question (p199) 
“Who is an expert?” and whether the expert should be in some recognised branch 
of study or “organised body of knowledge” (p200). “The important point about 
expert evidence (p219) is its correct interpretation by the court. Sir Ronnie
Flanagan (2004) concluded in his report of the Soham case that there would be
benefit in holding a meeting of all expert witnesses to enable them to compare 
evidence.
• Offender Profiling
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The NPIA now has full time Behavioural investigative Analysts and where possible 
provision of an approved BIA will be provided by the NPIA. It is ACPO policy that 
ACPO approved BIAs should be engaged to offer behavioural investigative 
advice. The BIA hopes to enhance the SIO’s understanding of the offence and 
offender by providing an additional perspective.
• Geographical Profiling
This specialism will only be of use in limited cases. The NCOF now have three 
British Police Officers trained as geographical profilers. The OSS has its own 
Geographic Profiling capability. Geographic Profiling is an investigative support 
technique to provide assistance in cases of serial violent crime and attempts to 
determine the most probable location in which an offender resides or works.
• Pathology
There are 43 pathologists registered with the Home Office and the Policy Advisory 
Board on Forensic Pathology monitors them. SIOs/IOs attend the post mortem 
with the approved pathologist and are witness to the examination. This can be a 
time to question the pathologist about possible causes of death and how injuries 
were caused. An exhibits officer also attends the post mortem and a police 
photographer. The pathologist’s findings are crucial to the strategies employed by 
the SIO. This was another issue, which was at once a solving factor and in two 
cases proved to be a negative factor. This was due to one pathologist who gave a 
wrong cause of death in two separate cases. This made the SIOs job impossible 
as the cause of death was not given as murder and therefore a murder 
investigation could not take place.
• Use of the National Police Improvement Agency
The NPIA Specialist Operations Centre provides a single point of contact for 
police forces and key partners requesting information, advice or support in relation 
to covert techniques, major crime, critical incidents and uniform operations.
• Confessions
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Traditionally this was the kingpin of any murder enquiry. All efforts would have 
been focused on the apprehension of the suspect and the subsequent interview.
• Interviews with Suspects
The British Police use the PEACE Interview Framework which consists of the 
following 5 phases:
• Planning and Preparation
• Engage and Explain
• Account, Clarification and Challenge
• Closure
• Evaluation
The PEACE Interview Framework is entirely compatible with the framework for 
interviewing witnesses that is described in Home Office (2007) Achieving Best 
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on Interviewing Victims and 
Witnesses, and using Special Measures.
• interviews of Witnesses
As stated under witness management there has been a shift from interviewing of 
suspects to the interviewing of witnesses. The introduction of The Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) according to Williamson (1993:35) “Probably 
resulted in a reduction in the use of grossly oppressive Interviewing.”
• Dying Declaration
In two cases the victims made a declaration while they were dying of who 
committed the murder. This represented a solving factor of 0.6%.
• Identity Parades
These are carried out in nominated police stations known as ID suites. These are 
permanent units led by a uniform Inspector who specialise in the running of 
identity parades where the witness in a crime is given the opportunity to pick out a 
witness. The identity parades were usually asked for by the CPS to provide 
evidence by witnesses. These are time consuming and resource intensive.
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• Witness Albums
These can now be shown on a laptop to potential witnesses and the witnesses no 
longer have to visit Scotland Yard for the photographs to be shown The 
photographs should be shown in blocks of 12 and supervised by a Sergeant.
• Financial Analysis
This is an increasingly useful investigative tool. All MPS Boroughs now have 
Borough Financial “Payback Units”. The role of fully trained financial investigators 
has increased and most teams will now have a fully trained financial investigator. 
The new Proceeds of Crime Act allows investigators to seize suspect’s assets. 
The Act is split into a number of different Parts. Part VII of the Act deals with 
money laundering. The Act expanded, reformed and consolidated the UKs 
criminal money laundering offences. Most of the offences under the Act apply to 
all individuals and businesses in the UK. However, some of the offences apply 
only to those doing business in the “regulated sector”. The details of a victim’s 
financial history and a suspect’s history can reveal important background 
information to the SIO.
2.8 Implementation of the SIOs Strategy
The implementation of a SIOs strategy is of paramount importance to the successful 
conclusion of inquiries. Most complex decisions will require an "elaborate co­
ordinated implementation process" Russo & Schoemaker (2002). There is a need to 
overcome flawed assumptions by monitoring actions and real time information. For 
SIOs there is a need to have regular updated information from the MIR and the 
enquiry team. The SIO should test and update assumptions. The SIO must be 
concerned with the early discovery of a murder weapon, the retrieval of forensic 
evidence and other physical evidence. A well directed search strategy taken with all 
the details available in the early stages of an investigation is crucial.
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The next strategy involves a review of all information collected and analysed, this 
can happen at various stages of the investigation. This strategy involves a constant 
and repetitive questioning of the evidence. There is a need to assess all lines of 
enquiry constantly to avoid a myopic stance that may set the enquiry on the wrong 
course. The Yorkshire Ripper case illustrated the pitfalls in simply addressing one 
line of enquiry to the exclusion of others (see chapter 5).
Fiest & Newis (2003) discuss anticipative skills in “Watching the Detectives” and they 
state that a good SIO would anticipate risks to the enquiry while setting parameters 
for the investigation. Similarly they comment that a good SIO would concentrate on 
what actually secures the conviction and that “the timing of strategic decisions can 
be critical” (p vi). Their research showed that an investigation may benefit from the 
performance of some actions soon after the incident, as both a means of focusing 
resources and increasing the chance of “utilising a line of enquiry to the exclusion” of 
others.
The Core Investigative Doctrine (Centrex now NPIA 2005) has advice on the timing 
of an arrest “The decision about timing depends on a number of factors”. These 
include the safety of the public and witnesses, likelihood that the suspect will commit 
further offences or is he likely to destroy, conceal or falsify evidence. The SIO 
should also consider whether further surveillance is required. Cook & Tattersall 
(2008:330) discuss delaying arrests which may reduce the delay in taking a case to 
court or maximise evidence recovery opportunities. The power of arrest comes 
under Section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act . The solving decision 
frame continues to expand over the length of an investigation whereas the legal 
frame is static. More information and intelligence will flow into enquiries at different 
stages providing more alternatives for the SIO to consider. Establishing the 
relationship between the victim and suspect becomes a starting point for the building 
up of a more elaborate analysis of the specific themes that operate in the given case. 
Chapters Six and Eight discuss the phasing aspect of decision-making in more detail 
and they look at the early stages of decision-making in inquiries to the evaluation of 
evidence to the charging of the suspect.
62
2.9 Conclusion
This chapter argued that NDM offered the most comprehensive framework to 
examine SIO decision-making in murder investigations. The chapter delineated the 
skills and qualities required of the SIO decision maker and presented two frames, i.e. 
the formal legal frame which is the static codification limiting and constraining what 
the investigating officer can do and the more informal investigative frame which is 
the dynamic use of police investigative and technical tactics. A frame is a mental 
construction consisting of salient current events and associated past events, 
experiences and beliefs and tells the decision maker what to expect. The frame may 
be in error but until feedback, or some other information makes the error evident, the 
frame is the foundation for understanding the situation and for deciding what the 
outcome will be. The next chapter seeks to explore this by means of qualitative 
interviews with experienced Senior Investigating Officers to elicit the key factors 
associated with solving murders and their styles of decision-making.
C h a p te r  3 : M e th o d o lo g ic a l C o n s id e ra t io n s
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3.1 Introduction
There is an extensive body of literature on research methodology in which there is a 
debate about the relative merits of qualitative and quantitative research methods with 
often the two approaches being frequently represented as adversaries in a 
methodological battle (Hammersley, 1996). Quantitative methodology by and large 
is derived from the positivist scientific tradition which assumes an objectively defined 
reality which it is the researcher’s task to delineate. Thus all relationships are 
findable and verifiable. Quantitative research systematically samples large numbers, 
utilises statistical analytic procedures and strives to be reliable and rational.
Qualitative research is based on a phenomenological position. Patton (1990) says 
that the phenomenolical approach is a focus on understanding the meaning events 
have for people being studied. Qualitative researchers set out to gain deep 
understanding of some phenomenon experienced by a carefully selected group of 
people. Qualitative research offers the investigator the opportunity to alter and even 
add data collection processes during the study (Haar 1992: 6). Central to qualitative 
methodology is the constructionist position which assumes that meaning resides with 
human beings who create their own understanding of reality based on their own 
experiences (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992). Qualitative methodology tends to use 
words rather than numbers and takes an interpretive, naturalistic approach in which 
the researcher’s task is to discover those meanings through an interaction exchange 
between them and their respondents. It is in the research process that meanings are 
constructed.
This chapter explains why the approach taken in this thesis is a mixed methods 
design in which both qualitative and quantitative methods are employed because in 
this way the research questions can be answered better.
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3.2 Qualitative or Quantitative or Both?
There is a view expressed in the research literature that qualitative and quantitative
methods are competing paradigms and cannot and should not be combined. This
position is expressed by (Guba & Lincoln 1988:111) as follows:
"Like water and oil, they will not mix; indeed to put them together is to adulterate 
each with the other”
On the other hand there is the view expressed by Tashakkori & Teddlie (2003:p14) 
that:
“Mixed methods are useful if they provide better opportunities for answering our 
research questions.”
They chart the reasoning for this, and argue that mixed methods:
• can answer research questions other methodologies cannot (i.e. can address 
explanatory and confirmatory questions at the same time thereby generating 
and verifying theory);
• provide stronger inferences (thereby complementing and overcoming 
weaknesses in single method approaches);
• provide greater diversity of divergent views (and where findings converge, 
greater confidence can be expressed in the findings).
A mixed methods approach involves both quantitative and qualitative techniques of 
data collection and analysis, either sequentially or in parallel (Tashakkori, & Teddlie 
(2003). Hammersley (1995) argues that there is no fixed relationship between the 
use of qualitative and quantitative methods and further that a particular stage in a 
research programme provides space for a number of research method possibilities. 
It may be that qualitative work is an essential preliminary to quantitative research or 
that it supplements quantitative research or that it can be employed as 
methodological triangulation, where a number of methods are used and the results 
compared for convergence. Alternatively a multi method approach examines a 
particular phenomenon or topic on several different levels and represents a 
complementary set of analysis whereby each layer employs the most appropriate 
method. Such a position ensures that where a range of methods is available, the
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most appropriate are deployed to ensure the research questions are addressed in
the most parsimonious and advantageous ways.
As Hammersley (1992:55) states:
“What is involved is not a crossroads where we have to go left or right A better 
analogy is a complex maze where we are repeatedly faced with decisions, where 
the paths wind back to one another. The prevalence of the distinctions between 
quantitative and qualitative method tends to obscure the complexity of the 
problems that face us and threatens to render our decisions less effective than 
they might otherwise be".
Mixed methods research is formally defined here as the class of research where the 
researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, 
methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study. Mixed methods 
research uses multiple approaches in answering research questions, rather than 
restricting or constraining researchers’ choices. It is an expansive and creative form 
of research, rather than limiting. It is inclusive, pluralistic, and complementary, and it 
suggests that researchers take an eclectic approach to method selection and the 
thinking about and conduct of research. The research was constructed using mixed- 
model designs by mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches within and across 
the stages of research. This research had three stages
• stating the research objective,
• collecting the data,
• and analysing/interpreting the data;
According to Morgan (1998) and Morse (1991), consideration may also be given to 
the dimension of paradigm emphasis (i.e. whether to give the quantitative and 
qualitative components of a mixed study equal status or to give one paradigm the 
dominant status). Time ordering of the qualitative and quantitative phases is another 
important dimension, and the phases can be carried out sequentially or concurrently. 
In this study the author carried out sequential research.
The strengths of a mixed method approach are:
• the researcher can generate and test a grounded theory
• mixed methods can answer a broader and more complete range of research 
questions because the researcher is not confined to a single method or 
approach;
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• a researcher can use the strengths of an additional method to overcome the 
weaknesses in another method by using both in a research study;
• the approach can provide stronger evidence for a conclusion through 
convergence and corroboration of findings;
• it can add insights and understanding that might be missed when only a 
single method is used;
• qualitative and quantitative research used together produce more complete 
knowledge necessary to inform theory and practice.
There are weaknesses of the mixed method approach:
• they can be difficult for a single researcher to carry out both qualitative and 
quantitative research, especially if two or more approaches are expected to 
be used concurrently;
• it may require a research team
• the researcher has to learn about multiple methods and approaches and 
understand how to mix them appropriately
• methodological purists contend that one should always work within either a 
qualitative or a quantitative paradigm;
• it can be more time consuming.
It was decided to use a mixed method approach in this research because of the 
broad and qualitatively different research questions and the emphasis on practical 
application; the materials, i.e. SIO accounts, archived cases and relevant documents 
were accessible to the researcher who has familiarity with these resources as a 
routine part of his professional activities, and these advantages outweighed the 
potential disadvantages.
A mixed method approach is used in research to increase the accuracy and to co­
ordinate knowledge through a “synthesis of the findings from different approaches” 
(Gilbert 2001:128). As he states “a qualitative method may follow after a qualitative 
one to flesh out the quantitative findings which are given priority”. The interviews 
conducted with the SIOs were triangulated by the study of the Holmes database.
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The mixed method research can help build a wider picture of the issue under 
investigation. The mixture of methods in this research ensures that the design is 
responsive to the research problem. The key research questions are the 
identification of the:
• solving factors in ‘hard to solve’ homicide cases
• decision frame for Category A and B murder cases
• key processes in decision-making in hard to solve inquiries
• decision-making styles of SIOs and their relation to decision-making theories
• contribution of investigative processes and SIO style to the resolving of crimes 
and length of time taken to resolve cases
In tackling these issues a number of sources of relevant information were at hand. 
There are key inquiries critical of police decision-making that source the origins for 
current practices. Hence archival documentary sources and content analysis was 
the appropriate means for extracting recommended good practice which has, over 
the years, been absorbed into modern police procedures.
Innes (2003) Kemp, Norris and Fielding (1992) show that investigative decisions can 
be more fully understood if they are conceptualised as dynamic and interactional. 
Investigative decision-making tends to be context specific and occurs in complex 
environments. The naturalistic paradigm was found to fit these important 
assumptions. NDM research has yet to offer a coherent method to get at the 
complex details of decisions made in real-life settings. Other approaches simulate 
decision situations. For example, Dunn & Kirsner (1989:17) employed concurrent 
“think aloud” commentaries by emergency personnel which overcomes the inference 
problem but allows after the fact rationalisations which may not be consistent with 
real-time decision-making. Crego & Alison (2004) facilitated anonymous group 
discussions among police officers, where officers recorded information on a laptop 
and their anonymised comments were shared by the whole group. This neutralises 
the high stakes element out of real-world decision-making. These different 
approaches vary in their attempts to capture the richness of data, generalising 
findings and obtaining in-situ live commentaries. But all acknowledge the difficulties
3.3 Methodological Rationale
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in doing so. The current research employed interviews to tap into the knowledge 
and experiences of Senior Investigating Officers. The cases these officers were 
investigating are logged into the Holmes computer system which enabled the 
creation of a quantitative data which can analyse structural features of enquiries, and 
permit modelling to identify the key solvability factors.
In order to reveal the contribution that solving strategies and SIO style contributed to 
the successful arrest and charging of a suspect, it was deemed important to analyse 
a large number of cases, hence the use of the Holmes archived cases.
The table below summarises the resources, data collection and analytic methods 
used.
Figure 3.1 Methods Used to Address Different Aspects of the Research
Study One Study Two Study Three Study Four
Historic Police SIO Archived
analysis procedure experiences cases
Data resources
Policy documents X X
Manuals X
Reports X X
Data base X
Practitioner X X X
experience
Data gathering
methods
Literature search X X
Interviews (SSIs) X X
Secondary analysis X
Data analyses
Content analysis X X X
Document analysis X X
Descriptive statistics X
Multivariate statistics X X
Interviewer Bias
The author is himself an experienced detective and has served as an SIO. The 
author’s background is similar to most of the SIOs interviewed. There was therefore 
a degree of self-consciousness about how this may affect the data collection.
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Certainly being a serving officer greatly assisted in gaining access to both the SIOs 
and their investigated cases. There was a degree of trust and confidence that might 
not have been accorded a non-police researcher. However, this familiarity may also 
have contaminated the interview content. In order to obviate this, the terms of the 
interview were carefully set out in a letter to the interviewees and was reiterated at 
the start of the interviews. The letter emphasised the anonymity of the research and 
the interviewees right to withhold any information that they thought sensitive. The 
researcher stressed the need for each SIO to explain their approach from their 
experience in their own words. A non-police interviewer may be perceived as more 
objective, but has a degree of naivety about police practice and procedures. It was 
easier for the present researcher to ask supplementary questions about the 
investigative process being himself familiar with it.
interviewer bias may happen as a consequence of trying to “clarify” questions when 
such clarifications are not part of the study protocol or when certain words are more 
emphasised during the interview. The interviewer may have a desire to help the 
respondent and may become too sympathetic to the problems and conditions of the 
respondent. Particular problems may arise if the respondent does not understand 
the question as stated and the interviewer tries to simplify the question. When 
questions are open-ended, this can involve the interviewer in formulating probing 
questions that go beyond the remit of the research. The response effect whereby 
respondents display an eagerness to please the interviewer or antagonism develops 
between the interviewer and interviewee are some of the problems that may occur.
To guard against these possible contaminating influences, firstly, the researcher was 
aware of the potential to bias the data. Secondly, by carefully wording the rules of 
engagement between the researcher and respondent, the interview material was 
collected within clear guidelines set down at the start of the interview. As SIOs were 
commenting on investigated cases, these cases could and were retrieved from the 
Holmes archive. Respondents were aware that the present researcher had access 
to the cases and would be undertaking further research using them. The bogus 
pipeline (BPL) is a research paradigm designed to reduce the effect of self- 
presentational motivations on attitudinal and behavioural self-reports first 
implemented by Jones & Sigall (1971). Among other factors, such as subjects’
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generosity in rating others, their desire to please the experimenter, and their possible 
lack of interest in the experiment, the desire to present oneself in a favourable light 
and to give answers that are perceived as socially acceptable was, and continues to 
be, a concern to researchers, since the presence of such biases can yield inaccurate 
results (Jones and Sigall, 1971). Proponents of the BPL argue that this procedure 
more effectively mitigates these factors than traditional paper-and-penci! 
questionnaires. One approach social psychologists have used to circumvent social 
desirability is attaching the person to an impressive but useless machine. People
respond more truthfully when they are led to believe that this “bogus pipeline” can
reveal the actual truth. The belief that the archived cases were a means to verify the 
SIOs accounts of their cases acted as a proxy BPL.
The SIOs were not keen to have the interviews tape recorded, partly because of 
sensitivities to the use of recorded interviews in matters of discipline. Whilst the use 
of note-taking enhanced the trust and contributed to rapport building, it did present 
some practical difficulties in capturing all the interview data. The use of note-taking 
emphasised that the interview was a research activity rather than a discipline 
interview. The researcher is an experienced verbatim note-taker and did not feel 
construction of the SIOs accounts too onerous. The interview template is shown in 
Appendix 3 and the letter to the SIOs is shown in Appendix 4.
Interview Details
Sample Size
This study deals with the two-year period from 2001-2003 for Category A and B 
murders within the London area. In all the MPS dealt with 190 murders 2001/2 and in 
2002/2003 they dealt with 196. There were 166 murder investigated by the
interviewed SIOs during this period.
The benefits of Semi Structured interviews
The semi structured interview techniques encourages two way communication 
because they are less intrusive to those being interviewed. Interviewees can ask 
questions of the interviewer. Often the information obtained from semi-structured
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interviews will provide not just answers, but the reasons for the answers. The author 
found the interviewees (SIOs) openly discussed sensitive issues more openly and 
offered their thoughts and experience on decision making and solving cases. This 
technique is used to collect qualitative data by setting up a situation (the interview) 
that allows a respondent the time and scope to talk about their opinions on a 
particular subject. It uses open-ended questions, some suggested by the researcher 
and some arise naturally during the interview the researcher tries to build a rapport 
with the respondent and the interview is like a conversation. Questions are asked 
when the interviewer feels it is appropriate to ask them. They may be prepared 
questions or questions that occur to the researcher during the interview. The wording 
of questions will not necessarily be the same for all respondents.
The main benefits of SSIs are as follows (Sociological Research Skills) 
(www.socioioav.ora.uk)
1. Positive rapport between interviewer and interviewee. Very simple, efficient 
and practical way of getting data about things that cannot be easily observed.
2. High Validity. People are able to talk about something in detail and depth. 
The meanings behind an action may be revealed as the interviewee is able to 
speak for themselves with little direction from interviewer.
3. Complex questions and issues can be discussed / clarified. The interviewer 
can probe areas suggested by the respondent’s answers, picking up 
information that had either not occurred to the interviewer or of which the 
interviewer had no prior knowledge.
4. Pre-judgement: Problem of researcher predetermining what will or will not be 
discussed in the interview is resolved, with few “pre-set questions”.
The possible disadvantages of SSI are:
1. Depends on the skill of the interviewer (the ability to think of questions during 
the interview, for example) and articulacy of respondent.
2. It can be time consuming and expensive.
3. Not very reliable -  difficult to exactly repeat a focused interview. 
Respondents may be asked different questions (non-standardised).
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4. Depth of qualitative information may be difficult to analyse (for example, 
deciding what is and is not relevant).
All these issues were considered and SSI adopted. The author was less concerned 
with time issues but felt that SSI was the best method to obtain the relevant 
information. It was very important to obtain sufficient detail and depth of information 
while giving the SIOs the right to clarify issues. The gaining of trust was important to 
elucidate.
3.4 Analytic Strategy
The documentary analyses of past enquiries and reports required an analytic 
scheme to extract the relevant findings from inquiries into historic cases in order to 
locate the origins of modern police murder investigative practice. This sets out the 
origins of processes incorporated into current procedures. Examination of the 
doctrine and manuals builds on this work together with interview with a current SIO 
to enable the present roles and processes to be mapped out. This is a necessary 
prior step to then extracting the qualities and skills brought to the investigation by 
SIOs and an elucidation of their decision-making styles within the parameters of the 
murder investigation procedure. The means to achieve this was a qualitative 
methodology of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 31 Senior Investigating 
Officers. The cases that these officers worked on are archived in Holmes. Thus a 
secondary quantitative analysis to look for patterns within these cases was deemed 
necessary to establish consistency of the key solving factors previously identified by 
the SIOs. A summary is presented below.
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Figure 3.2 Analytical Strategy
3.5 The Research Procedures
Reliability of Data Sources
Given that different data sources are consulted for the purposes of this thesis, 
different criteria of reliability and validity are adopted. The documents pertaining to 
commissions of inquiry are themselves subject to codes of conduct and carry legal 
status. These are held to be reliable sources. The data collected from the SIO 
interviews were by means of a semi structured interview. Here sufficient direct 
quotations are presented to source the interpretations made and thus offer some 
transparency to corroborate the themes presented in the coding dictionary. The 
Holmes data is entered on the system by the Major Incident Room (MIR) team as 
described in Chapter 6. The data entry is checked and audited by the Central 
Holmes team managed by a Detective Sergeant and an Executive Support Officer.
C h a p te r  4 ; S tu d y  O n e : D o c u m e n ta ry  A n a ly s is  o f  H is to r ic  
In q u ir ie s
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the themes from over 40 years of reviews and public inquiries 
into major murder inquiries. Jones, Grieve and Milne (2008:471) argue for the 
importance of an historical context when examining murder investigations. They 
looked at the Sir Lawrence Byford’s inquiry into the Yorkshire Ripper cases and Sir 
William Macpherson, report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The present 
chapter extends the scope of an historic review by including more cases than Jones 
et al. Six key themes emerge consistently from this overview. The purpose of the 
chapter is to highlight the main issues from the investigations researched and the 
problems identified and how these contribute to modern investigative practice. The 
reviews and inquiries also reveal the skill set needed by the modern SIO and the 
need for careful “phasing” of the SIO’s strategies and actions. The different phases 
in an enquiry are highlighted.
Looking across the historical pattern of inquiries, it does seem that at particular 
historical moments certain high profile major crime investigations come to be seen 
as problematic in some fashion. At such times, the conduct of the investigation itself 
is reviewed, either through a public enquiry, some other framework, or internally, with 
the result that some reform in policing practices is recommended. The introduction 
of significant reform is not a continuous progression and development; rather it tends 
to occur in ‘fits and starts’.
4.2 Method
Some of the cases researched were high profile and therefore self selecting 
(Lawrence Case) whilst others such as the Confait case were less well known but 
fulfilled the criteria shown below.
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The inquiries researched represent not only the high profile cases of the last 40 
years but those which significantly changed police procedure. Some cases were 
chosen due to their high profile and others, such as the Byford report, had not been 
published at the inception of the research but more details were made available 
during the research period and this material has been included. This was a desk 
study looking at the relevant enquiry reports and publications occurring within the 
last 40 years of reviews and inquiries. The frequency with which official inquiries into 
homicide are commissioned has increased over the last seven years. This phase 
started with the Macpherson report in 1999 into the murder of Stephen Lawrence 
and the review of the Damilola Taylor murder in 2002. The following year saw 
inquiries into the death of Victoria Climbie and Dame Janet Smith’s inquiry into the 
murders committed by Dr Harold Shipman. In 2004 Sir Ronnie Flanagan of the 
HMIC published a report into the murders at Soham.
A summary table below highlights the key enquiries and major findings and notes the 
chances in investigative practice that resulted.
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Figure 4.1 Table of Recommendations and Themes Identified from Inquiries
Case 
Date of 
Murder
Name and date 
of Inquiry/ 
Review
Critical Issues Main Recommendations
Themes
Identified
Maxwell
Confait
1972
Confait enquiry 
by Sir Henry 
Fisher1977
Uncorroborated 
confession 
evidence from 
main suspect 
having mental 
age of 8.
Tape recording of interviews 
Introduction of appropriate adults 
safeguards for vulnerable persons
Accountability of 
the Police 
treatment of 
vulnerable 
suspects 
Skills of SIOs
Sarah Harper, 
Susan Maxwell 
& Caroline 
Hogg
1983-1986
No public inquiry Failure to identify 
suspect
Catchem database introduced Systematic
failures
Management of 
flow of info
Stephen
Lawerence
murdered
22/041993
Report by Sir 
William 
MacPherson 
February1999
Failure to arrest 
suspects. 
Failure to keep 
victim’s family 
informed
FLOs introduced 
Decision Logs introduced.
Racial Awareness Training introduced 
Murder Review Groups introduced.
Systematic
failure
Skills of SIO
Victoria
Climbie
25/01/2000
Lord Laming’s 
Public Inquiry 
2001-2003 
reported 2003
Crimes involving 
children should be 
dealt with 
promptly and 
efficiently
Managers from each service should be 
involved in the investigation.
Police must take the lead in any joint 
investigation
Supervisory officers must take an 
active role in investigations
Skills base 
Phasing 
Lack of co­
ordination within 
the command 
structure.
Damilola
Taylor
27/11/2000
Taylor Murder 
Investigation 
Review Report 
of the Oversight 
Panel
December 2002
Post charge 
strategy
Use of mobile 
phone evidence
Management of 
witnesses
Evidential opportunities presented by 
new technologies
Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) 
updated on witness interview strategy 
Amendments to the MIM on witness 
interview strategy, the management of 
cell confession evidence and the 
evidential opportunities presented by 
new technologies.
Lack of clarity 
among senior 
officers
Skills of SIO’s
Phasing
Dr Shipman’s 
Murders
Dame Janet 
Smith July 2003. 
Inquiry into 15 of 
Dr Shipman’s 
patients
In July 2003 she 
reported on the 
police enquiry of 
1998
Pattern of deaths 
not identified
Standard of (behaviour) of CS Sykes 
and DI Smith fell below standard GMP 
should assign SIO’s with “appropriate 
experience”
Protocol should be established for low 
volume crimes.
New medical coroner service to 
provide specialised advice 
CPS to provide a solicitor with medico 
legal advice
Lack of clarity 
among senior 
officers
Holly Wells 
and Jessica 
Chapman 
August 
2002
HMIC report 
2004
Suspect arrested 
but took 10 days.
Lack of clarity 
among SMT
Misunderstanding 
of Critical Incident
Understanding of Critical Incident 
Systematic shortcomings due to 
amount of information.
MIR not fully staffed.
Confusion at Senior Management 
Level
“Golden hours allowed to slip by" 
“Inability to appreciate the value of the 
information available”
Poorly focused investigation.
Skills of SIO’s
Management of 
information
Lack of clarity 
among senior 
officers
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The key issues from each report were extracted and themed to represent the six 
recurring themes as follows:
• Clarity and leadership among senior officers;
• Skills of SIO's;
• Systematic failures;
• Phasing of inquiries;
• The role of the Major Incident Room/information management;
• Individual investigative strategy failures.
These will now be explored in some detail.
4.3 Clarity and Leadership Among Senior Officers
Smith and Flanagan (2000) mentioned leadership as one of their 22 skill clusters for 
reflective SIOs. They state that an SIO (p52) has to be seen to “take responsibility 
for the investigative process, providing direction”. The SIO also needs the ability “to 
bring pertinent information out of the team”. The “good leader” also had the ability to 
facilitate and maintain control and the ability to inspire the team. The Yorkshire 
Ripper case highlights how the direction given by the SIO can influence the rest of 
the enquiry. Peter Sutcliffe was interviewed by the police nine times between 1975 
and his arrest in January 1981. Interviewing officers were influenced by the 
credence given to the letters and the tape sent by a hoaxer. The common theme 
running through the Byford report, the Lawrence case, the Shipman case and the 
Soham case is one of the competencies of the SIO. It would seem that the wrong 
people were in charge throughout. Leadership is a key skill for SIOs and is crucial to 
the success of the investigation and appeared problematic in the inquiries examined. 
The question of leadership was not confined to multiple investigations but was 
subject to comment in single homicide cases such as the Damilola Taylor case. In 
both the Taylor case and the Yorkshire Ripper case the lack of a clear leader 
compromised the effective deploying of resources. One person cannot solve the 
case by themselves and it is the responsibility of all those who assume even partial 
leadership in key areas.
79
The Damilola Taylor review (December 2002) commented that the primary
investigation was well resourced:
1However; the structure of the oversight and support arrangements and 
the direct involvement of very senior staff with different roles and 
responsibilities did lead to a lack of clarity on occasions about where 
ultimate responsibility for the case as a whole lay".
The review (recommendation 3.3.14) felt that the comprehensive nature of these
arrangements and the involvement of so many senior officers may have created a
false sense of reassurance about the progress of the investigation. This became
"unhelpful when new problems were encountered in the secondary investigation after
the suspects had been sent for trial''. In recommendation 3.3.16 the panel
considered that the MPS should be commended for the scope and scale of Chief
Officer involvement however they commented:
"Certain lines of enquiry were implemented but not adequately resourced (i.e. 
cell confession evidence). It lacked overall direction and control. The analytical 
work that was commissioned at an early stage in the enquiry could have been 
dealt with in a more timely and effective way”.
The panel recommended (recommendation 17) that the use of Gold, Silver and 
Bronze command structures along with other support groups in difficult cases be 
continued but their nomenclature, purpose and accountability should be “clear". The 
extent to which these types of command structure can be applied to homicide 
investigations needs to be clarified. It was further recommended that ACPO identify 
options and disseminate clear guidance on this issue. The lack of clarity resulting in 
blurred lines of responsibility can be one of the unintended consequences in critical 
incidents. This can lead to blurred lines of responsibility and can overcomplicate the 
line of command. In the Shipman case the normal police command structure caused 
confusion. There was a lack of clarity within the command structure and people with 
the right skills were not placed in the correct positions.
In the Shipman Inquiry, Dame Janet Smith commented that the primary reason the
investigation failed was that:
"Chief Superintendent Sykes instructed Dl Smith to undertake the investigation 
and kept to himself the responsibility for supervision”. He was culpably wrong 
in both respects”.
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Dame Janet goes on to criticise CS Sykes in other respects and states that he 
should have realised that DI Smith was out of his depth and it should not have been 
DI Smith’s decision to decide when the investigation was to be closed. Dame Janet 
also criticises DI Smith, while she recognises that many of his mistakes were the 
result of his lack of experience of criminal investigations of a non-routine nature.
In the report on the Yorkshire Ripper case, Byford (Home Office) commented they 
were:
"Firmly of the view that in cross-border series there needs to be one officer in 
overall command of the investigation with authority to direct the course of the 
investigation in all the police areas directed”.
This was the advent of the principle of “OIC” the “Officer in Overall Command". The
Byford report further states that:
"It was ACC Oldfield’s failure to lead effectively which paved the way for the 
loss of confidence in and loyalty to his inquiry policies”.
In the Soham case there was confusion in the first part of the enquiry around the
definition of critical incidents. Sir Ronnie Flanagan (HMIC) felt there could have been
"A greater sense of urgency and that the good momentum achieved by the 
initial officer could have been consolidated”.
This re-created an understanding of the term “critical incident”, everyone in the 
command structure has to use and understand the same definition. Sir Ronnie’s 
report also comments on the difficulties involved in running a “twin-track 
investigation” where the SIO is considering the possibility of both abduction and a 
murder. Smith and Flanagan (2000) mentioned leadership as one of their 22 skill 
clusters for SIOs. They state that an SIO has to be seen to take “responsibility for 
the investigative process, providing direction” (p52). The SIO also needs to have the 
ability "to bring pertinent information out of the team”. The Yorkshire Ripper case 
highlights how the direction given by the SIO can influence the rest of the enquiry. 
Peter Sutcliffe was interviewed by the Police nine times between 1975 and his arrest 
in January 1981. Interviewing officers were influenced by the credence given to the 
tetters and the tape sent by a hoaxer.
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Smith and Flanagan (2000) defined the 22 skill categories for effective SIOs. They 
felt that SIOs should have the ability to think laterally and they pointed to the lack of 
formal processes by which investigators can learn. One criticism was that the 
mechanisms used by detectives to draw valid inferences are not formalised; there is 
no recognisable process in the way that other professionals record their methods by 
which they arrived at their conclusions.
The 22 skills were divided into 3 clusters; investigative ability, knowledge levels and 
management skills. The 22 skills are as follows:
• Adaption
• Administrative competence
• Appraisal of information
• Appropriate delegation
• Awareness of future developments
• Optimising the knowledge of the team
• Decision-making
• Handling expert advice
• Innovative investigative style
• Interpersonal skills
• Investigative competence
• Leadership
• Maintaining the professional integrity of the investigation
• Managing the communication process
• Organising the mechanics of the investigation
• Planning the investigation
• Resource management
• Staff development
• Staff support
• Strategic awareness
• Team building
• Underpinning knowledge
4.4 Skills of SIOs
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The skill base of the SIO features in all the inquiries and reviews. Table 4.2 below 
shows some of the key skills mentioned in the various inquiries.
Figure 4.2 Skills of the SIO
Skills of SIO Relevant enquiry
1. Effective Decision-making. The SIO should “Exercise critical faculties” Macpherson Inquiry
2 .Planning the Phasing of inquiries Climbie / Taylor Review 
/ Byford Report
3. Scene Management /Understanding “critical incident” management HMIC Soham Report
4. Witness management Macpherson Report / 
Soham
5. Strategic investigative awareness/ability to manage investigation Macpherson Inquiry 
HMIC Soham
6. Experience of major investigations Shipman enquiry / 
Taylor review
7. Management of the MIR Macpherson
8. Leadership Byford / Macpherson / 
Soham Review
The ACPO (2005:72) Core Investigative Doctrine states that flawed decision-making 
has been responsible for failed investigations). The doctrine further mentions 
“verification bias” where the detective allows their early assumptions in a case to 
determine their investigative strategy. Jones, Grieve and Milne (2008) describe this 
as being where the investigator adopts an hypothesis as to what has happened and 
then finds the evidence to support his/her hypothesis and excludes contradictory 
evidence. This was very evident in the persistence of the Ripper investigators to 
build their enquiry around the tape of “Wearside Jack” which later was established to 
be a hoax.
Adhami & Browne (1996) also suggest that detectives lack inferential judgement and 
are prone to making fundamental biases and errors of judgement. The failure to act 
quickly as in the Soham case and the continuation of wrong decisions in the 
Lawrence case were real life illustrations of the need for skilled decision-making by 
SIOs. Lord Macpherson stated that each bad decision was compounded. The
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selection of lines of enquiry and the current prioritisation and allocation of resources 
to support them is a key feature of a successful and cost effective investigation. The 
inquiries and reviews accentuate the need for careful phasing of the SIOs strategies 
and actions. The following examples show the need for planning:
• Recommendation 92 of the Climbie inquiry states that crimes involving 
children should be dealt with promptly and efficiently.
• Recommendation 3.3.16 of the Taylor Review stated that the enquiry lacked 
overall direction and control. The analytical work that was commissioned at 
an early stage in the enquiry could have been done in a more timely and 
effective way.
• In the Yorkshire Ripper case a major error was the excessive credence given 
to letters and the tapes from John Humble and therefore Peter Sutcliffe should 
have been arrested earlier.
• Recommendation 3.3.16 of the Taylor Review stated that the enquiry lacked 
overall direction and control. The analytical work that was commissioned at 
an early stage in the enquiry could have been done in a more timely and 
effective way.
• Post Charge Management Recommendation 4.5.3 of the Taylor review 
states that a number of lines were incomplete at the time the defendants were 
charged. These included the examination of 86 shoes and trainers seized 
from suspects and the analysis of mobile telephones.
Definition of expertise
Shanteau (1992:252) states that “Experts are operationally defined as those who 
have been recognised within their profession as having the necessary skills and 
abilities to perform at the highest levels. Kahenamn and Klein (2009:519) discuss 
the difference between the sources of intuition. They state that intuitive judgements 
arise from experience and skill are the province of NDM while intuitive judgements 
that arise from simplifying heuristics are within Heuristic bias. They are concerned 
with how skilled intuitions can be distinguished from heuristic based intuitions. The 
environment in which the decision-maker operates must provide valid cues to the 
nature of the situation and the decision-makers must have an opportunity to learn the 
relevant cues. Kahenamn and Klein found that people in professions marked by
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standard methods, clear feedback and direct consequences for error appear to 
appreciate the boundaries of their expertise. They conclude that “skilled judges are 
often unaware of the cues that guide them”. The professional usually acquires 
expertise by prolonged education and experience along with specialised knowledge. 
This acquired skill distinguishes experts and the SIO is expected to be an expert 
within the Police Service. SIO training offers a two to three week course and the SIO 
is now expected to maintain their professional expertise to PIP Level 3 within the 
Police Service. However no manual describes the intricacies of decision-making that 
the SIO is expected to utilise to solve murder cases. No manual of guidance sets 
out the types of decision-making theories that an SIO should use at different stages 
of an enquiry. The professional intuition that the SIO is expected to display is not 
recorded or explained, this research attempts to discriminate between imperfect 
intuition and skilled intuition. The simplifying or “satisficing” elements of potential 
decision-making are elements that any decision-maker has to utilise to make sense 
of a complex situation.
Fiest and Newiss (1999) looked at the number of actions raised during six hard to 
solve murder cases in the UK. They found that the number of Holmes actions raised 
solely by an SIO was at its highest during the first day of an investigation and 
accounted for 84.4% or 173 out of the 205 actions raised. They found three 
explanations for this:
• Some of these actions relate to the internal functioning of the major enquiry 
team.
• Some actions may be raised by the SIO in order to “jump the queue”, i.e. to
be raised immediately rather than wait for it to be processed through the
usual incident room procedures.
• The SIO raises many actions during the early stage of an enquiry
• On the basis of their experience.
Stelfox (2009.7) tries to define the qualities required of an investigator as follows:
• "Knowledge of the law, information profiles, human behaviour, investigative 
techniques and investigative strategies”
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• Skills in applying the techniques of criminal investigation such as 
interviewing and searching
• Understanding of how to apply their knowledge and skills to solve specific 
problems
Reasoning Skills/Intuition
The SIO needs to make use of their experience and utilise Innes (2003) four 
reasoning styles:
• commonsense reasoning
• indexical reasoning which is based upon the interpretation of information 
accounting for the local context of the crime.
• analogical reasoning associating a present problem or situation with the past 
problems or situations and using that knowledge to develop a solution to the 
new one.
• legal reasoning the SIO needs to know that the case meets evidential 
standards.
These four reasoning skills highlight the key interpretative and inferential skills 
needed by an SIO to evaluate and review cases constantly throughout their lifetime. 
Case construction work and assembling an evidential narrative often constitute a 
significant proportion of the overall investigative effort in self solving cases (some 
Category B cases and Category C murder cases). Constructing inferences is an 
important investigative tool in advancing understanding of how and why a crime 
happened.
Qualities of Decision Makers /Qualities of SIOs
Heirs & Farrel (1987) describe the qualities looked for in decision-makers as 
“judgement, perseverance and strength of character”. He comments that these 
qualities are “vital but, by themselves, they are not sufficient”. The time has arrived 
in Heirs view where we can no longer afford to have key decision-makers as 
generalists or specialists; we need “professional thinkers”. Decision-making should 
be the same for the manager/SIO what logic is for the mathematician and what the 
scientific method is for physicist -  the basic foundation of his or her professionalism
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“It is concerned with making predictions and judgements”. Bhushan and Rai (2004) 
comment that “strategic, operational and tactical agility in quickly responding with 
maximum concentration of effort is the absolute requirement for decision-makers”. 
By standardising “tactical and operational optimisation techniques “helps to eliminate 
variables. They note the benefits of a “thorough, systematic framework based on a 
scientific footing to analyse and make appropriate decisions in the world as it is 
today”. Expert judgements are important as long as they can be justified. In 
formulating a decision-making framework a core strategy should be established with 
the constants of the environment whereas the basic strategy will deal with the 
variable features. A hedging strategy will also be needed to counter unforeseen 
circumstances. Heirs is of the opinion that the “truly professional manager is the one 
who recognises thinking talent”. An ideal team would have different “thinking 
strengths” with “different varieties and combinations of imagination, experience and 
reason”.
Organisational factors also play a part in the decision-making process where there 
can be inadequate control and communication process for junior officers to 
contradict the dominant viewpoint. SIOs had to consider an average of four solving 
factors per case. Variations in decision-making can depend on the task and not 
necessarily the individual
Morgan (1990) in his book “The Police Function and the Investigation of Crime 
carried out research on how crimes were solved from the police practitioner’s 
viewpoint and the middle managers viewpoint. He states that (p53) the
“overwhelming impression is that information and local knowledge are believed to be 
the most important factors in solving crime”. In over 400 statements from Police 
Officers he concludes that there is general agreement that information collected from 
all people involved in a crime, local knowledge and access to information were the 
most important factors in leading to a successful conclusion. This reflects the 
research carried out in this thesis where different sources of information were 
identified as solving factors.
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Rivett (1994) describes skill “as the delivery of technique under pressure” and having 
practical knowledge in combination with ability. He sees decision-making as a 
scientific process with various stages.
• define the problem
• collect data and information
• analyse the data
• produce a hypothesis
• test the hypothesis
• implementation
4.5 Systematic Failures
Public inquiries into high profile cases such as Stephen Lawrence and Damilola 
Taylor case have exposed failures in police systems and in policy. The Home Office 
(report 25/04 Nicol, Innes, Gee and Fiest) on reviewing murder investigations noted 
that many of the serious failures that occur in modern day complex inquiries “need to 
be analysed and understood at a systematic rather than individual level" (p13). The 
report suggests that the organisational culture of the police produces a situation 
where "provided the investigation gets a result any problems, errors and mistakes 
can be glossed over” (p15). The structuring of the organisational systems and 
processes can improve the reliability of the investigative process. In the majority of 
cases researched, there were shortcomings in the resourcing and cross-checking 
capability of the Major Incident Room (MIR). This applies to both pre and post- 
HOLMES incident rooms. In the Cannock Chase murders of 1966 the police did not 
identify the murderer in four years. There was no co-ordination between MIRs as 
they were in two force areas and pre-Holmes there was no obvious method of 
sharing information.
4.6 Phasing of Enquiries
Planning and phasing major inquiries were referred to in the Climbie inquiry, Lord 
Laming stated that an investigation should have begun straight away, apart from
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leaving a message with the police photographic department and doing a police 
database check to see if the family were known, PC Dewar did absolutely nothing to 
begin investigating the crime before she went off duty at 7pm. Lord Laming identifies 
issues such as the failure to follow investigative leads. One of these was the 
identification of the scene and this is a general theme that emerges in various 
inquiries. Lord Laming identifies the following as investigative leads that should have 
been followed:
• The scene of the crime should have been identified
• Statements should have been arranged and obtained from all medical staff
• A full forensic medical examination should have been carried out 
« The likely suspects should have been identified
• Arrangements should have been made to speak immediately to Victoria, 
independently of any of the suspects, to allow her to speak freely about what 
had happened to her.
The Macpherson Inquiry (into the death of Stephen Lawrence) in recommendation
46.9 stated that when the investigation was handed over to a new SIO:
“he perpetuated the wrong decisions made in the vital early days. He did not 
exercise his own critical faculties in order to test whether the right decisions had 
been made. His fundamental misjudgement delayed arrests until 7th May”.
In recommendation 46.11 the report comments that the Detective Chief
Superintendent allowed himself to go along with the weak and un-enterprising
decisions made by his SIOs in which he had been himself directly involved. The
report criticises the failure to arrest one of the main suspects, Clifford Norris and to
remove him from the scene as “unexplained and incomprehensible”.
Recommendation 46.23 states that there can be no excuses for such a series of
errors, failures and lack of direction and control. Each failure was compounded.
Failure to acknowledge and to detect errors resulted in them being effectively
concealed. The second investigation:
“attempted to salvage the situation and had no criticism of the investigation by 
Mr Mellish. Indeed it was managed with imagination and skill”.
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4.7 Management of The Major Incident Room (MIR)
In the Yorkshire Ripper case, Byford criticised the amount of “unprocessed 
information” in the MIR. Bilton (2003:302) comments that the Byford team found 
“major flaws in the inquiry and its management in total disarray". The Byford team 
found a lack of “standing back and reviewing evidence” in the Ripper investigation. 
The Milgarth Incident Room became overwhelmed and had the direct effect of 
frustrating the work of SIOs and junior detectives alike. The management of the flow 
of information into the MIR was the subject of concern in many of the inquiries. The 
Yorkshire Ripper case was the most glaring example of the failure to provide an 
adequate database or system to link cases or identity killers across force 
boundaries. This was also true with the Maxwell, Hogg and Harper murders and the 
Soham case. The Lawrence report stated that the MIR was “inadequately staffed” 
(recommendation 46.14) and that the incident room was not supervised by 
responsible and trained staff. The report felt that this may account for the many 
delays apparent in the processing of information reaching the investigation team.
Lord Laming’s enquiry into the death of Victoria Climbie made a recommendation 
(p104) that PITO must ensure that Child Protection Team’s have an effective Child 
Protection database and IT management system. In the Soham case the HMIC 
report stated that high priority leads were not followed up for one week.
4.8 Individual Investigative Strategy Failures
In the Climbie Investigation Lord Laming states that an investigation should have
begun straight away after police were notified of the original problems and numerous
detailed investigative leads were not adopted by the investigators. They were
criticised by Lord Laming for not taking the basic steps required in a major
investigation and therefore vital evidence was lost. In the Soham case the HMIC
report stated that there could have been a greater sense of urgency and they
commented that the:
“good momentum achieved by the initial officers dealing with the 
incident could have been consolidated”.
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The report stated that high priority leads were not acted on for more than one week. 
There was an inability to appreciate the golden hour’s value of the information 
generated by the enquiry. Senior officers failed to act on valuable evidential leads 
gathered by officers on the ground. The HMIC report stated that the first SIO 
refused to deploy extra officers on the night the victims went missing. The report 
states that:
"there was a lack of clarity around who was running the investigation 
and Mr Beck was unable to maintain control and knowledge of the 
overall strategic direction of the investigation’’.
Many witnesses are naturally unfriendly to police enquiries and the SIO has to draw 
up strategies accordingly, in many of the cases mentioned here witnesses were 
reluctant to come forward and this necessitated the SIO seeking a proactive use of 
recruiting informants and seeking intelligence from other means.
In the Macpherson Report Chapter 19 refers to the handling of witnesses.
Paragraph 19.41 states:
"There was an overriding need in this investigation to turn information into 
evidence and to turn reluctant witnesses into willing ones in order to obtain the 
fullest possible information and evidence. There is no doubt that the 
investigation team felt rightly that there were witnesses who were saying less 
than they actually knew. Most, if not all, of these witnesses were young people, 
sometimes with a basic antipathy to the police. In these circumstances a tactful 
and sensitive approach to witnesses was needed. ’’
The review panel looking at the Damilola Taylor case reported in Recommendation
3.8.9 that the evidential opportunities that presented themselves during the 
investigation were correctly identified and acted upon. Recommendation 3.8.10 
however states that one potential source of evidence, the mobile telephones, was 
not properly pursued and the acquisition of potential evidence deriving from the 
footwear of one suspect, in the Shipman enquiry the DI reported to the Chief 
Superintendent on the 24th March 1988. Dame Janet Smith comments that “it 
appears that (the) DI may have been looking for a motive rather than gathering 
evidence” (p49). Dame Janet comments that it was clear that the DI "did not think 
carefully about the information he had received from Mr Loader, the Superintendent 
Registrar at Delfield. He did not test the validity of the statistics he was given” (p51).
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She further reports in Chapter 13 that Dl Smith did not progress the enquiry for two 
weeks at the start of April, then “there was a flurry of activity” (p93). Dl Smith then, 
in a discussion with Chief Superintendent Sykes, stated that there was no foundation 
for the concerns expressed by the original complainant and the first police 
investigation was closed. Dame Janet states that Dl Smith never understood the 
issues concerned “never had a plan of action” (p134) and that he was allowed to 
close the investigation before it was complete. By not acting in the early part of April 
Dl Smith failed to arrange an autopsy on Mrs Aida Warburton’s body.
The Damilola Taylor Review (Recommendation 3.2.8) remarked on the need to 
appoint people with the skills “to do the job”. This was echoed in Recommendation 
20 of the Flanagan Report. The Taylor Review stated that in exceptional 
circumstances MPS managers should consider looking beyond immediately 
available staff before the appointment of an SIO and an investigation team is made. 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan comments that the Chief Officer should (Pimlico Lecture 
12.1.05). Sir Ronnie stated that senior officers often failed to act on valuable 
evidential leads gathered by officers on the ground.
4.9 Summary
Past inquiries can help inform present or future investigative strategies by providing 
best practice and highlighting potential pitfalls. There is a need to retain 
organisational learning from past inquiries to assist future generations of 
investigators. Table 5.1 shows the systematic failures repeated over the last 40 
years. In the majority of cases researched, there were shortcomings in the 
resourcing and cross-checking capability of the Major incident Room. This applies to 
both pre and post HOLMES incident rooms. The role of the MIR and Holmes since 
the Yorkshire Ripper case illustrates the progress that has been made although, in 
the case of the Harper, Maxwell and Hogg murders, the suspect was not within the 
system. In the report on the Stephen Lawrence case Lord Macpherson stated that 
the MIR was “inadequately staffed” (Recommendation 46.14) and that the incident 
room was not supervised by responsible and trained staff. But the review panel in 
the Taylor case commented (Recommendation 6.5) that there were “demonstrable
92
differences” between the police handling of the investigation of this case and that of 
the Stephen Lawrence case.
The issue of leadership among senior management teams and SIOs was discussed 
in the inquiries researched. The Byford Report on the Yorkshire Ripper case states 
that “it was ACCs Oldfield’s failure to lead effectively which paved the way for the 
loss of confidence in and loyalty to his inquiry policies”. In the Taylor Review, the 
panel stated that “the use of Gold, Silver and Bronze command structures, along 
with other support groups in difficult cases, be continued but their nomenclature, 
purpose and accountability should be clear”. The creation of these command 
structures has had an unintended consequence in that it can lead to a lack of 
accountability. Byford in his report on the Yorkshire Ripper case stated that the skill 
base of SIOs, Superintendents and ACCs must be kept to a high level. Byford 
stated that the “career development, training and selection of senior detectives 
needs to be improved so that they have the management skills to meet the demands 
of an enquiry on the Ripper scale”. The skills shown in Table 1 illustrate the breadth 
of skills needed by the modern SIO.
The management of information is paramount to the success of an investigation. 
Child Protection Team’s should have an effective Child Protection database and IT 
management system. In the Soham case the HMIC report stated that high priority 
leads were not followed up for one week and valuable time was lost. Byford 
commented that the MIR in the Yorkshire Ripper case was “overwhelmed by a welter 
of information”. The Holmes system was an advance following the Yorkshire Ripper 
case but in cases such as the Soham inquiry it cannot cope with the amount of 
information generated in high volume cases.
The inquiries have shown consistent themes including the fact that the wrong people 
were in charge of inquiries at critical stages of major inquiries. Bad decisions, as in 
the Lawrence case, were compounded. Police must learn from these cases, the 
recurrence of the same themes over time causes concern. Similarly the unintended 
consequences shown must be monitored to ensure that the recommendations of 
inquiries do not become a burden in themselves. The next chapter picks up on
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these themes and explains how police murder investigative practice developed and 
identifies the skills sets required of detectives and Senior Investigating Officers.
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C h a p te r  5 : S tu d y  T w o : C u r re n t  P o lic e  In v e s t ig a t iv e  
P ra c t ic e
5.1 Introduction
There are relatively few expositions of major police investigations with the notable 
exceptions of Brookman (2005), innes (2003) and Kind (1987). The aim of this 
chapter is to identify and map out the key processes involved in modern murder 
investigations. In doing so the previous review of origins of UK practice identified in 
the previous chapter will be drawn upon and the current practices of the Metropolitan 
Police Service are described in some detail as it is this force that provided the cases 
upon which later analyses are presented.
The research involved a literature review of academic literature and police manuals 
along with Police Research Group publications. In addition one key informant was 
recruited to elicit information about the sequencing of the investigative process and a 
flow diagram was constructed.
5.2 Brief History of Murder Investigations
In 1842 the murder of Daniel Good resulted in the appointment of a unit of “detective 
policemen" although it was not until 1877 that the Metropolitan Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) was established. The original establishment comprised 250 men 
with a lawyer, Howard Vincent, as the director. The only forensic techniques 
available to these officers were plaster of Paris to make footprints and the occasional 
use of informants. Lord Trenchard was appointed as the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner in 1931 to modernise police detection in particular. A Metropolitan 
Police Training School was established. In response to Trenchard’s report, a Home 
Office committee was established to study detective work internationally. This 
concluded that Britain lagged behind the rest of the world. As a consequence 
regionally based clearing houses were established to act as intelligence and 
information centres supplying identification details on criminals.
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Two celebrated cases in the 1960s; the Moors Murder and the Cannock Chase 
murders, highlighted the problems that detectives were facing in the second half of 
the Twentieth Century. These were the issues of the increased mobility of the 
population and the dispersal of crime across police jurisdictions. The problems were 
exacerbated in the Yorkshire Ripper case of the 1970s and 1980s and led to the 
introduction of the computer package Holmes, the Home Office Large Major Enquiry 
System. The report by Sir Lawrence Byford, following the Ripper trial led to the 
Home Office Circular 114/82 and this gave guidance to all forces concerning the 
management of large murder investigations. These innovations are detailed in 
Chapter 3.
The Murder Investigation Incident Room Standardised Administration Procedures 
(MIRSAP) was introduced in 1982. The inception of Area Major Incident Teams in 
1987 and the establishment of the Serious Crime Directorate heralded the 
introduction of permanent murder teams and SIOs in the Metropolitan Police. HMIC 
Report (2000) commented that permanent teams enabled the retention of expert 
staff and the creation of the culture and ethic of teamwork. They also pointed out the 
disadvantages of dedicated teams losing local knowledge and the restricted sharing 
of expertise outside the team. In 1995 the National Crime Faculty (now NPIA 
Specialist OPS) at the Police Staff College was set up as a centre of excellence to 
support SIOs. The National Crime Faculty provides behavioural and geographical 
profilers and an expert database. An internal police notice (Special Police Notice 
6/99) heralded the introduction of the SIO decision log which should “accurately 
reflect the strategic and important tactical decisions made by SIOs as they relate to 
the investigation”.
The Macpherson Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence resulted in a raft of 
changes in how the MPS dealt with murders. These new measures developed the 
use of decision logs and Family Liaison Officers (FLO) and the permanent creation 
of Murder Review Groups. The Murder Review Groups heralded the introduction of 
a body to scrutinise major inquiries in the MPS. They can pass on good practice and 
objectively analyse every part of a case. Table 6.1 below provides a timeline of key 
events and murder investigations that were critical in the development of modern 
police investigative practices.
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Figure 5.1 Timeline of Key Events and Significant Murders in the UK
1839 The Metropolitan Police formed
[ 1878 The Metropolitan CID established
1901 Fingerprint Branch formed
1931 Lord Trenchard appointed as Police Commissioner in London
1935 The first Metropolitan Police Laboratory formed
1963-1965 The Moors Murders
1966 The Cannock Chase Murders
1972 The Confait Murder
1974 Judith Ward convicted
1975-1981 The Yorkshire Ripper Murders and attacks
1975 The Guildford Four convicted
1976 Stefan Ivan Kisko convicted
1976 The Maguire family convicted
1979 The Bridgewater Four convicted
1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (The Philips Report)
1982 The Byford Report on the Yorkshire Ripper case
1982 MIRSAP introduced
1985
1986
(HO/114/82) Prosecution of Offences Act saw the introduction of the Crown 
Prosecution Service
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) introduced j
1986 Tottenham Three convicted
1987 AMIP introduced in the MPS
1988 Serious Crime Directorate introduced
1988 ACPO Murder Manual introduced
1990 The Cardiff Three
1991 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice established by Lord Runciman
1993 Stephen Lawrence murdered
1995 National Crime Faculty introduced
1997 Report on Stephen Lawrence Inquiry by Lord Macpherson
1999 Decision Logs introduced for SIOs
2000 Homes 2 rolled out nationally
2000 Damilola Taylor murdered in Peckham
2002 Murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in Soham
2003 Sir Ronnie Flanagan’s report on the Soham murders
2005 Centrex Core Investigative Doctrine
2008 HMIC Report on Suffolk Murders
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Two methods were employed in addressing the research requirement to detail the 
current murder investigative practices. Firstly the relevant manuals and codes of 
recommended practices were identified and secondly one experienced SIO (who 
was not part of the SIO study) was approached to be interviewed about murder 
investigative practice.
Sampling Sources
The key sources were identified as
• NPIA Core Investigative Doctrine ( formerly Centrex)
• ACPO Murder Manual
• MIRSAP
• Police Research Group studies 
Procedure
The key sources were scrutinised and the recommended practice and procedures 
have been delineated. This was augmented by reference to the Metropolitan Police 
Service processes and procedures. The interview with the expert SIO was 
deconstructed and a detailed sequences of roles, actions and their purposes was 
mapped out.
5.3 Method
98
At present UK practice places heavy reliance on the ACPO (Association of Chief 
Police Officers) Murder Manual. The basic aims of police enquiries are described in 
the ACPO murder manual as follows:
• Preserve life.
• Preserve scene.
• Secure evidence.
• Identify victims.
• Identify suspects.
The preservation of life is paramount in any initial investigation along with the 
preservation of the scene. This may involve preservation of several scenes i.e. 
where the victim was attacked and then where the victim’s body was deposited. If 
vehicles were involved or the murder weapon was dumped elsewhere then these 
would become separate crime sites. The SIO may have to contemplate multiple 
sites. There is a need to secure evidence before it is lost either items that could be 
used evidentially or witness testimony. In the early stages of an investigation it may 
be difficult to identify the victim before forensic analyses have been undertaken or 
prior to enquiries of missing person or intelligence databases. The identification of 
suspects usually takes longer and may require the investigation of CCTV, the 
questioning of witnesses and forensic results amongst other considerations.
The Major Crime Investigation Process from the ACPO Murder Manual, along with 
the NPIA Core investigative Doctrine, is the major internal sources of investigative 
advice for SIOs. The ACPO Murder Manual breaks the investigative process into 
five stages as follows:
• Stage 1 - Fast Track Actions
• Stage 2 - Theoretical Processes or Investigative Process
• Stage 3 - Planned method of investigation
• Stage 4 - Suspect Enquiries
• Stage 5 - Disposal
5.4 Results
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Flanagan and Smith (2000) also described five stages in investigative techniques:
• Initial crime scene assessment.
• Assessing incoming information.
• Selecting appropriate lines of enquiry.
• Case development.
• Post charge management.
The executive of National Police Training in the UK Centrex decided in 2000 to 
formalise the principles of detective investigation in what they termed doctrine. The 
Centrex Core Investigative Doctrine (2005) describes the stages of Criminal 
Investigations including:
• Instigation of criminal investigations can occur through reports from the 
general public or from referrals by other agencies. Investigations can 
commence because of the identification of linked series or from cold case 
reviews.
• Initial investigation will be complete when all accounts are obtained from 
victims and witnesses along with fast track actions and the crime scene 
examination has been instigated.
• Investigative evaluation throughout the enquiry.
• Suspect management - PACE Code of Conduct states that “there must be 
some reasonable .objective grounds for the suspicion based on known facts 
or information which are relevant to the likelihood the offence has been 
committed”.
• Evidence evaluation arises when sufficient evidence has been amassed and 
there is sufficient material to justifty charging a suspect. This requires 
consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service.
• Charge, when the suspect is charged the matter proceeds to court.
• Case management, the SIO will be responsible for managing the case 
including disclosure under Part 1 of the CPIA.
• Court preparation, case papers and exhibits.
The role of the SIO is described in the ACPO Murder Manual as:
• Performing the role of Officer in Charge of an investigation
• Develop and implement the investigative strategy
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• Develop the information management and decision-making systems for the 
investigation
• Manage the resources allocated to the investigation
• Being accountable to chief officers for the conduct of the investigation.
A key theme of the ACPO Core Investigative Doctrine plots a set of principles which 
included “investigative thinking”. Jones, Grieve and Milne (2008) describe this as the 
use of hypothesis generating within the context of the investigation of a murder. 
These are the suggested explanations for a group of facts which require further 
verification or accepted as likely to be true.
5.5 The Metropolitan Police Service Structure for Investigating 
Homicides
Senior Investigating Officer
A Senior Investigating Officer is set at Detective Chief Inspector rank in the 
Metropolitan Police Service. In other British forces the SIO role may be set at 
Superintendent level. The Metropolitan Police investigate the greatest number of 
murder cases in the UK and the permanent establishment of murder teams (MIT) 
within the MPS reflects the high rate of investigations in the Greater London Area. 
Ail Senior Investigating Officers now have to undertake a five week SIO course 
comprised of classroom teaching and active participation in a simulated murder 
case. This takes place in a “Hydra Suite” which asks the SIOs to work together in 
syndicates to look at the tactical and strategic management of major crime 
investigations. All SIOs now have to be trained to Level 3 under the 
Professionalising Investigative Practice (PIP) process
There are four Business Groups in the MPS
• Territorial Police (TP) which oversees policing in London’s Boroughs,
• Specialist Operations (SO),
• The Serious Crime Directorate (SCD)which oversees all Serious Crime
• Central Operations (CO).
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The Murder Investigation Teams (MIT) form part of the SCD and are known as the 
Homicide and Serious Crime Command, SCD1. They undertake the following 
reactive investigations:
• ail murder, manslaughter (where there is likely to be culpability for the loss of 
life) and infanticide offences;
• deaths within the workplace or mass disaster where culpability for the loss of 
life is likely to be an issue in a criminal court;
• attempted murder where the evidence of intent is unambiguous and where a 
risk assessment identifies substantive risk to life (see note below);
• high risk missing persons where there is a substantive reason to suspect life 
has been taken or is under threat;
• Linked series of two or more rapes, which are beyond the capability of one 
borough's resources to manage (see note below); and
• Other critical incidents which, due to their serious nature, complexity or 
organisational risk, require Holmes 2 support.
The MPS had 25 MITs throughout London over three sites at the time of the 
research, there is now one unified command. The Serious Crime Directorate figures 
show that an SIO deals with an average of four Category B murders over a two year 
period. There were a total of 16 Category A murders within that period. These 
figures are skewed by the fluctuation of SIOs within the murder teams. This is due to 
retirements, promotions and transfers. There is no set time tenure for SIOs to stay in 
Post. A snapshot from the MPS Management Information Murder Index (MIM! 
database) statistics show on one day (20/06/2007) that an average of 2.25 cases 
was fully active per Murder Investigation Team. Each SIO had 3.6 quiet cases and 
8.6 stationary cases i.e. cases that await Court or closure. Figure 6.2 below shows 
the structure of a MIT.
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Figure 5.2 Organisations of the Murder Investigation Teams (MIT) (London 
Homicide Manual)
MITs are made up of one Detective Chief Inspector, three Detective Inspectors, six 
Detective Sergeants and 27 Detective Constables and 4-5 civilian staff. The core 
teams within MIT teams have the following skill-base:
• One Detective Sergeant as case officer
• One Detective Constable trained as a Family Liaison Officer and secondary 
role of identification and CCTV
• A Detective Constable trained in the primary role of Suspect Interviewing 
Officer and secondary role of Disclosure Officer
• A Detective Constable trained in the primary role of House to House officer 
and secondary role of Family Liaison
• A Detective Constable trained in the primary role of Identification and CCTV 
Officer and secondary role of Exhibits Officer
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• A Detective Constable trained in the primary role of Disclosure Officer and the 
secondary role of Suspect Interviewing Officer
• Two Detective Constables trained as MIR Receivers
• The remaining four Detective constables trained in the Vulnerable / Significant 
Witness procedures
• An intelligence team will be attached to the MIR with the following skills
• The Detective Sergeant to be a trained NCIS reader, Undercover 
Manager and have an awareness of Informant Handling
• A Detective Constable trained in Telephone Intelligence
• A Detective Constable trained in Financial Investigation procedures
SCD1 Homicide and Serious Crime command provide Homicide Assessment 
Teams. These officers are comprehensively briefed by their SIO as to how they 
should discharge their responsibilities. HATs are required to attend, as soon as 
practicable, all incidents of suspicious unexplained death and shootings involving the 
discharge of a lethal barrelled firearm.
Role of the Major Incident Room
The hub of any major enquiry is the MIR where a great amount of information is 
gathered from members of the public, enquiry officers and other sources. The 
information is channelled using a set of administrative procedures into a system 
whereby the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) can direct and control the course of 
the enquiry.
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MIR Structure
Figure 5.3 Structure of the Major Incident Room (London Homicide Manual)
Reciever 
Detective constable
Researcher
Registrar
DC
Office Manager 
Detective Sergeant
Document reader 
In putter
Typist
The principal objectives of an incident room controlling a major investigation are to:
• provide the SIO with an accurate record of all relevant information relating to 
the crime, together with police enquiries made and the results thereof;
• show the state of the enquiry and how much work in the form of outstanding 
actions remain to be done at any one time;
• enable police officers making enquiries to establish whether any person has 
previously come to the notice of the investigation;
• provide enquiry officers with a ready means of acquiring all the information 
that the system contains about their enquiry subjects;
• keep records highlighting people, vehicles, addresses, telephone numbers or 
any other factors which have become the subject to the enquiry, so that such 
records are capable of in-depth analysis and from which lines of enquiry and 
suspects may be identified, thereby enabling the SIO to direct special 
attention to them;
• act as a means of historical reference so that in a long running enquiry, 
officers joining the investigation team can have easy access to major policy 
decisions taken earlier in the enquiry, and the rationale behind those 
decisions;
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• facilitate, at the appropriate time, the production of reports for legal 
consideration;
• ensure that all information is recorded and linked with the standardised 
procedural rules of the system. Information can thereby be readily retrieved 
to aid the SIO and his/her supporting teams to establish priorities and to 
ensure the best possible use is made of staff and equipment so that enquiries 
are made speedily and effectively and the results are subject to detailed 
analysis;
• ensure that all the recognised protocols have been applied to facilitate
necessary research to be made across different databases and, where
appropriate, for investigations to be linked; and
• provide a database from which it is possible to undertake self and internal
reviews and which will support reviews of the investigation by external
sources.
MIR staffing roles and levels are as follows:
Office Manager Detective Sergeant
Receiver Detective Constable
Registrar Police Officer / Police Staff
Document Reader Detective Constable
Action Manager Detective Sergeant
Indexer(s) Police Staff
Officer / Police Staff
Exhibits Officer Detective Constable
Disclosure Officer Detective Constable
Researcher Accredited Police Staff
Analyst Accredited Police Staff
Typist Support Staff
MIRSAP dictates the day to day running of the incident room, the allocation of work 
and the review of information within the system. The five key roles mentioned above 
all receive specialised training. The Receiver is responsible for the immediate 
review of all the information that comes into the system. The Receiver will set the
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priorities for information to be entered into the system and will keep the SIO informed 
of any developments. The Statement Reader will review all statements and will 
determine follow up actions. The Indexer, usually civilian, reads all the statements 
and using a standardised procedure index all the relevant points so that key words 
can be cross-referenced across the system. The Action Allocator also determines 
the timeframe within which tasks should be completed. Each action is allocated into 
the system and given a number and a time period for completion.
Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
Holmes is a computerised information storage and retrieval system, with five major 
aims:
• To provide the SIO with an accurate record of the state of the inquiry;
• To determine the current status of the inquiry (i.e. the number of actions 
generated);
• To provide the inquiry with an accurate record of all people, exhibits, phone 
numbers and vehicles;
• To assist in the cross-referencing of information and intelligence;
• To assist legal decision-making including disclosure issues.
The Holmes system is governed by a set of standardised procedures called MIRSAP 
(Major Incident Room Standard Administration Procedures) which govern the input, 
processing and accessing of data. Only authorised users trained in Holmes can 
access the system. Holmes is supported by MIRSAP (Major Incident Room 
Standard Administration Procedures) described above. As Maguire and Norris state 
(1992) in their report on the Conduct and Supervision of Criminal Investigations that 
a computerised system does not necessarily remove “weaknesses, errors or even 
malpractice" from the inquiry. They conclude that the Holmes system while not 
eliminating problems caused by human fallibility “encourages a more thorough, 
professional and rational approach to major investigations with inbuilt checks and 
balance’’.
The Holmes system is divided up into indexes to allow quick retrieval of vital facts 
and cross-checking. The Murder Manual explains (8.2.12) that the:
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"crux of successful indexing of material within Holmes is the ability to form 
a timely, accurate and searchable database of information, with a trail of 
accountability”.
Holmes uses the following different indexes:
• Category - This index should be one of the most important sections of the 
database and properly used can be a vital tool in progressing the investigation 
to a successful outcome. PO Murder Manual (Reference 8.2.16) states that 
“careful consideration must be given to creation and naming of categories 
which requires initiative and flexibility of mind”. The Murder Manual lists 
categories.
• Exhibits package on Holmes chronicles each piece of evidence that comes 
into the inquiry. The SIO will nominate an Exhibits Officer who will be 
responsible for the movement and chronicling of each piece of evidence.
« Personal Descriptive Forms (PDF) are taken of all persons contacted and 
entered on the Holmes system. These are checked against all descriptions 
on the Holmes system.
• Location - All locations are entered on the system
• Nominal - Each person that comes into the investigation will be given a 
nominal number so that they can be cross checked.
• Organisation - shows all key nominals and persons of interest and their 
relationship criminal or otherwise.
• Sequence of events - this draws on all information held within the system This 
presents ali key times and dates contained within the database to assist the 
SIO
• Telephone - shows all linked telephone calls between nominals within the 
system.
• Vehicle - shows all vehicles mentioned within officers reports and statements.
The system issues actions to Police Officers to conduct enquiries and then these are 
resulted by the Major Incident Room staff. HOLMES 2 was introduced in 2000 and 
improves the ability of the Incident Room to assist the investigation process of a 
major inquiry easier by helping investigating officers make sense of the vast amount 
of information generated. It identifies and plots lines of enquiry, keeps track of vital
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pieces of evidence and reduces paperwork. Criminals are increasingly on the move 
and an inquiry could need the input of more than one police force. HOLMES 2 
enables several forces to work together on the same investigation, allowing them to 
add information to just one HOLMES 2 Incident Room. Fiest and Newiss (1999) 
looked at the number of actions raised during six hard to solve murder cases in the 
UK. They found that the number of Holmes actions raised solely by an SIO was at 
its highest during the first day of an investigation and accounted for 84.4% or 173 out 
of the 205 actions raised. They found three explanations for this:
• Some of these actions relate to the internal functioning of the major 
inquiry team.
• Some actions may be raised by the SIO in order to “jump the queue”, 
i.e. to be raised immediately rather than wait for it to be processed 
through the usual incident room procedures.
• The SIO raises many actions during the early stage of an inquiry
The normal range of Holmes actions generated in a Category B inquiry is between 
700 to 1,000 actions. A Category A murder inquiry could generate about 1,500- 
1,800 actions. Holmes is not an analytical tool and cannot be used as such. 
Analysts are attached to each murder team and are used in various capacities 
according to the nature of each operation. An artificial intelligence system may be 
needed to provide an IT back up for SIOs. This may assist SIOs in the decision­
making process by providing statistical back up. Adhami and Browne (1996:64) 
discuss the feasibility and minimum requirements of a decision support system for 
SIOs. They advocate that a combination of sources of expertise would be needed to 
develop a decision support system. A retrieval mechanism linked to Holmes with 
access to an experience base “could significantly improve the functionality of 
Holmes”.
Strategies
Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) have been trained to group their decision­
making process around these aims. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) have 
developed a series of strategies (described in the SIO decision log) associated with 
the achievement of these aims. The strategies are:
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• Forensic Strategy
This is to co-ordinate and focus the collection and interpretation of physical 
evidence. DNA evidence has revolutionised investigations over the last ten years 
and has been the single biggest advance in forensic investigation since the advent 
of fingerprint evidence. While the SIO has to rely on the expertise of their Crime 
Scene Managers (a mixture of Detective Sergeants and civilian support staff) their 
decision-making process around forensic matters requires great deliberation. Ail 
SIOs have separate forensic strategy meetings with a selected group.
• Arrest Strategy
This refers to a pre-determined strategy by the SIO to arrest people in a particular 
order. This is a strategy used to put pressure on the suspect. The priority in which 
people are arrested may influence the level of information given to police. The 
suspect will know that friends or suspects have been arrested and they may 
change their allegiances or give a version of events explaining the murder.
• Family Liaison Strategy
Since the Macpherson Report this has been undertaken by dedicated officers and is a 
relatively new tool for investigators. The primary role of a Family Liaison Officer is that of 
an Investigator and the successful enquiries were those that used the role appropriately.
• Media Strategy
The police may use the media to help identify suspects, locate witnesses or to reassure 
the public. In the MPS the media strategy would be carried out with the DPA (Directorate 
of Public Affairs). Fiest (1999) discusses the management of the media in serious crime 
investigations and noted the level of media interest in these cases placed huge demands 
on the SIO and some SIOs felt that they were spending 20% to 40% of their time in the 
first few days of an inquiry.
The management of press conferences and the appointment of an appropriate 
person to speak to the media are other considerations for the SIO. Other 
considerations are:
• The management and sustaining of press interest
• The disclosure and generation of information
• Targeting audiences, general relations with the press, victims, victim’s 
relatives and communities
• Personnel issues what methods of working need to be agreed with the Press 
Liaison Officer
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The Centrex (NPIA) Core Investigative Doctrine (2005:100) outlines the media 
strategy that SIOs can consider in investigations. These include:
• Identifying the offender
• Locating the suspect if a suspect has been identified. Future ID procedure
should not be comprised.
• Witness Appeals
• Reassuring or warning the public - this should be part of a wider risk
assessment and should form part of a preventative strategy.
• Press conferences
• Search strategy
Searches are needed at crime scenes to look for physical evidence and victims and / 
or witnesses. Searches are needed to trace escape routes and to search for CCTV. 
Fully managed searches are carried out by Police Search Advisors (POLSA) using 
trained personnel. These include fingertip searches of the scene and detailed 
searches at suspect’s addresses.
5.6 Mapping the Murder Investigation Process
The interview with the expert SIOs identified a series of decisions which are 
presented in Table 5.4 below. The flow of decisions is broken down into seven 
stages; the event itself, the person responsible for dealing with that part of the 
incident and the action they take. The objectives are explained, as are the 
parameters they operate within and the product they produce and the pressures that 
affect the decision-making process. The chart outlines 12 different stages before the 
suspect is charged. Some of these stages occur prior to the SIOs involvement such 
as the initial stages where a body is found and the scene is contained. These issues 
can determine a cases success or otherwise.
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5.7 Summary
This chapter provides the background to the present Major Investigative Team (MIT) 
system. It shows how the Holmes and MIT evolved from the faults discovered in 
major inquiries shown in Chapter 5. It provides an explanation of the investigative 
process and defines the current system used currently by the MPS in its permanent 
murder teams. The role of the SIO was discussed and the legal definitions of the 
role explained. Holmes was defined in detail and the stages of the investigative 
process were discussed. The sources of current practice ,i.e. the ACPO Murder 
Manual, form the basis of investigative practice in the UK. The flowchart of the 
investigative process (Figure 6.4) showed the 12 stages in these types of 
investigations
C h a p t e r  6 :  S t u d y  T h r e e :  S e n i o r  I n v e s t i g a t i n g  O f f i c e r  S t u d y
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter reports the results of a qualitative study of 31 Senior Investigating 
Officers (SIOs) in the Metropolitan Police Serious Crime Directorate to explore their 
decision-making styles. In particular the study sought to describe their nominations 
of key solving factors that contribute to the successful identification of charges 
against suspects. The aims of the study were to:
• identify the key variables in solving murder cases, i.e. solvability factors
• characterise the management style of SIOs
• identify the internal and external pressures affecting decision-making in the 
investigative environment
• construct the decision frame within which SIOs manage murder inquiries
• SIOs Decision-making Style and how they correspond to decision-making 
theories described in Chapter 2.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Details of the Sample
The 32 SIOs responsible for leading murder investigations during the period 2001- 
2003 across the three MPS murder commands were identified and contacted. Thirty 
one interviews were arranged giving a response rate of 96%. Two SIOs declined 
although one arranged for his deputy to contribute to the study. The SIOs had 
investigated 1661 murder cases between them, i.e. an average of 5 cases per SIO. 
The SIO’s were chosen to match the cases making up the quantitative data set, i.e. 
cases occurring between 2001-2003. There was only one female SIO. Their 
average age was 44 years old and the average length of Police Service was 24 
years. Most were career CID officers with three having transferred from the uniform 
branch at Detective inspector level and three having transferred at Detective 
Sergeant level. Their rank when investigating the murders was either Detective
1 T h e s e  cases feature in the quantitative analysis in chapter 8
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Inspector or Detective Chief Inspector. To preserve the anonymity of the SIOs they 
were given a code number, 1 to 31 (any other information might have given a clue to 
their identity). The list of SIOs was supplied by the Serious Crime Directorate at 
New Scotland Yard. There was only one female SIO and the great majority were 
white males in their late 30s to 40s. Most were career CID officers with an average 
of 24 years service. Some had been part of the murder commands before and some 
were “ievei transfers”, i.e. transferred direct from the uniform branch of the MPS. 
The intention was to research up to 150 cases to allow comprehensive analysis. 166 
cases were researched and this represents the great majority of the cases available 
for the timeframe. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the best method to 
capture the information required. The selection criteria for interview was determined 
by which SIOs had led inquiries within the research period. Thirty one SIOs were 
interviewed and 166 cases were researched. The sample size was dictated by the 
number of SIOs who investigated cases during that period. As Hagan (2000) states 
the “sample size depends on the expected frequency (or rarity) of the characteristics 
to be observed”. In some cases the lOs were the Senior Investigating Officers. 
There are self-imposed limits to the research due to the sheer volume of murder 
cases within the Metropolitan Police Service. This research is confined to Category 
A and B murders and not Category Cs due to their sheer volume and the “self 
solving” aspect of these murders. Category C cases are “routine” easy to solve 
cases where the suspects were already known or can be easily detected. Category 
A homicides are defined as a major crime of grave public concern and Category B as 
a routine major crime where the offender is not known. In all the MPS dealt with 190 
murders of all types (i.e. Category A, B and C) in 2001-2002 and in 2002-2003 they 
dealt with 196. There were 166 murders investigated by the interviewed SIOs during 
this period.
Privacy and Confidentiality
All information collected was kept in a manner that will avoid any inadvertent 
disclosure. The identity of participants and details of the murder cases is protected. 
Permission was sought from the then Deputy Assistant Commissioner in charge of 
the Serious Crime Directorate. His permission was granted and the anonymity of the 
cases and SIOs was assured. The DAC was also concerned about disclosure of any 
victim’s details or their family details. Access to Holmes was granted by the
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Commander Homicide in the Metropolitan Police and access was granted to the 
older cases on HOLMES 1 database. For cases in the qualitative study it was 
agreed that all the SIOs and the specific murder cases would be coded using a 
numerical identification system so that an individual or the cases could not be 
identified. The data were kept in a secure office and all data was protected by a 
password. The author has full security clearance. The material could only be 
accessed by the researcher. Participants were assured that all interview data was 
secured and that no individual’s details would be released to anyone and only 
aggregate data would be published.
Assurances were given to the SiOs about the security of the data and that the results 
would be anonymised. The SiOs were told they would be given the overall results 
and that that their responses would be checked against secondary analysis on 
Holmes. It was impressed to the SIOs that this was not a “review” of their work but 
was an attempt to understand the solving factors in major cases and to analyse their 
decision-making processes. I emphasised that no specifics would be given to senior 
officers and that the research was stored securely. The paper semi-structured 
interviews were located in a locked cupboard and only the author had access.
Ethics
A protocol and formal permission to access the data and the criteria to preserve 
confidentiality of cases and investigating officers was negotiated with the 
Metropolitan Police Service as the official keepers of this information. The officers 
interviewed were all serving MPS officers and permission was granted (by 
Commander Homicide) to approach these individuals. Their participation was 
voluntary and was conducted under the agreed protocol. The protocol followed 
guidance as set in the British Psychological Society’s ethical guidelines for 
conducting research. . Denzin (2001:463) presents a model for a “radical ethical 
path” that transcends institutional review boards by paying close attention to the 
“problems associated with betrayal, deception and harm” Denzin discusses why we 
are doing research and to frame ethical and moral conduct of research beyond 
institutional lines while focusing in the human being as the centre of inquiry.
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The doctrine of informed consent allows participants to refuse to take part in the 
research having received information about the extent and purpose of the research. 
This includes any risks to them and confidentiality arrangements to protect their 
anonymity. This principle (Gilbert 2001:151) is generally taken to “mean that those 
who are researched should have the right to know that they are being researched 
and that in some sense they have actively given their consent”. The SIOs in this 
case were given assurances about protecting their anonymity and not exposing 
cases that were sub judice. There was a danger that by exposing certain aspects of 
the cases researched that the SIO would be revealed by unique features of cases. 
As a result only the general aspects of cases are discussed. All the SIOs were 
invited to participate in the research. It was explained that secondary analysis of 
their cases would take place on Holmes. The researcher provided information about 
the project, its aims and objectives in order that participants could make an informed 
decision about their participation. The participants were reassured that this was not 
a formal “review” of their investigations but an anonymised study of their cases to 
determine the solving factors and decision-making processes utilised. The ultimate 
objective is to develop an evidence based approach to improving practice
The SIOs were given time to consider their participation and the level of their 
participation, whether that would be data collection oniy or participation in the 
interview. All the SIOs (bar one) consented to interview. It was explained that they 
could withdraw at any stage and any “sensitive” inquiries could be “redacted”. It was 
emphasised that this research concentrated on the general issues of decision­
making and not on the specifics of each case. All the SIOs were experienced with 
the MPS Murder Review Group process and were therefore used to questioning and 
challenging of their inquiries. The researcher emphasised that this research was not 
a “challenge” to their practice but an attempt to elucidate the particularities of 
different approaches. All the SiOs gave consent to their cases being researched on 
Holmes (only one case was restricted). Previous permission had been granted by 
the Commander Homicide to access the archived cases, but it was felt appropriate, 
in addition, to seek the permission from the individual SIOs. It was further explained 
that the SIOs would be given access to the final thesis if they so desired. The SIOs
Informed Consent
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were also told that they had had the final veto to any material included in the 
interviews. Finally, the participants were assured that the raw research data would 
be kept secure and general trends reported. Where verbatim quotations were used, 
these would be anonymised.
6.2.2 Interview Details
The interview process was designed to examine the decision-making process by 
Senior Investigating Officers in murder inquiries in the MPS. In this part of the thesis 
quantitative research forms a study of the decision-making process used by SIOs. A 
qualitative methodology enables the rationale behind the decision-making process to 
be analysed.
The author sought permission from an ACPO member to access all the relevant 
Holmes accounts at the central MPS Holmes administrative centre. Many of the 
Holmes accounts had been “archived” electronically and the author further sought 
permission to access these cases. There are therefore two Holmes databases, live 
and archive both of which were accessed for this research.
Coding Dictionary
The means to address the research aims was the undertaking of a secondary 
analysis of the Holmes data databases. The categories of Holmes were described in 
detail in Chapter 5.
The present researcher accessed each of the Holmes indexes to determine actions 
raised for inquiries the interviewed SIOs had been investigating between 2001 and 
2003. Holmes is not a user-friendly database and neither is it an analytical tool. As 
a consequence it was necessary to extract the data from Holmes and construct a 
separate SPSS database to address the research aims. The author is trained in 
Holmes and has managed Holmes databases.
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SPSS
The SPSS (originally, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was released in its 
first version in 1968. SPSS is among the most widely used programs for statistical 
analysis in social science. It is used by market researchers, health researchers, 
survey companies, government, education researchers, marketing organisations and 
others. Statistics included in the base software are as follows:
• Descriptive statistics: Cross tabulation, Frequencies, Descriptive, Explore, 
Descriptive Ratio Statistics
• Bivariate statistics: Means, t-test, ANOVA, Correlation (bivariate, partial, 
distances), Nonparametric tests
• Prediction for numerical outcomes: Linear regression see Chapter 6
• Prediction for identifying groups: Factor analysis, cluster analysis (two-step, 
K-means, hierarchical),
Questions in Interviews.
The questions began with a description of the SIO and some of their professional 
qualifications. To assist the research they were asked about their length of service, 
their age and what type of career they had experienced. The SIOs were asked what 
type of cases they were investigating and whether they were Category A or Category 
B cases. The SIOs were asked about the specific solving factors for the individual 
cases and the unique (if any) solving factors for those cases. The motive for the 
murder was discussed and if the case was successfully prosecuted. This included 
whether the case was referred to the CPS, if the case proceeded to court and the 
outcome at court.
Each solving factor was discussed and recorded in detail along with any negative 
issues that faced the inquiry. It was felt important to allow the respondent time to 
talk about what was of significance while retaining some structure. The guided or 
focused interview fulfilled these requirements. Specific questions were asked but the 
respondents were allowed freedom to talk about their topic and give their own views. 
The focused interview allowed for easier analysis. Careful preparation of the 
interview guide helped to record responses under prepared headings.
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At the end of the interviews the SiOs were asked about their general decision-making 
process and their management style. An early pilot interview was conducted on a 
retiring SIO. He had investigated five Category A and B murders in the 2001-2003 
periods. This early work highlighted the need to include matters outside the SIOs 
control as a contributory factor in the decision-making process such as the level of 
work undertaken by local Borough officers. The interview highlighted both good and 
bad initial work by Uniform officers, which either assisted or hindered the SIOs 
progress in a case. This interview was the prototype for the remaining 31 interviews.
The answers given by the SIO were recorded in longhand by the author as to how 
the SIO prioritises decisions and how they phased inquiries. The author then added 
their description of the SIO management style and their decision-making process. 
The phasing of inquiries was both a general and a specific question asked to 
ascertain the difficulties in generally managing longer cases and how this differed in 
the different types of cases investigated. Some cases (including SIO 3) stated that 
some cases “evolved” while SIO 11 stated that each case has its own “timeframe”, in 
the first 24 hours SIOs needed support while after seven days there was “calm on 
the waters”. One of the research aims was to establish how much the type of case 
altered the investigative strategy, if at all, and the questions were designed to elicit 
this. The pressures faced by the SIOs, both internally and negatively were explored. 
The manner in which the SIO managed their own MIT team was explored along with 
how they used their Detective Inspectors, how they used decision logs and did they 
keep an overarching decagon log or left this to the Detective Inspectors. The 
establishment of Core Roles within the team and the frequency of team meetings 
were asked for. The SIOs were asked how they ensured the implementation of their 
strategy, including liaison with other agencies, forensic considerations, management 
of Holmes and the use of the Murder Review Group (MRG). The internal and 
external pressures were discussed. The external pressures mentioned by the SIO 
included media intrusion, management of the crime scene and other areas such as 
the lack of public co-operation and unsuccessful identity parades. The internal 
issues questioned were around motivating the team, liaison with local officers (Police 
Boroughs) and their relationship with their senior managers (Superintendents). 
There were issues during the interview process that the author had not originally 
considered and these were subsequently included. These were issues such as:
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• The size of disclosure of evidence to the defence in multiple defendant cases.
Particularly in relation to gang related inquiries where there could be up to a
dozen defendants
• The extent of how important witness management was and how difficult it is.
The different cultural and language issues. SIO 18 stressed the importance
of a good witness liaison officer
• Dealing with large number of witnesses and how resource intensive this could
be
• The role of the Murder Review Group and how this provided both advantages
and disadvantages for the inquiry team
• MIT model too rigid there was a lack of flexibility the balance of teams was
wrong
• Different solving factors for different types of cases and it is possible to solve
older cases
• “Case Building” on ACPO coding framework 
6.2.3 Analytic Method
A thematic content analysis was employed to reveal the themes and sub-themes. 
The method adopted followed that used by Fielding (1988) when analysing 
interviews of probationer constables. The themes were guided by the interview 
format and care was taken to place the interpretation within the context of the 
statements. The themes were grouped and a coding dictionary was developed for 
data codes inclusion in the combined analysis reported in the next chapter. The 
broad codes were derived from the key interview questions. Detailed constituent 
codes were added as each transcript was read. The data file recorded the number 
of occurrences within the interviews of elements within each theme. The inclusion 
criteria for the constituent elements were extracted exhaustively and iteratively from 
the interviews. As each interview was read and codes confirmed or added until the 
complete list of codes was derived from ail the interviews, each interview was read 
again to recode the code profile for each SIO.
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Four broad themes were identified:
1. Pressures on the SIO
2. Management style of the SIOs
3. Decision-making style of the SIO
4. Solving factors in hard to solve cases
As well as detailing the aspects mentioned by the SIOs within each theme, the 
analyses also identified the decision frame used by the SIOs. The explanations 
given by the SI Os were compared and the processes identified so that a composite 
model could be created. The data extraction took place between September 2004 
and May 2006. The information was updated when new information became 
available such as the subsequent arrest of a suspect or the end of a court trial.
In addition a multi-variate analytic procedure (Multi Dimensional Scaleogram 
Analysis) (MSA) was adopted. This procedure developed by Louis Guttmann (see 
Wilson, 2001) allows profiles of categorical data to be analysed. Profiles were 
constructed for each of the SiOs related to their answers from the interview material 
about their decision-making and management style. A series of dichotomous codes 
indicting presence or absence of a particular management tactic or decision type 
was re-coded. MSA then compares these profiles and plots points into a two 
dimensional space representing the SIOs. The more similar the profiles shared by 
individual SIOs the closer together they are plotted in the space. Subsequent 
variable outputs from MSA permit a picture to be built up indicating the features of 
the profile the SIOs in proximity to each other share. Regions can be drawn onto the 
MSA space that optimally captures the SIOs that share similar features and are 
distinguished from those having different features. The broad themes revealed from 
the research are shown in Table 6.1. The research identified positive and negative 
pressures on the SIO which were generated both internally within the MPS and 
externally. The research further showed the management style of the 31 SIOs and 
the decision-making style that they used in the 166 inquiries. The 41 solving factors 
were established from the research with 7 broad themes.
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The overall template for the thematic analyses is given in Figure 6.1 below thereafter 
subsequent sections detail these results.
6.3 Results
Figure 6.1 Broad Themes and Sub-themes
Broad themes Sub themes Exemplars
Positive/negative External Behaviour of local officers
pressures Internal Behaviour of the first police officers at the scene
Use of the Media
Crimewatch
Family Liaison Officer
Milieu of suspects witnesses
Witness management
Multiple suspects
Informants
House to House enquiries
Management style Autocratic
Democratic
Rote
Innovation
Reflection
Traditional military model 
Consultative encourage feedback 
By the book
New method, creative thinking 
Review and analysis
Decision-making Use of Holmes 
Investigative thinking 
Priorisation 
Rule following
How Holmes used 
SIO role
Using same methods 
Behaviour referenced by manual
Solving factors Police investigative factors Arrest Strategy Linking offences 
Behaviour of local officers 
Investigative thinking 
Proactive surveillance 
Witness management 
House-to-House enquiries 
Covert methods
Police Search Advisory Team (POLSA) 
Family Liaison Officers
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Broad themes Sub themes Exemplars
The Use of Outside 
experts
Technical
The Media 
Suspects Behaviour 
Legal
Intelligence
Reward
Holmes computer system
Use of the National Crime and Operations Faculty and
outside experts
Geographical profiling
Liaison with outside agencies
Pathology
Closed Circuit Television Circuits CCTV 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition System 
Telephone analysis 
E-FIT
Recovery of the murder weapon
Forensic recovery including DNA
Crimestoppers
Crime watch
Use of the Media
Confessions
Interviews with suspects
Dying Declaration
Early consultation with the Crown
Prosecution Service
Identity Parades
Witness Albums
Immunity from prosecution
Use of intelligence
Informants
Financial Analysis
Analysis
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The SIOs highlighted the pressures, both positive and negative that they 
experienced when investigating category A and B murders. These pressures 
derived from internal and external sources and are detailed in Figure 6.2 below. The 
internal pressures are those produced by the organisation, (i.e. the Metropolitan 
Police) itself. The external are those pressures dictated by forces outside the 
organisation such as the media, the Crown Prosecution Service and witness co­
operation.
6.3.1 Pressures/Influences on SIOs Decision-Making Processes
Figure 6.2 Internal Pressures Identified from the SIOs Interviews
Internal
Pressures Example Quotes Positive Negative
Resources SI02: “We have a permanent team which means 
we get consistency and resilience”
SI012: “For a ‘Rolls Royce’ team the 
SIO needs full resources”.
Structure of the 
Major Incident 
Team
“SI013: “I am fully inclusive in my decision­
making process except for sensitive information”
SI07: “We seem to be constantly on-call 
and I never get time to finish one job 
properly".
SI022: “The local officers arrested the suspect 
and contacted us straight away, they showed 
real initiative".
SI01: “Lack of action at the scene by 
Borough and confusion on whether the 
victim was the assailant”.
Expectations of 
ACPO officers
SI024: “I had a case which was linked to other 
cases after consultation with the Commander, 
this enabled us to share inter.
SIO10: “ACPO does not identify proper 
support”.
SI011: 'There is potential pressure on 
an SIO in Cat A cases with intrusion by 
ACPO (Association of Chief Police 
Officers) and different AC’s (Assistant 
Commissioners)".
Volume of work SI016: “The cases sometimes come in phases, 
but generally we had enough people to deal”.
SIO10: “The volume of crime impacts on 
performance we are not allowed to 
deliver service”.
SI012: “In 10 months we had seven 
jobs, we needed to build in blocks of 
time to cope”.
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Internal
Pressures Example Quotes Positive Negative
Superintendent’s
review
SI06: “One Super an ex SIO helps with 
resources, I have asked for help from other 
teams”.
SI016: “Zero support from the 
Superintendents”.
SI018: “They were either not involved 
or too involved in investigations”.
Murder Review 
team’s reports
SI08: the “MRG are helpful in solving cases". 
SIO20: “I find the MRG (reports) useful they are 
a mechanism to give objective opinion”.
SIO10: “Sometimes the MRG reports 
put the SIO on the defensive”.
SI04: “There are more people 
inspecting than actually assisting us to 
do it”.
SI03: “Holmes leaves good food rotting 
on the dockside, it stops the momentum 
of decision-making”.
Suspects
behaviour
SI019: “The suspect made an admission that he 
was the ‘main man’ but he made the admission 
to a third party”.
SI09: “The suspects confession is only 
a starter we still need corroborating 
evidence”.
Time scales SIO10: “Some jobs have their own momentum”. 
SIO10: “after seven days there is calm on the 
waters”.
SI05: “In the first 10 days you play catch up, 
then after that you start too tidy the bases”.
SI04: “During the golden hour we can retrieve 
evidence but only with skilled personnel”.
SI011: “Each job has its own time 
scales”.
The milieu of 
suspects / 
witnesses
SI013: "My main issue in one case was to stop 
the witnesses killing the suspect as this was 
their culture”.
SI015: “I potentially had huge numbers 
of witnesses in one case but no one 
came forward”.
Family Liaison 
issues
SI017: “The FLO role is developing and I was 
lucky to have exceptional FLOs who helped the 
family and the investigation by digging into the 
victomology issues”.
SI015: “The family complained about 
police action despite a huge search for 
the victim’s remains”.
SI019: “The family removed evidence 
from the scene to protect the victim’s 
reputation” (i.e. drugs material).
Investigative
Thinking
SI018.“ln one Cat A I tried to identify possible 
defences and eliminate them”.
SI023: “I have a rigorous approach to charging 
as [information] changes and other witnesses 
come forward”.
SI011: “I had a robust proactive 
patrolling approach which on reflection 
diverted resources".
Holmes SI06: “Excellent library, good for disclosure but 
it is not compatible with everything else ...can be 
a waste of resources”. “Can’t retrace steps in 
Holmes, the SIO can’t see which cases are 
going to be solved".
SI02: “We need an extra Holmes team" 
(to process information).
SI04: “It is the SIO that drives the 
enquiry not Holmes".
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Figure 6.3 External Pressures Identified from the SIOs Interviews.
External Example Quote Positive Negative
Media intrusion SI017: “Various media appeals including ethnic 
minority radios led to witnesses coming forward”. 
SI019: “After a media appeal we found the crime 
scene”.
SI01: “The media slow down a 
Category A enquiry immensely and 
can damage the relationship with 
the family (of the victim)”.
SI011: The media can drive the 
enquiry to a certain extent whereas 
the SIO should set the agenda on 
the media”.
Lack of public co­
operation
SI018: “There was witness intimidation and I 
appointed a good witness liaison officer. I had a 
full witness strategy”.
SI019: “I had non co-operating 
witnesses in drug related murder 
(as the witnesses were addicts) and 
in another pub dispute all the 
witnesses were drunk. In another 
case the witnesses lied at Court”.
Behaviour of 
witnesses in Identity 
Parades
SI017: “I had to work hard to keep two vital 
witnesses in the UK as they were illegal 
immigrants, I worked with the Immigration 
Service”.
SI018: “I was trying to protect witnesses who 
were still lying (about the incident)”.
SI018: “I had to test the validity of the witness 
accounts”.
SI027: “The main witness couldn't take the 
pressure and withdrew his evidence”.
SI014: “In one case where a foreign 
student was killed by a suspect with 
mental illness issues the suspect 
was stopped by a Special Constable 
who called supervisory officers and 
the man’s description was put on 
the intelligence database. As a 
result of a check on the intelligence 
system he was identified and picked 
out on an identity parade. The local 
police helped solve the murder by 
good intelligence gathering”.
International aspect 
of individual inquiries
SI018: “The trial took place in Albania and I had to 
protect witnesses who did not fully co-operate yet 
required armed protection”.
SI018: “I had to control the family (of the victim) in 
Canada and Jamaica".
SIO20: “I had to take the MIT team 
to a war zone and the risk 
assessment took 26 pages”.
Lack of suitable 
experts
SI07: “It is important to task experts then make 
decisions as a result of their findings”.
SI017: “It is difficult to determine 
the quality of expert advice”.
Lack of forensic 
material
SI019: “We are lucky in the Met having good 
quality CSIs”.
SI01: “No forensics at the scene 
(had been washed away) had to find 
the murder weapons”.
Witness management SI023: “The main suspect claimed diplomatic 
immunity”.
SI014: “I identified significant 
witnesses early in the case and 
appointed an officer to look after 
them”.
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Interna! pressures
Behaviour of First Officers at the Scene
The highest number of negative factors or pressures mentioned by the SIOs related
to the police procedural practices of local officers who attended the initial scene.
The behaviour of the first officers at the scene is of paramount importance to the
investigation in securing uncontaminated physical traces suitable for forensic
analysis and also identifying any key witnesses. This proved problematic in several
instances as a large percentage of the Metropolitan Police at street level are
probationary officers with relatively little procedural experience or knowledge. As
SIO 3 (Research Book 1:12) commented:
“The MPS has a “Rolls Royce” model in its murder teams but at times there is 
‘Skoda’ model on Borough”.
Paradoxically when local officers got the procedure right this was highlighted as a
key solving factor. SIOs commented in equal terms about good and bad police
practice at the scene. One SIO found that on taking over an investigation the wrong
three people had been arrested and they had to be “de-arrested”. However in the
same enquiry it was good work by the first officers in recording blood traces on the
step of the building where the murder took place that greatly assisted the enquiry. In
another case two probationary constables stopped and arrested a suspect who was
unloading the victim’s body from a car. In cases where there was a delay before the
investigating officers from Serious Crime Directorate had arrived, local uniformed
officers, often constables, had to secure the scene, in eight cases the local officers
behaviour was specifically mentioned as being inadequate and impeding the enquiry.
Local officers had failed to seal the scene or recover forensic evidence effectively.
This was summarised in the following comment:
“There was a lack o f action at the scene by borough and confusion on whether 
the victim was the assailant”. SIO 1
However in another eight cases the behaviour of the local uniformed officers was 
seen as a positive solving factor where officers had arrested suspects early, 
recovered evidence or obtained witness details prior to the arrival of the murder 
teams.
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“In one case where a foreign student was killed by a suspect with mental illness 
issues, the suspect was stopped by a Special Constable who called 
supervisory officers and the man's description was put on the intelligence 
database. As a result o f a check on the intelligence system he was identified 
and picked out on an identity parade. The local police helped solve the murder 
by good intelligence gathering”. SIO 14
Family Liaison Officers
There was a wide range of how the FLOs were used by the SIOs. Many 
experienced issues around managing FLOs with difficult families or in cases where 
the family may have been suspects. Despite advances in liaison with victim’s 
families there are extreme cases where the family failed to co-operate with the 
police. In one case the family actually complained about the Police Family Liaison 
Officer.
One case was described (SIO 15) by the SIO as “difficult” as he faced a hostile set of 
witnesses. The victim was killed in a flat used for illegal drug activity and all the 
witnesses were either “high” on drugs or hostile to police enquiries. The mother and 
the girlfriend of the victim removed evidential property against police wishes from the 
scene and this made the FLOs duties difficult. Despite considerable covert proactive 
work the environment worked against the police and the case remains unsolved.
Informants
Informants by their nature are duplicitous and this was reflected in one case where 
an informant provided nothing of evidential value to the investigation. This was 
resource intensive and led the inquiry into potential false lines of enquiry. This was a 
long case, lasting 19 months with a total of 2,865 Holmes actions. The SIO had to 
consider many demands on the enquiry team to assist in the identification of the 
suspects. One case that involved the longest murder trial in English history involved 
informant led evidence. The management of a criminal informant was paramount in 
this particular case and the initial SIO rebutted the information supplied by the 
informant. The second SIO managed the informant carefully and this led to a 
conviction in this case.
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House-to-House Enquiries
During the interviews the SIOs mentioned the lack of dedicated resources in this 
important area of investigation. The MIT’s have an agreement with local Police 
Boroughs whereby the Boroughs have to supply personnel to assist the MIT enquiry 
team. The logistics of this arrangement were difficult in practice and led to 
difficulties.
External Pressures
Use of the Media
The use of the media was again both a positive and negative factor in the solving of 
cases. Several SIOs commented that their inquiry was made more complicated by 
media interest and the misreporting of the incident. One SIO (SIO 1), who 
investigated a Category A case, stated that the inquiry was made more complicated 
by the media and the factual misreporting of details in the case. This posed 
problems for the SiO who had to deal with the family of the victim who had not been 
pre-warned of the newspaper article. This had originated from an ACPO member 
who had briefed the press “off the record”. Another SIO in a Category A murder 
stated that finding the crime scene (in this case the victim’s body had been moved 
from the original scene) was of a paramount importance. After a media campaign 
the SIO found the crime scene and was able to progress the inquiry.
Brookman (2005) comments on the “detrimental effect on a homicide investigation 
and its prosecution” by the media in modern investigations. This happened in the 
Damilola Taylor case where a tabloid newspaper released details of “hold back 
evidence”, that is material which had been held back from the public by the SIO 
which only the suspect would have known. This assists in the arrest and interview 
stage of the enquiry.
BBC Crimewatch
In one case (Research Book 1.87) Crimewatch turned down an SIOs request for a 
place in the programme due to the victim’s criminal background. There were eight 
“persons of interest” shown on a recovered CCTV tape whom the SIO wished to 
identify. BBC Crimewatch has strict criteria for items broadcast on the programme.
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However this has led to 57 murders being solved directly over the last 25 years (BBC 
2009 www.bbc.crimewatch).
CCTV
Many SIOs commented on the bad quality of the CCTV collected and this prevented 
the identification of suspects and witnesses. The difference in the real-times shown 
on the tapes caused many problems, as did the quality of the tapes.
Witness Management
Many witnesses are naturally unfriendly to police enquiries and the SIO has to draw 
up strategies accordingly. In many criminal cases witnesses were reluctant to come 
forward and this necessitated the SIO seeking a proactive use of recruiting 
informants and seeking intelligence from other means. This was particularly so in 
Operation Trident cases. In one case involving a homophobic attack (Research 
Book 1:29) 24 witnesses had seen the attack but none stated that they had seen the 
fatal blow. As stated in Chapter 3 (Cannon-Bowers 2000:9) there are potentially 
“multiple information sources” and evolving scenarios within investigations. This 
especially applied to the Category A cases. In one case (Research Book 1:5) the 
SIO faced problems with the statements taken from witnesses in a Category A case 
where every account given by the witnesses was different. The SIO had to arrange 
20 interviews with witnesses in a foreign language to help to establish a version of 
the events around the murder and help to establish the crime scene.
The Use of Identity Parades
The handling of Identity Parades, which are usually requested by the CPS as part of
the legal case construction. These are carried out in nominated Police Stations
known as Identity Suites. They are time consuming, resource intensive and rarely
produce positive results in terms of a Police suspect being identified. This is often
due to the delay between the incident and the parade being convened. Other
complications were highlighted by SIO 14 who stated that the:
"brother o f the victim who witnessed the murder only picked out two o f the three 
suspects who entered the victim’s flat but he did not pick out the main suspect. 
The family o f the victim then wanted to take their own actions and kill the three 
suspects. The main suspects and their families then had to be warned and 
protected”.
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Multiple Inquiries
All of the SIOs interviewed commented on the pressure of running multiple inquiries
at the same time, with an average of six murder cases running concurrently. When
SIOs were given adequate resources they were able to prioritise these more
efficiently as described SIO 4:
7 was given a second team to assist with a complex Turkish gang murder and 
with the second team I was able to set up a separate intelligence team. The 
intelligence  was skewed by the manipulation o f an informant by the Turkish 
gangs”.
The misinformation by an informant added to the pressure felt by this SIO on this 
case but the addition of a second intelligence team alleviated part of the problem.
One other difficulty mentioned by SIOs (Research Book 1:25) was the lack of 
continuity involved in the handing over of inquiries after a different team had been 
involved. Chronologically the local CID may have dealt with the inquiry initially then 
“the on-call murder team” followed by the “in frame” murder (the team with the 
capacity to take the enquiry) team.
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6.3.2 Management Style of SIOs
Analysis of the SIO interviews identified 5 basic sub themes indicative of 
management style:
Figure 6.4 Management Styles
Management style Exemplar behaviours
Autocratic SIO makes decisions unassisted by the MIIT 
Compartmentalisation of enquiry activities
Democratic • Regular office meetings to ensure adequate inter­
communication.
• Inclusive decision-making
• DI delegated to take charge of specific parts of the inquiry
• “Use the collective brain of the team”
Reactive Issuing Homes actions automatically 
Rote behaviours
Proactive Good use of fast time actions 
Practice use of experts
Innovative Making brave decisions with an ability to spot the “strange thing”i.e. an innovative strategy
Makes use of novel investigative techniques
Two dimensions of the SIO management style were revealed through the interviews:
(i) The relationship with the team (autocratic or democratic):
(ii) The response mode (reactive, proactive and innovative).
Autocratic
This is exemplified by one very experienced SIO who took all his decisions on a 
personal basis and then asked his Intelligence Officers (lOs) to write up strategies 
for certain parts of the inquiry such as the forensic aspects. This SIO is now retired 
and might be construed as representing an “old style” detective. One Category A 
case that this SIO dealt with illustrated the lack of an ability to deal with multi-layered 
decision-making especially around covert issues. The SIO was uncomfortable 
dealing with informant led information and tried to overlook this information by 
dealing with the case in a purely reactive matter. The information supplied by the
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informant was correct and could have progressed the inquiry quicker but the SIO 
“buried” this source of information.
One other SIO stated that he kept “tight control” of the investigation by delegating 
certain aspects to his DIs but retaining control of the decision-making process. SIO 
26 believed in “firm and effective leadership and had a very controlling, directive 
style of leadership”.
Democratic
Inclusive decision-making was adopted by some SIOs as a means of harnessing the 
experience and ability of their respective teams and represented a more democratic 
management style. SIO 14 claimed to use an “inclusive” decision-making process 
employing all the “experience in the room” (i.e. Major Incident Room). The SIO 
insisted that the lOs composed separate decision logs. Interestingly this SIO stated 
that his decision-making process was instinctive while remaining a “conscious 
process”. SIO 17 planned meetings with his team every day at the start of an inquiry 
and subsequently continued the meetings every other day during the inquiry. This 
SIO supported this inclusive process of management. The frequency of office 
meetings was remarkably consistent with most SIOs conducting two meetings a day 
at the start of the inquiry, one per day in the middle part of the inquiry and one 
meeting a month after this. The SIOs who were classified as operating a democratic 
style used their Detective Inspectors (Investigating Officers) as either the lead on 
some inquiries or as Deputy SIO. One SIO saw the role as performing an “umbrella 
function” while the lOs lead the operational side of the inquiry. This could be seen 
as “distributed decision-making” with the SIO ultimately accountable but the DIs 
making tactical decisions. The influence of a team was shown to be an important 
part of successful decision-making.
The decision-making process of the majority of the SIOs interviewed was influenced 
by the contributions of their team in office meetings. Seventeen of the SIOs 
mentioned this as a significant part of their decision process. Another SIO (SIO 1) 
used the “collective brain of the team” to structure his decision-making and felt that
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the role of the SIO was in solving crime and in “filling in the gaps”, indeed most of
the SIOs used a consultative method of team discussion, asking the team to
contribute ideas. They then made their decisions based on those observations.
Most SIOs relied on regular office meetings with all or selected members of the team
to progress the inquiry. SIO 12 ran “open meetings” and encouraged reviews of his
inquiries, with the Murder Review Group “regularly looking at the job”. This was rare
among the interviewees. This SIO stated that:
"I build in blocks of time in the investigations. I had to prioritise as I took seven 
other jobs (Operations) in 10 months. I completed strategic documents on the 
main strategies. I ensured that every member of the team had access to 
Holmes, so everyone was aware of my strategies and the state of the inquiry. I 
focused on intelligence strategies and I proactively used the analysts. There is 
little strategic work on major investigations”.
This SIO displayed an openness and understanding of strategic issues and was 
keen to invite feedback on his decision-making.
Similarly SIO 20 stated:
"I am inclusive in office meetings and I stress that it is an open forum. I then 
score and prioritise all actions. After that I consult with the investigating officers 
(DIs) and the case officer (DSs) in mini office meetings where I like to try 
different hypothesis and then I prioritise appropriately. I try to provide clear 
direction to the team”.
Whilst he was prepared to listen to the team he felt that it was incumbent upon him
to provide clear direction. The smaller groups formed by the SIO had further
meetings designed to encompass all possible strategies and enable the SIO to
prioritise actions. By spreading the decision-making process to other junior officers
the SIO was using the “collective brain” of the team. The SIO demonstrated three
different aspects of decision-making within this one statement. First prioritising
actions, then testing hypothesis and finally providing leadership. This statement
highlights the multi-layered nature of decision-making within these environments.
SIO 19 reflecting upon their approach to management said that:
7 am a hands-on manager and then I carve up responsibility among the DIs. I 
hold regular meetings with the team and only then do I complete my decision 
logs”.
SIO 4 stated that he “tended to be supportive rather than critical” of his team while 
SIO 5 from a similar career path stated that she “scooped up" ideas from the enquiry
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team along with her deputies and then she made the final decisions. SIO 13 saw
himself as “the ultimate decision-maker” while he used his Detective Sergeants as
the “executive arm” to implement strategies. This SIO used another DS to act as
Case Officer and “put the job together”. SIO 13 stated that:
7 try to include the teams in decision-making except for sensitive (covert 
intelligence) information which I treat as “need to know’’ only. I keep a sensitive 
decision log on a restricted view basis. I try to use the experience in the room 
with DIs taking specific roles as either Intelligence DI or Witness Liaison”.
This delegation of key elements of the investigation was discussed by various SIOs,
SIO 20 mentioned that:
7 ensure that my Intelligence Sergeant is aware of my lines of enquiry and that 
he in turn picks out the relevant points to support the SIO. Holmes actions 
should reflect the SIO strategies and correspond with the lines of enquiry”.
Innovative
These SIOs were “pushing the boundaries” using novel techniques to help solve
cases. They were prepared to seek help from new sources and to ask the opinion of
experts. SIO 26 used complex witness matrices and contributed to the London
Homicide Manual. SIO 25 used extensive analytical techniques to solve a
multifaceted gang murder involving an international criminal network. SIO 22 used a
new forensic technique (Luminol) to trace a murder scene. By intelligence and
analysis this SIO concluded that the murder scene was in a particular address. He
used the new technique to prove that the victim had been murdered at this address
and the body had been removed and placed elsewhere. SIO 21 ran a complex joint
operation with a provincial force and overcame IT issues to link the two cases. By
forensic evidence and analysis he linked two previously unconnected cases. The
same SIO used technical strategy and media strategy to “flush out” a suspect. This
SiO talked of using “investigative triggers” to probe the information stored within
Holmes. SIO 18 in one international case used a large number of investigative
strategies to proactively seek out a suspect. This SIO also used expert witnesses in
a unique manner tasking them with a specific remit. SIO 15 saw prioritisation as vital
in an investigation along with the need to be “innovative”. He stated that:
“As well as the ability to prioritise an SIO needs to be innovative and be able to 
do the “strange thing” (i.e. a unique decision) as each case is different.
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Sometimes this requires brave decision-making with the ability not to make 
decisions as important as actually making decisions. There is no need to make 
decisions just for the sake of it”.
SIO 16 illustrated the concept of a “strange thing” in his use of the Body Farm at 
Tennessee University in the USA to help solve a case. The victim’s remains were 
found in the back garden of the suspect. The suspect had painted the victim’s body 
white. After analysis by the experts at the University the suspect was charged with 
the murder as the links were proven. As the SIO stated the case was solved by 
“pure science” but other evidence amassed by the MIT indicated that the victim’s 
body could only be dumped in one place.
In one case that was proving difficult to solve he reviewed his strategies and found
that despite a generous offer of a reward no-one had come forward. He then started
to look at the lifestyle of the victim and found that, after looking in detail at the
intelligence and the lack of forensic material, the evidence pointed to a criminal
influence behind the murder. After adopting covert techniques he identified the
suspect. SIO 21 stated that he:
“Identified the “triggers" for solving the case and then he probed these to isolate 
the solving factors”.
Reactive
The SIOs in this category were managing investigations by rote, i.e. investigating by 
numbers, simply issuing automatic Holmes actions. They were not necessarily trying 
to solve the particular case in hand at the start of the inquiry. SIO 5 relied heavily on 
the Detective Inspectors to run cases and the routine issuing of Holmes actions from 
the MIR. SIO 8 rejected informant evidence from another policing agency and set 
back the investigation. This SIO did not appear to trust the information given to him. 
SIO 20 issued the normal set of Holmes actions and then talked of “rattling cages”
i.e. arresting the usual suspects.
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There were several examples of replicated behaviour among SIOs where certain 
investigative techniques were used again and again. The replicated behaviours 
were:
• Covert techniques,
• Proactive techniques,
• Investigative thinking,
• Intelligence,
• Use of informants,
• Financial strategy and
• An arrest strategy.
The use of replicative behaviours reflected the particular experience of the SIOs and 
their specific policing background. Those who had been involved in more proactive 
or covert police work tended to be more comfortable with this type of work. Similarly 
if an SIO had used one technique successfully in one case this tended to be 
replicated in other cases. Some SIOs mentioned that they had certain expertise on 
their teams and this affected the strategies used.
Proactive
In one Operation Trident case SIO 13 used covert techniques and surveillance 
techniques to help trace the suspect and gather evidence. This helped to trace the 
murder weapon and an admission was made by the suspect who had the gun. He 
had killed the driver of a sports car, a woman, in a revenge attack. SIO 21 used 
proactive methods to identify a prostitute who was with the victim at the time of the 
robbery. The prostitute was an eye witness to the murder but her identity was not 
known at first, her agent was identified first and then she was traced. SIO 22 
maintained pressure on the “weak link” in a criminal group and used a robust arrest 
strategy to maintain momentum on the suspects in the group.
Multivariate Analysis of Styles
To build a more complex picture of the SIOs management style a Multi Dimensional 
Scalogram Analysis (MSA) was conducted. Each SIO had a profile indicating
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presence or absence of behaviours identified through the content analysis. This was 
subjected to MSA in which the two domains intersected resulting in a four-fold 
typology:
1. innovative democrat
2. innovative autocrat
3. proactive democrat
4. rote replicator.
MSA plots the SIOs as points in the multidimensional space. Each variable can be 
overlaid to determine what aspects of the SIO’s style are drawing similar individuals 
together. Partition lines are drawn on the basis of inspection of the individual 
variable plots.
Figure 6.5 MSA of SIO Management Style
Ten SIOs were characterised as rote replicators, eight as proactive democrats, 
seven innovative autocrats and six as innovative democrats. The following table 
shows the distribution of variables characterising these types drawn from the MSA 
partitioned regions.
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Table 6.1 Distribution of SIO Characteristics by Management Style
Rote
replicator
N=10
Innovative
autocrat
N=7
Innovative
democrat
N=6
Proactive
democrat
N=8
Chi square
Solo decision­
maker
4 5 1 1 6.8 ns
Inclusive
decision-making
0 0 6 7 o o 
 ^
o
[< 
V 
CM 
Q.
Consultative 0 0 6 7 27.4 
p< 0001
Used Murder 
Review Group
2 1 4 3 5.07 ns
Holmes actions 
by rote
5 0 0 0 12.5 p< 006
Fast time actions 0 2 4 5 10.7 p<013
Use of new 
science
0 3 3 0 10.4 p<015
Use of novel 
techniques
0 5 6 0 24.7
p<.0001
Replicating
behaviours
6 1 0 1 9.4 p<024
Proactive use of 
experts
0 0 1 4 10.05
p<018
From this analysis it can be seen that the innovators are prepared to use novel 
techniques and use new scientific procedures. They differ in their preparedness to 
use external expertise. There are two types of innovator, those who tend to make 
solo decisions and do not use inclusive decision-making processes. The reactive 
processors tend to use Holmes action generation as their cue and engage in 
repetitious behaviours. There were no differences in career path or age of these 
types. The clear-up rates achieved by the innovative democrats was highest, 86% 
and the lowest 59% were the rote replicators. However these differences were not 
statistically significant.
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From the interviews the following three interlocking themes emerged as the main 
features of the SIO decision-making process. The key elements informed each other 
and overlapped in the decision-making. Figure 6.6 presents a diagrammatic 
summary which illustrates the inter-relationships between the use of Holmes, 
prioritising lines of enquiry and investigative thinking.
Figure 6.6 A Representation of the Decision Process Used by SIOs.
6.3.3 T h e  Decision-Making Process
Use of Holmes Computer System
There were two basically different views about the use of Holmes and its efficacy. 
Holmes was seen as either a routine requirement used simply to store data or its 
analytical potential was recognised and used. Some SIOs did not fully understand it
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while others such as SIO 24 saw it as a “failing system”. SIO 2 stated that the 
inputting of information onto Holmes restricted the flow of intelligence and, as a 
consequence, information did not flow through the system quickly enough. He felt 
that it was like “good food rotting on the dockside” and that it stopped the 
“momentum of decision-making”. SIO 10 also commented on the need to maintain 
momentum in an investigation without being “too rigid on the original decision­
making process”. This SIO felt that it was necessary to “do the high priority actions 
first” whilst bypassing the Major Incident Room”. He also felt that putting the exhibits 
on Holmes held “things up”. This SIO was aware that there was a need to “ghost” or 
predict decision-making by foreseeing future difficulties.
SIO 14 saw Holmes as a:
“Good investigative tool but it is slow, it will eventually get there but not in fast 
time. Holmes is not leading the inquiry”.
SIO 21 stated:
"Holmes doesn’t assist the management of the investigation, it is not a good 
management tool. While every Monday I check the state of the actions, the 
intelligence just sits there that is where the MIR action manager comes in”.
Considering that Holmes is the basic database for murder inquiries these statements
by SIOs represent a worrying description of the main IT system for solving murders
in the UK. Holmes did not appear to satisfy the SIOs needs in every investigation
however, not all SIO’s were expert users. Many had not been involved actively with
Holmes prior to becoming an SIO. SIO 8 stated:
7 ignore Holmes in the short term and set it in motion; I don’t necessarily use it 
as an investigative tool. It is almost irrelevant at the start of an inquiry”.
SIO 6 felt that whilst Holmes was an “excellent library” the retrieval of information 
was difficult and that it could be a “waste of resources”. Like many SiOs, this SIO 
adapted Holmes and demonstrated some ability to escape the management by rote 
style. This SIO adapted Holmes to manage the actions generated by Holmes in a 
Category A case by using a matrix. SIO 7 admitted that he “didn’t understand 
Holmes” whilst SIO 9 felt that Holmes was the “tail that wagged the dog” and that it 
didn’t throw up the actions required. SIO 4 was a career detective and this was 
displayed in thorough, detailed responses to investigations with an emphasis on 
issuing actions on Holmes. However SIO 20 stated:
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"Holmes is stifling, graphical indexing (on Holmes) is time consuming and 
Holmes should only ever be a tool for analysis”.
This SIO reflected the view of many SIOs that the Holmes database was a good
reference tool but it tended to operate in slow time and did not adequately reflect the
information that was being received in the MIR. He stated that:
"The inquiry at times gets ahead of Holmes and I have to rely on office 
meetings and the team and analyst to support my decision-making”.
SIO 22 felt that “Holmes was a good management tool after a few weeks into the 
investigation” while SIO 19 felt that Holmes depended on the MIR staff operating it. 
He stated that:
“Holmes with the right staff is a good system and in one case helped to link the 
main TIE (suspect) with other TIEs that we did not know about”.
Investigative Thinking
SIOs had different approaches to their investigative thinking. One approach may be 
labelled “scientific thinking” and this can be illustrated by one SIO who stated that he 
arrives at a “hypothesis” after the first week. He then progresses systematically by 
proving the negatives as a way to support his theory about a particular case. 
Another SIO felt that by reviewing the strength of the accumulating evidence he 
could identify the suspect’s “weakest link' and then divert resources to concentrate 
on where the “suspect was most vulnerable”. One SIO faced an overseas trial (p3 
Book 1) while simultaneously investigating the murder in the UK. The SIO had to 
work "backwards” stating he advanced other enquiries to help identify them to the 
crime scene in this country. Other SIOs relied on their past experiences of cases on 
‘old fashioned’ police “legwork” (routine police evidence gathering) progressively 
leading to the identification of important witnesses or identifying a crime scene with 
new equipment. SIO 18 for example used his experience to negate possible 
difficulties in the seven inquiries he led during the research period.
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The prioritisation of lines of enquiry was seen as a fundamental part of the SIO’s
decision-making process by SIO 11. This SIO stated:
“That each action should support a major line of enquiry. Prioritisation of line's 
of enquiry is vital and the SIO must consider if that particular item supports a 
line of enquiry. I prioritise intelligence and ignore routine non-essential 
statement taking from police witnesses. I place more emphasis on forensic 
reviews rather than taking statements from POLSA teams (Police search 
teams)”.
SIO 17 saw the prioritisation of lines of enquiry as “clear signposts to success”. He 
felt that successful investigative work was a “slow process” using the example of one 
case where his team researched parking tickets on the victim’s vehicle, which led 
back to the murderer. SIO 1 stated that his use of the media to find a crime scene 
illustrated the need to prioritise lines of enquiry. In this particular case the SIO 
tasked his officers with a single line of enquiry rather than process actions from 
Holmes.
SIO 21 stated:
7 base my decision-making on sensible criteria. I think it is important to have 
the confidence to make decisions and the SIO should lead the inquiry. The SIO 
should not be frightened to make decisions and should prioritise actions. The 
SIO should select possible motives for the murder and lead the inquiry along 
those lines”.
The decision-making process should be constantly reviewed and adjusted when
fresh information comes to light. The ability to make a decision at the right time and
then constantly review it appeared to be a defining characteristic of successful
inquiries SIO 29 saw a need:
“To speed up the decision-making process with “hot debriefs” and getting facts 
quickly to make decisions quickly”.
In one other case the SIO prioritised the phone billing for the day of the murder and 
the day before thus reducing the research required in the early stages of the 
investigation. This SIOs six cases within the time period illustrated a clear pattern of 
systematic research and intelligence gathering along with the identification of key 
witnesses.
6.3.4 Prioritisation
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SIO 13 who dealt with Operation Trident cases (Black Gang Shootings) stated that:
“There was a need for fast time actions backed by intelligence from the Trident 
intelligence team. The inquiries are reliant upon source (informant) material 
and family liaison is usually difficult”.
Confidence in decision-making was mentioned by SIO 28, he commented:
“The real skill is in determining the prioritisation of lines of enquiry and allowing 
the team to have confidence in their own decision-making capabilities”.
The ability to prioritise and “score” potential solving factors was part of one SIOs 
management and decision-making process. He held “mini office meetings” when 
appropriate and produced “hypothesis” which he then scored. Where appropriate he 
produced a matrix and explained in the decision log how it was scored. He used one 
of the decision logs as a “strategy document”. He ensured that his Detective 
Sergeants understood his priorities and that the investigation moved in a “clear 
direction”. The action issued by the SIO on Holmes should reflect the SIO strategies 
and “correspond with his line of enquiries”. Another SIO remarked that the 
prioritisation of actions was the “real skill”. This respondent stated that the SIO 
cannot “pursue all lines of enquiry” and so “fast tracked” one of the actions 
suggested by a Detective Constable. The SIO agreed with the DC and arrested the 
suspect following a detailed arrest strategy. Within prioritisation, SIOs indicated four 
decision-making activities which are now described.
1. Phasing or Timescales of investigations.
2. Starburst
3. Evaluation
4. Implementation
1) Phasing
Phasing played a major part in Category A cases and SIOs described how they 
divided particular cases into distinct phases. In broad terms a first phase was 
concerned with meeting the requirements of Section 51 time limits and 
obtaining sufficient evidence to bring the suspect to court. A second phase was 
concerned with obtaining similar fact evidence and constructing a case to prove 
several murder charges against the same suspect. The second phase was a 
long term one with the need to co-ordinate forensic evidence, witness 
statements and advice from other experts. One SIO commented that in a long
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running case he had to “build in blocks of time” (p65) to deal with the particular 
case but also the seven other cases his team were dealing with at the time. At 
the other end of the investigative phase, one SIO (Research Notebook 2:7) 
described the benefit of a “long war” in keeping a case open, ln one murder 
case where the suspect was shot, the suspects were part of an ongoing 
proactive operation. It was decided that the murder case took primacy. The 
SIO decided that a joint operation with the proactive team would be more 
effective. The enquiry team worked with the proactive team and a huge 
amount of intelligence was obtained. SIO 27 dealt with a Category A murder 
which took place over 4 years with distinct phases of the inquiry. The initial 
stage of the inquiry generated a large number of actions. The second stage of 
the inquiry took place around the arrest stage and post arrest stage. The third 
distinct phase took place over the trial phase.
One SIO described the first 10 days of an inquiry as playing “catch up” and then 
after issuing actions there was a need to “tidy bases” before moving on. 
Similarly another SIO commented that after the first week of the inquiry there 
was “calm on the waters” and the SIO could start to compose strategies. The 
same SIO remarked that each case had its “own timeframe”. SiO 21 used 
activities as a basis for theming his phases in the following way:
• Forensic phase - initial phase
• Media phase
• Phone analysis - secondary phasing
• Linking two cases
• Dealing with Korean culture - third phase dealing with witnesses
• Track suspects car traced specks of blood 5 months afterwards - fourth
phase
All SIO’s interviewed agreed that the normal timescales for decision-making 
within an investigation were as follows:-
• The Golden Hour
• The first 24 hours of an investigation
• The first 48 hours of an investigation
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• The first week
• The first month
• The second month
• The third month.
The exception to this rule was “black on black” shootings investigated under 
Operation Trident where the timescales differed. This was due to the nature of 
the victims and witnesses where the SIOs found that by waiting for the gangs to 
disagree and cultivating significant witnesses arrests were made some 
significant time after the original incident. By not streamlining and not 
prioritising lines of enquiry the SIO can overload the inquiry detracting from 
what is really needed to solve the case. Hyper-vigilance and overloading the 
MIR can be as unproductive as doing too little. The balance of activity levels at 
the first stage of an inquiry is of paramount importance. The research 
illustrated the phases used in the major inquiries and a pattern of decision­
making emerged starting with the initial “starburst” of activity in the early stages 
of an inquiry.
2) Starburst
The initial murder scene can be seen as a starburst of information where the 
SIO is confronted by a maelstrom of information. The SIOs task is to collect all 
information and intelligence pertinent to the case. This includes the 
identification of witnesses, house-to-house enquiries, anniversary appeals and 
the collection of CCTV tapes, the collection of Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition systems, E-Fit impressions and the collection of telephone / 
communication evidence. This period of activity is resource intensive, however 
the collection of evidence in the early stages of an investigation provides 
evidential opportunities that cannot be replicated. This early stage can be 
described as an incremental approach to decision-making where “satisficing” is 
all that can be done until the investigative stage. This satisficing, or doing the 
best job possible, is a legitimate technique at the early stage of an inquiry (see 
Chapter 2).
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This is followed by an evaluation phase where the information can be analysed,
this may include financial analysis and phone analysis along with the
management of outside experts. SIO 22 reviewed his suspect strategy in one
case and managed his “suspect group “so that they gave evidence for the
prosecution by careful management of that group. The SIO stated:
7 identified a weak link where they were most vulnerable. I kept plugging 
away and managed to turn the suspects round (to give evidence). It was 
important to maintain momentum and to keep the inquiry going”.
The SIOs indicated that the construction of a good search strategy following the 
initial collection of information is of a paramount importance in the tracing of 
evidence. The SIO must be concerned with the early discovery of a murder 
weapon, the retrieval of forensic evidence and other physical evidence. The 
review of all information collected can happen at various stages of the 
investigation. This involves a constant and repetitive questioning of the 
evidence. The SIOs (and the historic cases mentioned in Chapter 4) highlight 
the difficulties in an “assumption train” of inferences not based on fact and 
substantiated information. There is a need to assess all lines of enquiry 
constantly to avoid a myopic stance on lines of enquiry that may set the inquiry 
on the wrong course.
The Yorkshire Ripper case illustrated the pitfalls in simply addressing one line 
of enquiry to the exclusion of others. When describing the overall decision­
making model the research described how the initial activity is framed within the 
legal knowledge (as outlined in Chapter 2). Then the forensic management 
and procedural knowledge (as identified in Chapter 4). This makes up the 
evaluative knowledge structure described by O’Keefe, Brown and Lyons 
(2009:237) in the context of police rape investigations as the totality of prior 
experience the officer brings to an inquiry. As they say, this knowledge 
structure “affects the salience, availability and prioritisation of information”. The 
relative weight attached to this incoming information and the levels of activity 
generated appear, in the case of the present SIOs, to be affected by a process 
that can be termed diagnostic inclination. That is the degree to which the SIO
3) Evaluation
150
is prepared to engage investigative thinking, i.e. hypothesis generation and 
analysis from the inception of the inquiry. The SIO in this case does not simply 
view Holmes as a filing cabinet to be filled through rote observance of the 
murder manuals (i.e. the procedural knowledge base). The primary decision 
goal is moderated by diagnostic inclinations and the style of the SIO being 
more flexible and creative or rigid due to rote following of the investigative 
principles. This can be represented as follows:
Figure 6.7 Evaluative Knowledge Structures
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4) Implementation
The investigative stage is where the SIO draws up past experience of the type 
(theme) of murder (e.g. gang related, domestic) where there appeared to be 
two types of investigative thinking: proactive or reactive. Being responsive to 
new information in a more creative way was associated with a democratic 
management style where the SIO activity sought feedback from the members 
of the MIT. Reliance on the SIOs own past experience of a particular type of 
murder and simply following the guidance in the manual was associated with a 
more directive management style. At this information processing stage SIOs 
deploy potential solving factors and go through a series of iterations and re-
151
framing as the leads in the inquiry are evaluated. This can be represented as 
follows:
Figure 6.8 Investigative Stage
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Stages
Setting priorities
proactive Theme specific decision frame reactive
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evidence / 
evaluation Re-frame
evidence / 
evaluation
It is at this stage there is a funnelling of information. The interview material indicated 
that the SIOs had to ensure the implementation of their decisions by careful 
management of the MIR and enquiry team. Ensuring implementation is perhaps the 
hardest part of SIOs responsibilities. The implementation of an SIOs strategy is of 
paramount importance to the successful conclusion of inquiries. Most complex 
decisions will require an "elaborate co-ordinated implementation process”. Russo, 
Schoemaker (2002). For SIOs there is a need to have regular updated information 
from the MIR and the enquiry team. This stage concerns the procedural features 
involved in the investigation with a more complex set of heuristics weighing up the 
pros and cons to evaluate the potential information and evidence and to focus on the
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solving factors. The more successful SIOs did this using a more systematic 
approach e.g.:
“coming to [an] hypothesis after the first couple of weeks and then to prove the 
negatives to come to the main theory”
“The assimilation of facts and adjusting your decision-making process when 
fresh information came into the inquiry was crucial to getting the facts right It 
was important to admit when you are wrong”.
This more differentiated approach contrasted with who just applied the panoply of 
available resources. Irrespective of the approach the end result is the charging of a 
suspect (and, as will be shown in the next chapter, the more discerning strategy 
resulted in this being achieved more quickly). It is the SIOs duty to then ensure an 
evidential package before the case is fit to proceed through the criminal justice 
process. This is achieved at the deliberative stage.
Figure 6.9 Deliberative Stage
Final
Deliberative
Stage
Differentiated
alternatives
Pros & cons
l
Solving
factors
Undifferentiated
alternatives
Charge |j Charge j
suspect !I suspect
By putting the whole model together, this suggests two routes through the decision­
making and employment of investigative thinking. The right hand route proposes a 
pathway drawing on procedural knowledge and past experience in a reactive manner 
and applying the principles from the Murder Manual in a rote “by the book” fashion 
where the SIO is directive and does not utilise the inputs from the MIT. The 
alternative pathway is one in which the SIO is more creative and is able to 
differentiate the potential value of the available soling factors. Both routes do result
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in charging of suspects but, as will be shown, the right hand route takes rather 
longer.
Figure 6.10 Full Decision Model
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Seven broad solving themes emerged comprising 41 individual solving factors. 
These were mentioned by the SIOs as solving their particular cases are:
1. Police Strategies
2. Suspects Behaviour
3. Technical Strategies
4. Intelligence Strategies
5. Media strategies
6. Use of outside experts
7. Legal strategy
A full listing of these is given in Chapter 7, Table 7.5.
Forensic Witness Management
The technical strategies such as the use of CCTV material was thought to be a key 
solving factor. Many SIOs commented that when seeking to exploit CCTV cameras 
it was vital to set parameters for retrieval. The collection of CCTV evidence played a 
large part in the successful conclusion of cases involving disputes. This is explained 
by the large number of these cases that take part in public places and areas covered 
by CCTV notably town and city centres. Telephone analysis was also thought to be 
an important solving factor. The obtaining of a suspect’s telephone billing details 
usually provides a clearer picture of what has happened at the time of the murder. It 
can also place a suspect in an area through a process known as cell site analysis. 
The use of intelligence was also nominated as a significant factor encompassing the 
use of analysis, financial analysis, the use of informants and the use of intelligence 
from within the murder teams and murder command. Teams now have dedicated 
Intelligence Cells within the inquiry team.
The use of outside experts from the National Policing Improvement Agency, such as 
geographical and behavioural profilers and liaison with external agencies, were 
mentioned by some SIOs as contributing to solving cases. The use of the Media 
generally, and more specifically individual press offices, Crimestoppers and the 
BBC's Crimewatch programme, were also felt to have contributed to the resolving of
6.3.5 Solving Factors
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the inquiry. The solving factors were further broken down into those which generate 
strategies to find the suspects i.e. witness management and investigative thinking 
and those which are “suspect confirming”. These suspect confirming strategies are 
those issues such as Identity Parades and the use of witness albums.
6.3.6 Comparison of Successful I Unsuccessful SIOs
The SIOs were broken down into different groups according to their clear-up rate, i.e. 
the number of cases they solved during the research period. Eleven SIOs had a 
100% clear-up rate. The majority were “career detectives” i.e. they had been in the 
CID at each rank of their service. Compared to the SIOs in the “poor” category i.e. 
with a clear-up rate less than 50% were the majority. Six out of eight SIOs had no 
previous CID background in contrast with 10 out of the 11 successful SIOs with 
100% clear up.
Table 6.2 Successful SIOs
Detection Rates SIO Total Career Path
100% - Excellent 11 81.8% D, 11.1% S, 11.1% N
80% - Good 5 60% D, 20% N, 20% S
79-50% - Average 8 42.8% D, 28.5% N, 28.5% S
Less than 50% - Poor 7 42.8% N, 28.5% S, 28.5% D
D= Career Detective
S = Partial CID experience
N = No previous CID experience
SIO 8 (had six successful cases with no unsuccessful cases in the research time 
period 2001-2003). SIO 10 had eight successful cases with three negative and one 
case at trial. SIO 14 had five successful cases (including a Category A case) with 
one unsuccessful case. SIO 18 had ten successful cases with one negative case.
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SIO 20 had five successful cases including one Category A case. SIO 22 had three 
successful cases and two unsuccessful cases.
All of the successful SIOs indicated they used the following strategic themes:
• Witness management
• CCTV
• Forensic
• Intelligence and
• Investigative Thinking
• Media
Examining the interview material with the SIOs shows that the successful SIOs were 
more likely to develop informal contacts with journalists to obtain the best use of the 
media to solve the case without overburdening the MIR. The use of “Investigative 
Thinking” by seven of the eight successful SIOs also reflects the wider decision­
making process by the successful SIOs. The unsuccessful SIOs used only one 
theme collectively. This was the Intelligence Theme. Interestingly the unsuccessful 
SIOs used more individual themes than the successful SIOs. Looking in detail at 
these themes they may well be seen as themes “of last resort” after the cases have 
proved difficult to detect. Analysis of success rates by style shows the innovative 
and democratic SIOs enjoying the highest clear-up rates.
Table 6.3. Clear-up Rate Compared to Management style
Management 
Style of SIO
%of
SIOs
Clear up Rate % 
average Career Path
Democratic 32.2% 79.5% 60% D, 20% S, 10% N
Autocratic 29% 70% 66% D, 22% S, 11% N
Management by 
rote 22.5% 61.8% 57% N, 14% S, 28.5% D
Innovative 16.1% 85.4% 100% Detective
D = Career Detective 
S = Partial CID experience 
N = No previous CID experience
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The chapter has illustrated the significance of the SIOs decision-making and 
management style on Category A and B murders. It has identified the key variables 
that solved the murder cases within the 166 cases researched. The seven broad 
solving themes and 41 solving factors help to explain how these major cases are 
dealt with. It highlights the importance of what the police do and how crucial the 
management of witnesses is to the success of inquiries. The selection of the correct 
solving factor for the inquiry being investigated is a crucial element to success.
The use of intelligence and the SIOs own “investigative thinking” abilities were the 
third and sixth highest solving factors respectively. The collection and analysis of 
telephone billing along with CCTV material showed the importance of the early 
selection of the correct solving factor. A review of the solving factors reveals that the 
most underused aspects were the linking of offences, the use of analysis and the 
use of financial analysis. If these were used in real-time and in a more streamlined 
manner they would be of greater assistance to the inquiry and SIO. The positive and 
negative pressures within the separate investigations were identified.
The SIOs management style was an important factor in the decision-making process 
and the inclusive approach was used by successful SIOs. The less successful SIOs 
had a more reactive style responding to events rather that anticipating them. The 
inclusive style and the prioritisation of lines of enquiry were significant inter-related 
with Holmes activity. The inclusive style encouraged the team to participate. In 
Chapter 5 the major issues from public inquiries were identified and those themes 
have been further identified in this research. One SIO talked of the lack of support 
from his Superintendent, which indicates that there is still lack of leadership in some 
Senior Management Teams. The disparities in the use of Holmes also potentially 
indicate a problem with information management within the MIR system. The lack of 
a post charge strategy in one Category A case shows that individual strategy failures 
can occur. As reported by the SIOs, their nomination for the top individual solving 
factors were within the technical and the police strategies.
6.4 S u m m a r y
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The next chapter reviews these features of investigation by examining the Holmes 
records of the cases that the 31 SIOs dealt with. This provides an opportunity to 
examine more objectively the features associated with solved and unsolved cases 
and permits a comparison with those factors the SIOs themselves nominated as 
contributing to the investigation.
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C h a p t e r  7 :  S t u d y  F o u r :  H o l m e s  S e c o n d a r y  A n a l y s i s
7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters indicated that there are a series of procedures and strategies 
involved in a murder investigation. This chapter presents a secondary analysis of 
the 166 cases investigated by the SIOs featured in Chapter 7. The 166 cases were 
archived on the Holmes database.
The research aims in this study are to:
1. Enumerate the key strategies used in Category A and Category B murder 
investigations;
2. disaggregate the specific elements (tactics) making up these strategies;
3. profile the key factors distinguishing solved and unsolved cases including the 
SIO management style extracted from the preceding analyses;
4. provide an account of the structural features of Category A and Category B 
murder investigations including the:
• time taken
• number of action generated
• the length of time taken to charge a suspect
7.2 Method
The research aims were addressed by undertaking secondary analysis of the 
Holmes data databases (see Chapter 5). This was a quantitative method described 
in Chapter 3. The strengths of a mixed method approach were explored in that 
chapter and they included a more complete understanding of the issues to inform the 
theory. It was decided to use a mixed method approach in this research because of 
the broad and qualitatively different research questions and the emphasis on
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practical application; the materials, i.e. SIO accounts, archived cases and relevant 
documents, were accessible to the researcher who was familiar with these resources 
as a practitioner. Access to the central Holmes database held in central London was 
allowed by the Commander Homicide. Access was allowed to both HOLMES 1 and 
HOLMES 2. The findings were compared with the SIO interviews and the Holmes 
action queues (number of Holmes actions created) were researched along with the 
book 200 (SIO Decision Log) entries. These again were compared with the SIO 
interviews, in many cases there were Holmes actions not mentioned by the SIO but 
took up a great deal of time in the investigation but did not help the case. The 
categories of Holmes are explained below. These issues were noted in a research 
diary. As the author went through the Holmes accounts he kept note of the length of 
time the inquiry had taken and the number of actions issued overall.
7.2.1 Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
Holmes is a computerised information and storage system used in murder cases 
investigated by British police forces previously described in Chapter 4. Briefly 
Holmes provides SIOs with an accurate record of the state of the inquiry and 
determines the status of the inquiry. It provides a record of the people, exhibits, 
phone numbers and vehicles in the inquiry and assists in the cross-referencing of 
information and intelligence. Holmes assists legal decision-making including 
disclosure issues
Holmes is divided up into the following different indexes:
• Category
• Exhibits
• Location
• Nominal
• Organisation
• Sequence of Events
• Telephone
• Vehicle.
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The present research accessed each of these indexes to determine actions raised 
for inquiries by the interviewed SIOs between 2001 and 2003. Holmes is not a user- 
friendly database and neither is it an analytical tool. As a consequence it was 
necessary to extract the data from Holmes and construct a separate SPSS database 
to address the research aims (see Appendix 2 and 3).
7.2.2 Sampling Cases
There are self-imposed limits to the research due to the sheer volume of murder 
cases within the Metropolitan Police Service. The selection of cases was based on:
1. Category A and B murders (see Chapter 2.3 for definition)
2. a circumscribed time period (2001-2003)
3. cases investigated by 31 SIOs interviewed for the qualitative study
This research is confined to Category A and B murders and not Category Cs due to 
their number and the “self solving” aspect of these murders. By definition, Category 
C cases are “routine” easy to solve where the suspects were already known or can 
be easily detected. Category A homicides are defined as a major crime of grave 
public concern and Category B as a routine major crime where the offender is not 
known. This study confined itself to a two-year period from 2001-2003 for Category 
A and B murders within the London area. This allowed for sufficient time for the 
outcome of long running cases to be recorded. In all the MPS dealt with 190 
murders in 2001/2002 and in 2002/2003 they dealt with 196. There were 166 
Category A and Category B murder cases investigated by the interviewed SIOs 
during 2001-2002.
7.2.3 Procedure
Permission was sought from an ACPO member to access all the relevant Holmes 
accounts at the central MPS Holmes administrative centre. Many of the Holmes 
accounts had been “archived” electronically and further permission was sought to
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access these cases. As mentioned earlier, an additional consent was obtained from 
the SiOs whose cases were being subjected to this analysis.
There are two Holmes databases, live and archived, both of which were accessed 
for this research and amalgamated for the purposes of analysis. A Coding 
Dictionary was derived (see Table 8.5 for full details) from the proceeding accounts 
in Chapter 4 of the doctrine and from the analysis in Chapter 7 of the SIO interviews.
Seven investigative strategies were identified (by a combination of factors identified 
by the SIOs, Murder Manual directives, and Holmes indices) as follows:
• Police strategies
• Technical aspects
• The use of intelligence
• The use of the media
• The use of technology
• The behaviour of the suspect
• Implications of the legal aspects of the cases
Each of these was broken down into a sub set of 41 solving factors (described in 
detail in Chapter 3). The data extraction took place between September 2004 and 
May 2006. The information was updated when new information became available 
such as the arrest and charging of a suspect.
The data was extracted from the Holmes database and then placed in the research 
notebook and onto an Excel spreadsheet. This was then transferred to the SPSS 
spreadsheet. This was then formalised in to the categories shown in table 7.5.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
In this research the highest age range of murder victims was between 21 to 30 years 
of age. The research illustrates the consistency of the age of victims in peace time
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post war Britain. The age range combined with the main motive for killing which are 
“quarrel or dispute” shows that the majority of murder cases are between young men 
in public places. The age range of the victims, the 16-30 age group was the highest. 
This has important implications for the SIO in setting search parameters and 
prioritising suspect categories. The majority of victims were male as shown in Table 
8.1 below. The modal age category was 21-30. Victims were fairly evenly split in 
terms of ethnicity with a small majority being classified as white.
Table 7.1 Victim details
Details N (166) %
Age
Under 20 21 12.7%
21-30 69 41.6%
31-40 27 16.3%
Over 41 38 22.9%
Missing data 11 6.6%
Sex
Male 128 77.1%
Female 30 18.1%
Missing data 8 4.8%
Race
White 79 47.6%
Non white 71 42.8%
Missing data 16 9.6%
The next group of results provides some details of the motive, means and location of 
the killing. A total of 20 different types of murder were identified which were 
categorized into the following broader categories, (full listing is given in Appendix 2) 
Thirteen of the cases were “criminal on criminal” killings and 11 involved black on 
black gang shootings investigated by Operation Trident. Therefore, in conjunction 
with contract killings, a total of 25 murders in this research period can be classed as 
criminal killings, making it the third highest motive after disputes and robbery /
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financial cases. There was a number of not known motives (six cases) and these 
can make inquiries more complex and harder to solve. They present SIOs with 
issues around the elimination of suspects and how to target resources.
Table 7.2 Type of Murder
Type N %
Disputes/domestic 54 32.5 ;
Robbery/financial 28 16.9
Racist/homophobic 25 15.1
Drug related 21 12.7
Other 19 11.4
Stranger/mental illness 12 7.2
Criminal contract 7 4.2
The weapon of choice from the present research was a knife or sharp instrument 
along with a manual method of killing which indicate that these are crimes of 
instantaneous rather than pre-determined acts of extreme violence. The weapons 
are those that present themselves at the scene, i.e. beer glass or a domestic knife.
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Table 7.3 Murder Weapons used in 166 Cases Researched
Weapon N %
Knife 44 26
Manual 42 25
Firearm 35 21
Asphyxiation 9 5
Motor vehicle 7 4
Ligature 6 4
Sharp instrument 5 3
Blunt instrument 4 2
Strangulation 4 2
Not Known 3 2
Drugs 2 1
Other 2 1
Multiple weapons 1 1
Poison 1 1
Arson 1 1
Table 7.4 below shows that most victims were found in a public place 62.7% (104) of 
cases, and in 36.1% (60) the location was a private place.
Table 7.4 Murder Venue in 166 Cases Researched
Public place 104 62%
Private Place 60 36%
Not known 2 1.8%
Solving Factors
Table 7.5 illustrates the frequency of the strategies used in each of the inquiries. 
The table shows the use of forensic techniques was the most used strategy followed 
by the management of witnesses, the use of police intelligence, the use of CCTV
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footage and phone analysis. The passive data techniques are highlighted in the 
table under the technical heading. The table further shows that the SIO considered 
many of the factors shown but did not actually deploy them.
Table 7.5 Frequency with which Strategies and Tactics Used
Police
No of 
times 
used 
success 
-fully
%oftotal
No of times considered 
By SIO Legal
No of 
time 
used 
success 
-fully
%of
total
No of times 
considered 
by SIO
Witness Mgt 54 32.5 166 Consult with CPS 10 6 166Invest Thinking 31 18.7 38 Identity parades 17 10.2 89Covert techs 18 10.2 41 Witness Albums 1 0.6 76Local officers 17 9.6 130 Immunity 1 0.6 1House to House 17 10.2 166Proactive surv 16 9.0 38Arrest Strategy 12 7.2 62Linked cases 5 3.0 166FLO 4 2.4 166Reward 3 1.8 102Anniversary Appeal 2 1.2 166Holmes 2 1.2 142POLSA 2 1.2 89Post charge 1 0.6 34strategy
Technical intelligenceForensic techs 62 37.8 156 Police Intell 48 22.9 16CCTV footage 42 25.6 128 databasesPhone analysis 45 27.1 123 Use of Informants 17 10.2 6Private CCTV 3 1.8 22 Use of analysisRecovery murder 10 6.0 141 Use of financial 9 5.4 52weapon analysis 8 2 166Use of E Fit 6 3.6 22 32ANPR 1 0.6 45
Non police Mediaexperts
NCF/NPIA 10 4.6 54 Media generally 12 3.0 117Liaison outside 7 4.2 38 Crimewatch 1 0.6 7Agencies Crimestoppers 1 0.6 67Pathology 5 3.6 165Behavioural 4 2.4 15Profiling
Geographical 1 0.6 7Profiling
Suspect
behaviour
Confessions 4 2.4 4Dying Declaration 2 1.2 2Interviews 4 2.4 166
Total = 515
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Case 88 of the present research illustrates the complex interaction between all the 
participants in a murder scenario. The victim was a prolific violent burglar who was 
disturbed by the homeowners ex-partner who went to the kitchen and armed himself 
with a knife and then confronted the burglar. A fight ensued and the burglar was 
stabbed 20 times. The suspect then decamped from the scene. The scenario 
shows the complexity of possible “motives” and legally it is difficult to distinguish 
between the “suspect” and “victim”. The suspect in this case was found guilty of 
manslaughter. The dynamics involved in the scenario are initially confusing. The 
decision-making process of the SIO in this type of case must be objective
7.3.2 Phasing of Inquiries
This refers to the management of major inquiries over its lifetime. Phasing played a 
major part in the inquiries researched and from the secondary analysis all the cases 
were examined for the flow of action allocation during the lifespan of the inquiry. The 
average length of time taken for resolved Category A and Category B cases within 
this research is 60 weeks (14 months) while the unresolved cases, at the time of last 
database update, took 56 weeks. These cases are therefore protracted and require 
a series of phases to maintain and preserve the investigation. It is also possible to 
examine the average number of tactics used within particular strategies to see 
whether the quantity was significant. Overall resolved cases averaged 358 actions 
and the unresolved 866 actions. Figure 7.6 below displays the level of activity within 
the first month. The cases fell into three different lengths of time, quick, average and 
long. These are shown in Table 7.6 below. This table shows the highest number of 
cases was within the “quick” period a total of 77 cases.
Table 7.6 Length of 166 Research Cases in 3 Broad Groups
Type Length in months
Number
solved
%of
total
solved
Unresolved* % of total unresolved
Quick 1-12 months 41 36% 37 70%
Average 13-18 months 43 38% 6 11%
Long 19 months plus 29 26% 10 19%
Total 113 100% 53 100%
* This is the length of time the enquiry has been running
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Three detailed examples are shown below to illustrate the demand periods of these 
major inquiries. The cases were chosen to illustrate typical cases that fall within the 
categories shown in Table 8.6.
Example One: Operation 63
Figure 7.1 Illustration of a ‘Quick’ Case
 Figure 7.1 Illustration of a ‘Quick’ Case
Operation 63
HolmesActions
0 Forensic - 20
■ ID Parades-24
■ Witness Mgt - 21
M o n th s  o f the  e n q u iry
This case was an Operation Trident enquiry where 14 shots were fired into the side 
of the victim’s vehicle. The victim was an ex Jamaican Police Officer and it was a 
case of mistaken identity, the intended victim was in the vicinity. The case was 
solved by the use of police intelligence and eye witness testimony. There was no
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forensic material but the suspect was picked out on an identity parade. One suspect 
was charged and one is still in the USA and is shown as wanted by the MPS. This 
Operation lasted 12 months with a total of 1,323 actions; this was a criminal case 
with witness management actions and forensic actions as well as identity parade 
actions.
Example 2: Operation 89 
Figure 7.2 Illustration of an ‘Average* Case
Holmes Actions 
Operation 89
□ Financial-188
■ Forensic -90
■ Phone - 96
■ Bus-17
Months of Inquiry
Operation 89 was a Category A case that lasted 14 months with a total of 1,398 
actions. The highest number of actions related to financial analysis, then phone
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analysis, then forensic actions and finally 17 actions related to the suspects’ 
movements on public transport. The case relates to a missing girl whose body was 
later found in a suitcase in a different part of the UK. The inquiry involved officers 
going to Korea and dealing with the authorities in that country. The MIT traced the 
suspect’s vehicle five months after the incident and found traces of the victims DNA 
in the boot. The MIT then traced the victim’s Korean bank card which was last 
cashed in France. Cell site analysis then traced the suspect from London to the 
North of England and this case was linked to another murder by the same suspect. 
This was a complicated case involving foreign liaison and conducting financial 
enquiries abroad. There was also IT problems linking the two UK police forces.
Example 3: Operation 34
Figure 7.3 Illustration of ‘Long’ Case
Operation 34 P e ak s of Activity
Holmes Actions
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Months of the enquiry
This long running case was a Category A case with a high profile involving the death 
of a young male. The phone evidence in this case was vital but the trial judge 
rejected the phone evidence offered before the court. The milieu of the witnesses 
was also an issue. Eighteen witnesses gave evidence and the police had alerted the 
CPS to difficulties with the witnesses. The age group and the cultural background of 
the witnesses made it difficult for the police to obtain accurate witness testimony. 
The crime scene was a confused one with potential multiple sites that took up a 
great deal of police time. Community tensions were high and the SIO had to operate
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in a highly political atmosphere. He stated that at the early stage of the investigation 
he was offered every assistance. The issue here was resourcing the inquiry during 
its long period of investigation. The graph shows the peaks of activity over the four 
year period of the investigation with peaks of activity in iate 2002 when Treasury 
Counsel was appointed and then another peak during the trial in 2004.
The peaks of activity displayed in Operation 34 show the demand on “long” inquiries 
over a four year period, the demands in this case were dictated by the return of 
forensic material in late 2001 and late 2002. Late 2002 also saw the discovery of 
new witnesses, mid 2003 marked the list of actions given by Treasury Counsel to the 
incident room. Then in 2004 the trial took place at the Old Bailey and this entailed a 
high volume of work. Operation 34 was a Category A case that took four years to 
conclude with a lengthy court trial. A total of 2,906 actions were allocated as follows:
• 256 being forensic actions,
• 272 intelligence actions
• 221 actions related to CCTV and
• 42 phones enquiries.
7.3.3 Peaks of Activity in Category A and Category B Cases.
The analysis of the 166 cases showed the peaks of activity in category A and 
Category B cases.
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Figure 7.4 Percentage of Actions Raised in the First Month of the Inquiry
%
Number of actions raised
The starburst phenomena discussed in Chapter 6 can be illustrated by plotting the 
number of actions raised by time into the inquiry. This is illustrated in Figure 7.4; this 
illustrates the initial confusion in major inquiries of this type. The great majority of 
Holmes actions were issued in the first 100 weeks and this initial period of activity 
illustrates the frantic nature of major inquiries in the first instance.
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Figure 7.5 Starburst Activity in the First Phase of an Inquiry
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7.3.4 Solving Factors
Overall 76% of cases were solved with an average solving time of 63 weeks. The 
modal category number of solving strategies was four as shown in the figure below.
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Figure 7.6 Number of Solving Factors used in Inquiries
No of Inquiries
No of solving factors
Where a solving factor was a deliberate part of the SIOs strategy five factors 
statistically significantly differentiate those murders that were solved and those that 
remained unsolved. The five factors relate to those that were used most frequently 
and not the count of solving factors.
Table 7.7 Solving Factors (for Unsolved Cases see Appendix 1)
Factors Solved Unsolved Chi Square P Value
Forensic
material
62 12 3.27 0.005
Early witness 
management 54 3 7.966 0.003
House to house 
enquiries
54 1 4.427 0.0026
Investigativethinking 31 4 4.05 0.0032
Intelligence
database
48 16 3.9 0.003
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It is also possible to examine the number of tactics used within particular strategies 
to see whether the quantity was significant.
Figure 7.7 Average No of Tactics with a Strategy used in Solved and Unsolved 
Cases
/  / /  / /  /
V
<r
The number of police strategies used were statistically significantly different Mann- 
Whitney U (z = -3.2 p<.01) as were the average number of suspect strategies (z=-2 
p<.05). The first set of results report the general descriptive characteristics of the 
investigations. It is important to note with respect to the first table, frequencies with 
which particular tactics within the seven solving strategies were deployed. It is 
important to note that these frequencies do not imply routine deployment rather they 
were identified by the SIO as a specific aspect of their investigative strategy.
Table 7.8 below illustrates the frequency of the strategies used in each themed 
inquiry. It shows that the use of forensic techniques was the most used strategy 
followed by the management of witnesses, the use of police intelligence, the use of
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CCTV footage and phone analysis. The passive data evidence elements are 
highlighted in this table under the technical heading. The table further shows that 
the SIO considered many of the factors shown but did not actually deploy them. The 
traditional factor of suspect confessions played a minor part in the overall results. 
The Police (Police initiated strategies) investigative strategy represents the largest 
number of solving factors
The following tabulation describes, in brief the characteristics of enquiries by type of 
murder.
T a b le  7 .8  P ro file  o f  C h a ra c te r is t ic  by m u rd e r  ty p e
Type %solved
Average 
time to 
charging 
(weeks)
Average 
no of 
actions 
raised
Most often used 
weapon
Average 
no 
of police 
strategies 
used
Average no 
of intelligence 
strategies used
Dispute / domestic 83% 54 636 Manual 37% 
Knife 28%
1.05 .44
Robbery / financial 85% 50 596 Manual 43% 
Knife 32%
1.5 .46
Drug related 60% 75 826 Firearm 43% 
Knife 33%
1.14 .57
Stranger / mental 
health
75% 79 1619 Knife 50% 
Manual 25%
1.14 .25
Criminal / contract 57% 141 1025 Other 43% 
Knife/firearm 29%
1.14 1.14
Racist / 
homophobic
76% 58 367 Firearm 48% 
Knife 20%
0.7 .36
Other 68% 80 Other 42% 
Knife 26%
0.89 .36
7.3 .5  M u lt i-V a r ia te  A n a ly s e s
A logistic regression was conducted to extract the solving factors associated with 
successful resolution of the investigation as defined by charging a suspect. Four 
models were entered as follows:
Model 1 - victim details 
Model 2 - added murder details,
Model 3 - added police investigative strategies
The following tabulation describes the profile of characteristics of inquiries by type of 
murder.
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Model 4 - added SIO characteristics.
T a b le  7 .9  L o g is tic  R e g re s s io n  w ith  C a s e  B e in g  R e s o lv e d  o r  n o t as  th e  
D e p e n d e n t V a ria b le : O d d s  R a tio s .
Entered variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B)
Victim  details
Sex Male (REF) 1 1 1 1
Femaie 1.91 2.3 2.22 2.4
AgeGroup <20 (REF) 1 1 1 1
21-30 1.31 1.72 1.38 1.23
31-40 1.4 2.63 2.32 2.43
41 plus 1 0.99 1.09 0.90
Race White (REF) 1 1 1 1
Non-white 0.83 1 1.14 1.06
M urder details
Theme dispute (REF) 1 1 1
robbery 1.06 0.83 1.07
drug 0.63 0.55 0.69
stranger 0.54 0.43 0.44
criminal/contract 0.19 0.25 0.28
racist/homophobic 0.82 1.28 1.64
other 0.19* 0.2 0.2
Murder Venue public (REF) 1 1 1
private 3.06* 2.78 2.9
other 0.2 0.16 0.16
Murder weapon knife (REF) 1 1 1
firearm 0.57 0.62 0.56
manual 0.57 0.56 0.50
other 2.02 1.91 1.75
Investigative strategies
Police strategies (count) 2 .0* 2.15*
Experts (count) 0.76 0.71
Technical (count) 1.6 1.58
Media (count) 0.59 0.73
Intelligence (count) 0.65 0.62
SIO details
Age of SIO 0.94
Style 1 Proactive (REF) 1
Reactive 1.33
Style 2 democratic (REF) 1
autocratic 1.07
If a graduate Non-graduate (REF) 1
graduate 0.45
Chi square block 1.97 14.52 12.68* 1.73
model
*p<.05 ** p<01
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In these logistic regression models, the reference category of categorical variables is 
shown by the abbreviation, REF, next to the relevant category. Thus “male” is the 
reference category of the variable sex of the victim and has an odds ratio (Exp(B)) of 
1 to which we can compare the odds ratios of female victims towards predicting the 
solvability of a case. Here we see that the odds ratio of a case involving a female 
victim is 1.91 which means that those cases would be twice as likely to be solved 
compared to those involving male victims. However, we must note that this is non­
significant. In addition, the model Chi square is also non-significant indicating the 
unsuitability of this simple model in predicting solvability of a murder case. Thus we 
see that in these models when the victim is female, or aged between 20 and 40, or 
white, the likelihood of solving a case is greater than those involving male victims, 
those over 40 or under 20, or those involving non-white victims. However, these 
factors are non-significant. In addition, Model 2 showed that, compared to murders 
involving disputes or robberies, murders involving drugs, racist motives or criminal 
contracts are less likely to be solved. However, murders committed in private are 
significantly three times more likely to be solved that those committed in public. 
Knowing the murder weapon does not increase the likelihood of solving a crime 
although knife crimes are more likely to be solved that those involving firearms or 
using manual means. However, adding investigative strategies in Mode! 3 
significantly improved the model to predict solving a case. In Model 3, while 
controlling for victim and murder details, increasing police strategies significantly 
improved the likelihood of solving a case two-fold for every strategy used. The use 
of outside experts, the media or intelligence decreased the likelihood and using 
technical strategies increased the likelihood, but these strategies were non­
significant. Model 4 introduced the SIO characteristics to the model but did not 
improve the fit or demonstrate that the characteristics or style of the investigating 
officer improved the likelihood of solving the crime.
Further logistic regression was performed to determine which of the police strategies 
might predict resolving a case.
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T a b le  7 .10  L o g is tic  R e g re s s io n  E x a m in in g  P o lic e  S tra te g y  as  S o lv in g  F a c to rs :  
O d d s  R a tio s
Entered variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B)
Victim  details
Sex Male (REF) 1 1 1
Female 2.23 5.6* 9.7*
AgeGroup <20 (REF) 1 1 1
21-30 1.72 1.08 1.51
31-40 2.63 4.85 6.53
41 plus 0.98 0.99 1.15
Race White (REF) 1 1 1
Non-white 1.00 1.38 1.34
M urder details
Theme dispute (REF) 1 1 1
robbery 1.06 1.40 1.76
drug 0.63 1.54 2.03
stranger 0.54 8.111 0.92
criminal/contract 0.19 0.189 0.19
racist/homophobic 0.82 3.54 (p=0.06) 6.3
other 019* 0.149* 0.11*
Murder Venue public (REF) 1 1 1
private 3.06* 3.58 4.58*
other 0.2 0.39 0.57
Murder weapon knife (REF) 1 1 1
firearm 0.57 0.55 0.56
manual 0.57 0.59 0.51
other 2.02 3.6 3.72
Policing strategies
Investigative thinking No (REF) 1 1
Yes, investigative thinking 22.43* 44.02
Anniversary appeals No (REF) 1 1
Yes, uses anniversary appeals 0.14 0.08
Proactive surveillance No (REF) 1 1
Yes, use proactive surveillance 0.27 0.25
Early witness No (REF) 1 1
Yes, uses early witnesses 8.29** 8.99**
House to house No (REF) 1 1
Yes, uses house to house 12.99* 12.4*
SIO details
Age of SIO 0.932
Style 1 Proactive (REF) 1
Reactive 1.93
Style 2 Democratic (REF) 1
Autocratic 1.29
Style 3 Innovative (REF) 1
Management by rote 2.81
Neither 3.78
If a graduate Non-graduate (REF) 1
Graduate 0.52
If career Detective No (REF) 1
Career Detective 0.60
| Chi square of block 16.49 27.2*** 6.36
*p< 05, ** p< 01; *** p<0.001
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Once again, Model 1 is not a good predictor of solvability but in Model 2, which 
introduces policing strategies to predict solvability of murder cases, we see that 
cases involving female victims are now more likely to be solved that those involving 
males (by a factor of 6). In addition, certain policing strategies can dramatically 
increase the likelihood of solving a case, notably the use of investigative thinking (by 
22 times); the use of witness management (by 8 times) and the use of house to 
house enquiries (by 13 fold). However, in Model 3, where SIO characteristics are 
added and controlled for in the model, there are further increases in the predictability 
of solving a case by these policing strategies. Now the use of investigative thinking 
is predicted to increase the solvability by 44 times and the use of early witnesses by 
9 times. In addition in cases where the victim is female, controlling for policing 
strategies and SIO characteristics increases the likelihood of solving a case by 
tenfold. A further regression model, examines those solving factors associated with 
time taken to arrest and charge a suspect.
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T a b le  7.11 L in e a r R e g re s s io n  w ith  L e n g th  o f  T im e  (in  w e e k s ) T a k e n  to  R e s o lv e  
C a s e  as  th e  D e p e n d e n t V a ria b le
Entered variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta B Beta B Beta
coefficient values coefficient values coefficient values
Victim details
Sex Female (REF)
Male -26.6 -0.206 -26.1 -0.202 -46.1** -0.357**
AgeGroup <20 23.5 0.14 26.1 0.161 26.3 0.162
21-30 17.1 0.17 25.7 0.247 26.9 0.259
31-40 16.4 0.12 12.2 0.088 16.7 0.119
41 plus (REF)
Race Non-white (REF)
White 24.33* 0.233* 24.5 0.235 31.46* 0.301*
Murder details
Theme dispute (REF)
robbery -4.4 -0.034 10.2 0.078 7.25 0.055
drug 23.2 0.143 26.1 0.161 29.14 0.180
stranger 12.9 0.067 31.4 0.162 30.12 0.155
Criminal/contract 92.2*** 0.343*** 97.9*** 0.364*** 99.72*** 0.371***
Racist/homophobic 13.6 0.087 7.0 0.045 6.22 0.040
other 14.6 0.08 22.5 0.123 10.03 0.054
Murder venue private(REF)
public -8.6 -0.081 -7.9 -0.075 -14.17 -0.134
Murder weapon knife (REF)
firearm 17.3 0.127 18.3 0.134 19.8 0.145
manual -5.1 -0.045 -2.1 -0.018 -0.69 -0.006
other -15.32 -0.112 -12.2 -0.089 -10.3 -0.075
Policing strategies:
Arrest 9.7 0.05 0.559 0.003
Link -48.1 -0.156 -62.3 -0.202
Local -30.1 -0.192 -33.17 -0.212
Investigative thinking 12.1 0.097 26.6 0.213
Anniversary appeal 23.8 0.045 8.9 0.017
Proactive strategy -0.2 -0.001 9.7 0.053
Post charge -63.25 -0.119 -52.7 -0.099
Early witness -15.1 -0.141 -7.7 -0.072
Flouse to house -1.2 -0.008 6.4 0.043
Covert -6.2 -0.038 6.6 0.041
Reward -35.1 -0.114 -25.7 -0.083
Holmes -9.1 -0.024 4.2 0.011
Family Liaison Officer 26.8 0.087 34.3 0.111
SIO details
Style 1 Proactive (REF)
Reactive 31.9* 0.305*
Style 2 democratic (REF)
autocratic -0.19 -0.002
Style 3 Innovative (REF)
Management by rote -24.1 -0.176
Neither 20.2 0.194
If career detective No (REF)
Career detective -21.2 -0.198
R square 0.23 0.32 0.40
F 1.808* 1.2 ns 1.4 ns
*p<.05, ** p<.01; *** p<0.001
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In Model 1 of this linear regression predicting time taken to arrest of suspect, race of 
victim and cases involving contract killing significantly impact upon length of time to 
charge. Cases involving white victims take significantly more time that those 
involving black victims before a suspect is charged (24 more weeks on average) and 
cases involving contract killing take exceptionally longer than cases involving 
disputes (92 more weeks on average). Adding policing strategies used in the 
investigations did not significantly change the predictive power of the model with the 
only significant factor predicting time to charge now only being those cases involving 
contract killing. However, in Model 3, controlling for individual SIO policing styles 
and characteristics, several factors now significantly predict time to charge. Once 
again, white victims significantly increase time to charge but controlling for SIO 
characteristics has revealed that gender of the victim is also a significant predictor 
where cases involving male victims take less time on average than those involving 
female victims (on average 46 weeks less time). In addition, if the SIOs style is 
reactive this significantly increases resolving time by 31 weeks. The key tactics were 
investigative thinking, early witness strategy and house to house enquiries. The 
characteristics of the SIO were not significant in whether a suspect was charged, but 
did have an impact on the time taken to achieve this. If the SIO is reactive rather 
that proactive then this can lengthen the enquiry by up to 5 months.
Also the linear regression where Male is coded 1 and Female is 0, the coefficient of 
-26.6 would mean that it takes less time to solve cases where the victim is male (not 
female), controlling for all other variables in the model. A comparison of the mean 
time to charge by gender is shown in Table 7.13
T a b le  7 .1 2  T im e  to  C h a rg e  (in  w e e k s ) by G e n d e r
Sex of Victim Mean N Std.
Deviation
1 Male 59.9022 92 40.74
2 Female 85.2174 23 81.50
Total
64.9652 115 52.06
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The secondary analysis revealed the importance of what the SIO does along with the 
importance of managing the phasing of an inquiry over a period of time. The 
research further showed the importance of choosing the correct solving factors for 
the type of inquiry being investigated at that time. The seven broad themes and the 
36 individual solving factors uncovered by the research show the breadth and 
complexity of solving major crimes in the UK. The identification of the factors serves 
as a guide for SIOs and how these most challenging of inquiries can be solved. The 
multi-variate analysis showed that the number of police investigative strategies used 
was a significant variable predicting success. The “investigative thinking” employed 
by SIOs (i.e. what factors they initiated) was also significant. The SIO style was 
important in determining the length of the inquiry.
7.4  S u m m ary
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C h a p t e r  8 :  D i s c u s s i o n
8.1 in t ro d u c t io n
This chapter presents an overview of the research results and provides a summary 
of the findings. An over-arching aim of this thesis was to describe the murder 
investigative process and highlight the decision-making of the SIO. Re-iterating the 
objectives of this study the:
a) Research objectives:
1 Evaluating the solving factors in ‘hard to solve’ homicide cases.
2 Describing the decision frame for Category A and B murder cases.
3 Establishing the “phasing “patterns of decision-making in hard to solve 
inquiries, notably the starburst levels of great activity.
4 Elucidating the decision-making styles of SIOs and what models of 
decision-making they used (i.e. Naturalistic Decision-making or 
Traditional Decision-making) and further defining their expertise.
5 Demonstrating the contribution of investigative processes and SIO 
style to the resolving of crimes and length of time taken to resolve 
cases.
6 Establishing the different types of murder cases and how the theme of 
the murder case itself defines the solving factors.
b) Practice objectives:
1 Establishing principles of good practice.
2 De-constructing key elements within the complexities of investigations 
of Category A and Category B cases.
3 Indicating the relative efficacy of differing SIOs management styles.
4 Characterising successful SIOs.
In addressing the research questions a mixed methods design was adopted such 
that:
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• Study One utilised an archival analysis of past public or professional inquiries 
into murder investigations that were problematic and led to recommendations 
from which modern practice is derived ( reported in Chapter 4);
• Study Three was undertaken by interviewing currently serving or recently 
retired SIOs to establish their decision-making and management styles 
(reported in Chapter 6).
• Study Four presented a secondary quantitative analysis of cases in Homes in 
order to look at the role of key solving factors and the SIO factors contributing 
to successfully charging a suspect (reported in Chapter 7).
The theoretical formulations were described in Chapter 3.
8.2 M a p p in g  C o n te m p o ra ry  M u rd e r  In v e s t ig a t io n  P ra c tic e
The basis for the modern murder teams and the introduction of Holmes and the MIT 
structure were described as evolving over time and developing through errors made 
in a series of celebrated case (described in Chapter4). Thus the use of the Home 
Office Large Major Enquiry computer System (Holmes) arose in the aftermath of 
data handling mistakes in the search for Peter Sutcliffe, the eponymous Yorkshire 
Ripper. The Macpherson Inquiry drew attention to the need for systematic 
management of the MIR, exercise of the SIOs critical judgement and better witness 
management. Planning the phasing of inquiries were the subject of the Taylor 
Review and also the Climbie Inquiry. The Lawrence Inquiry drew attention to the 
running of Family Liaison Officers (FLOs). The main stages in running a murder 
investigation are formulated through the Murder Manual and MIRSAP along with the 
NPIA Core Investigative Doctrine. This Doctrine states the parameters at the 
instigation of an initial investigation through and includes suspect management and 
evidential evaluation. This Doctrine underpins modern investigative practice which 
has been informed by the recommendations of inquiries in the aftermath of errors by 
SIOs and murder investigation teams.
Six themes were identified from these inquiries and can be summarised as follows:
• Clarity and leadership among Senior Investigating Officers (SIO)
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• Skills of the SIO;
• Systematic failures;
• Phasing of inquiries
• The role of the Major Incident Room/ information management;
• Individual investigative strategy failures.
The key sequencing of a murder enquiry is summarised below.
F ig u re  8.1 S u m m a ry  o f  S e q u e n c in g  o f  R o le s  a n d  A c tio n s  in a M u rd e r  In q u iry
T im e
Body sighted ' 999 call made to police
999 call received and Assessment,
officer despatched  ^ preservation, initial exam
Uniform arrive at scene of scene, calls 
supervisor
Supervisor arrives-at— — ►
scene Risk assess,
 ^ Initiates enquiries,
begins log, notifies local 
CID
Local CID arrive at
scene ------► CID declares critical
incident, notifies HAT
HAT aoes to scene
Confirms critical incident 
Informs Supt Serious
8.3 K e y  S o lv in g  Is s u e s
One of the key solving factors to emerge was the SiOs ability to identify the theme of 
the murder quickly, i.e. whether this was likely to be a gang related killing or resulting 
from some domestic dispute, and to keep reviewing the progress of the
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investigation. Forensic management was the single most important factor SIOs self 
identified but interestingly it was the management of witnesses that was a decisive 
factor revealed through the secondary analysis. The research findings suggest that 
witness management was a particularly significant factor in the following types of 
murder cases:
• Criminal killings
• Disputes
• Drug related murders
• Financially motivated murders
• Operation Trident murders.
There were a greater variety of weapons used in solved cases ranging from sharp 
instruments, blunt instruments and firearms along with two strangulation cases. 
Arrest and suspect charged in dispute cases took an average of 49.5 weeks to solve 
while unsolved cases, in the analysis, had been running for an average of 65.73 
weeks against a mean of 60 weeks overall. The research results revealed that in 
solved dispute cases a knife and manual methods were used most frequently. In 
unsolved cases a firearm was used four times and manual methods eight times as 
often with a knife used in only two such cases. Solved dispute cases involved 636 
Holmes actions while unsolved disputes had to date issued 650 actions. The solved 
disputes were more likely to take place in public places as opposed to private. The 
victims were mainly white and male.
In unsolved dispute cases the difference between public and private places is less 
distinct; nine cases took place in public with six cases taking place in private. 
Proportionally more of the victims in unsolved cases were black (six cases) while 
one in five victims were female, (in solved cases it is 1 in 7). In unsolved cases there 
was an equal number of black and white victims. In dispute cases there was little 
evidence of “investigative thinking” used in unsolved cases yet this was a feature in 
most of the solved cases. Forensic issues were the most used tactic in both solved 
and unsolved cases. The management of witnesses was the second most used 
tactic in solved cases along with the use of CCTV evidence. This reflects the 
importance of witness identification evidence in these cases. The highest negative 
factor in solving the cases was from the behaviour of officers first at the scene of a
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major inquiry. This remains a problem for investigators as it may be sometime 
before they arrive at the scene of a major inquiry and what happens in the first 
instance can have a permanent impact on the inquiry. Paradoxically when local 
officers got the procedure right, this was highlighted as a key solving factors. SIOs 
commented in equal terms about good and bad practice at the scene.
The successful cases also involved consulting with the CPS, the NPIA and the 
media. In unsolved cases there was no phone analysis, no covert tactics used and 
no analysis used. The range of time taken varied from 10 weeks to 169 in solved 
cases and from 23 weeks to 73 in unsolved cases.
Recent HMIC research (HMIC 2009) has shown that the average cost of a Category 
A inquiry across the country is £1,562,524 and the average cost of a Category B 
inquiry is £676,198. This takes into consideration the cost of permanent teams and 
non permanent teams. As shown in Chapter 8 the proactive style of SIO can reduce 
the inquiry by up to 5 months, this reflects a huge saving in resources. This means 
that the average Category B inquiry cost £48,299 per month and a 5 month saving 
equals £241,499.
A statistically significant variable from the research predicting whether the case was 
solved or not was the number of police investigative strategies used. The weight for 
this was 2.15 meaning for every additional strategy used there was a doubling of the 
likelihood of solving the cases. The weighting indicated that the likelihood of 
resolving the case was also affected if the victim was a woman by a factor of 9.
Other factors of significance included:
• Investigative thinking (factor of 7)
• Early witness strategy (factor of 8)
• House to house enquiries (factor of 4).
The solving factors associated with the arrest and charging of offenders was the 
number of police investigative strategies used. The key tactics were investigative 
thinking, early witness strategy and house to house enquiries. The characteristics of 
the SIO were not significant in whether or not a suspect was charged, but did have
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an impact on the time taken to achieve this. If the SIO is reactive rather than 
proactive then this can lengthen the inquiry by up to 5 months. If the victim is female 
the resolving time is reduced by 46 weeks. If white, the time taken to resolve is 
increased by 31 weeks, and if the case is a criminal contract killing by 99 weeks.
When considering the themes of murder the following critical aspects of the types of 
investigations were revealed:
Category A
There were eleven particularly high profile cases in the 2001-2003 period. Category 
A crimes are defined as a “major crime of grave public concern, for example if the 
victim is a child or where multiple murder or the murder of a Police Officer occurs”. 
These cases are by their nature complex, lengthy and the average solving period for 
these investigations is 28.4 months. The investigative methodologies involved can 
be more complicated than the investigation of Category B cases. The results 
indicated that the volume of information handled by the investigation teams can be 
overwhelming. The average range of actions allocated per month by the Holmes 
system ranges from 36 actions to 173 per month.
The research revealed differences in decision-making between the more complex 
Category A and more standard Category B murders .The differences were as 
follows:
• the breadth of decision-making
• the volume of information
• the volume of intelligence
• involvement of and with the media
• coping with the need for resources over a long period of time
• managing of outside experts
• need for expert advice from SIOs in similar cases
• creating the correct management structure
• developing a strategy for different phases of the investigation
• coping with pressure from ACPO officers
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This list is not exhaustive but highlights the complex nature of Category A inquiries 
and the demands they place on the SIO.
Criminal Killings
These cases encompass organised crime and “gang” killings. These gang killings 
include killings by Colombian, Albanian, Somalian and Asian gangs operating in 
London. These criminal gangs carried out vendettas and retribution attacks in 
London. The presence of these groups reflects the cosmopolitan nature of London. 
Large urban areas, especially in the western world, are becoming polyglots of a 
more transient population and directly affect the victimology issues that the police 
have to deal with. This applies especially in London where the diversity of the 
population has changed dramatically over the last twenty years. Most immigrant 
populations are law abiding and are simply economic migrants to the capital. The 
wide range of London’s population is reflected in the diverse background of suspects 
and victims within the research period with certain ethnic minorities over 
represented.
From the investigative viewpoint these cases were difficult as the nature of the 
societies these groups operate within make it problematic for the police to obtain 
witnesses. These groups are “hard to reach” and they survive on an element of fear. 
Operation Trident cases and Tamil killings shared the problem of witness co­
operation. These cases therefore rely more heavily on intelligence and informants
combined with the collection of CCTV and phone analysis. They displayed 11 
different solving factors. These cases took an average of 12.7 months to solve.
Contract Killings
There were three such killings within the research period taking an average of 27 
months to investigate. These investigations are difficult protracted inquiries and 
usually involve criminal on criminal. The phasing of these inquiries is important. 
Researching the investigations showed that the successful investigations were 
divided into four proving phases:
• who hired the contract killers
• who organised the killing
• who the killers were
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• the identity of the armourer.
Drug related murders
These cases took an average of 10.3 months to solve, ranging from 2 months to 18 
months to solve. Most of the murders included in this section relate to the supply of 
drugs of all categories. As most of these crimes involved criminals, intelligence and 
phone analysis were the highest solving factors.
Disputes
These are the largest number of cases within the research period. Most of these 
cases happened in or near public places and most were not premeditated but were 
arguments that escalated to physical attack. The physical location of these cases 
determined many of the solving factors. The collection of CCTV and the 
management of witnesses were important in these cases. The results showed that 
there appeared to be no premeditated motive for these attacks and were often 
spontaneous.
Financial
There were eight such cases in the research period and these included a case 
where the suspect tortured and then killed the victim to obtain access to his financial 
records. In two of these cases the suspects left the country and this made the 
inquiries more complex. The investigative strategy included inquiries abroad.
‘Honour’ Killings
These cases involve usually Asian victims, and young females who are forced into 
marriage and then dispute the ethos of “forced marriage”. These are low volume. 
There was only one of these cases within the timescale of the research and 
encompassed the following solving factors:
• Investigative thinking
• Witness Management
• Covert strategy
The Collection of CCTV
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• Forensic Strategy
• Analysis
• Phone analysis.
Homophobic Murders
There were six such cases within the time period of the research. These relate to 
attacks on homosexual victims where the motive is clearly sexual orientation. The 
cases within the research highlighted the need for close liaison with the gay 
community and there was a large range of solving factors (12 in total). Forensic 
issues, intelligence strategy, the collection of CCTV, house to house enquiries and 
the behaviour of first officers at the scene was particularly important.
Mental Health Related Murders
The issue of mental health was a factor in four of the cases researched. One of the 
attacks was an attack on a female where the suspect used a carving knife to cut the 
victim’s throat. The suspect was so ill that he could not be interviewed and he was 
transferred to a secure hospital. Another case involved a similar modus operand! 
and the suspect was found guilty of manslaughter. In both these cases uniform 
officers arrested the suspects. The third case was an attack, which took place in a 
petrol station where the suspect stabbed the victim and left the murder weapon in 
the victim’s body. The SIO linked this case with another reported case and the 
suspect was sent to Rampton Secure Unit. The fourth case was a Category A case 
where body parts were discovered by members of the public. The suspect was 
charged with three murders. He had a long history of mental illness. The SIO 
introduced different phases to deal with legal constraints and the need to prove at 
least one of the murders. The average solving period for these cases was 11.33 
months.
Missing Persons (believed dead) Investigations
These cases involved a tandem or “twin track” strategy for the SIO where they are 
concerned with trying to find a missing person in the first instance whilst considering 
the possibility of a murder inquiry. The Soham case and the resulting report by Sir
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Ronnie Flanagan highlighted the difficulty of dealing with abduction and a murder 
enquiry simultaneously (see Chapter 5).
Multiple Homicides
One of the cases involved the death of five members of the one family. There were 
four solving factors involved in this case. These cases will attract media attention 
and will be Category A cases. The number of actions will be higher than other cases 
as the number of victims is higher. In one Category A case with three different 
victims this necessitated three different Family Liaison Officers.
8.4 P h a s in g  P a tte rn s
The analysis presented in Chapter 7 illustrated the importance of “phasing” 
particularly in the long cases researched during the research period. Seventeen 
percent of the cases took over 19 months and required management over long 
periods of time. The research further showed how critical the first weeks were for 
the majority of investigations. “Starburst” activity was critical for most investigations 
and decisions made in the first period of the inquiry had long term ramifications.
SIOs “knowledge is split into legal, forensic and procedural relying on a primary 
decision goal to set the initial investigative strategy”. The decision frame period then 
highlights how the SIO makes decisions in a rigid or flexible manner and the 
research has shown how those SIOs who had greater diagnostic inclinations and 
used more analytic investigative thinking are more successful. The investigative 
stage is an information processing stage where the SIO starts to identify solving 
factors. After choosing amongst the 41 solving factors the SIO evaluates the 
evidence and moves onto the final deliberative stage where the SIO along with the 
CPS starts to process the evidence and can then charge the suspect(s).
8.5 D e c is io n -M a k in g  S ty le s  o f  th e  In v e s t ig a to r
The research evidence revealed four main types of management style. About a third 
was “democratic” (32.2%) with innovative SIOs representing 16.1% and autocratic
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29% of the total. Management by rote represented 22.6% of the total number of 
SiOs management style. The highest clear-up rate was for innovative SiOs at 
85.4% with “democratic” SIOs at 79.5%. This “distributed decision-making” was a 
key feature of the successful SIOs decision-making.
Another feature of SIO decision-making style was instances of replicated behaviours 
where certain investigative techniques were used again and again. The techniques 
replicated were:
• covert techniques,
• proactive techniques,
• investigative thinking,
• intelligence,
• use of informants,
• financial strategy and
• an arrest strategy.
The use of replicative behaviour reflected the particular experience of the SIOs and 
their policing background. Those who had been involved in more proactive or covert 
police work tended to be more comfortable with this type of work. Similarly if an SIO 
had used one technique successfully in one case this tended to be replicated in 
other cases. Some SIOs mentioned that they had certain expertise on their teams 
and this affected the strategies used.
One SIO had a financially trained officer on his team who was conducting financial 
analysis in every case. Other more experienced SIOs had the confidence to impose 
their own strategic thinking. This indicated the individuality of the approach to major 
investigations and how difficult it is to impose standard templates for success. There 
is a deeper point that certain SIO’s are replicating behaviour which may not be 
checked by Superintendents or Murder Review Groups. There is a need for this to 
be monitored. Replicated behaviour is not intrinsically a negative factor but 
successful techniques should either be shared or the resources that drive that 
behaviour should be available throughout the organisation. If SIO’s are simply 
replicating behaviour because they feel comfortable with those areas they may, in
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turn, miss other issues that may help solve the case but take them outside their 
comfort zone.
8.6 H o w  F in d in g s  L in k  to  D e c is io n -M a k in g  T h e o r ie s
Certainly the situation that an SIO finds him/herself in mirrors the features listed 
under naturalistic decision-making settings. A murder has many unknowns at the 
early stages of the investigation. The environment is certainly dynamic and shifting 
as more information comes into play. As was described in Chapter 5 the Murder 
Investigation Teams comprise multiple roles and players. The investigation is 
conducted within the requirements of the law and good practice guidance as well as 
responding to organisational pressures to maintain budgetary control and gain an 
early outcome. Thus the more traditional decision-making models do not appear to 
apply in the study of the decisions made by SIOs and therefore the approach that 
informs the present study is naturalistic decision-making (NDM). This research is 
concerned with the type of decision-making models SIOs actually use. The key 
aspects of NDM shown in Figure 2.2 illustrate the real-life decision-making styles 
needed by SIOs. They include complexity of choice and a continuing cycle of 
thinking.
In Chapter 2, it was noted that Davis (1996) stated that the police depended on 
instinct, habit or memory when conducting investigations. This research found a 
greater range of approaches than implied by this presumption. The key in the 
decision cycle was making the “right decision at the right time in the inquiry”. This 
research demonstrates that SIOs solve problems by selective, heuristic searches 
through large problem spaces and large databases, using means-ends analysis as a 
principal technique for guiding their search. The research highlighted the importance 
of decision-making over the length of a murder inquiry and Figure 6.10 illustrates the 
full decision model from the hypothesis generation of the evaluatative knowledge 
structure, through the hypothesis testing of the investigative stage to the hypothesis 
confirmation at the final deliberative stage. The links between actions, results and 
analysis represents a feedback loop that develops further actions as a consequence.
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In Chapter 6.3.3 three interlocking themes emerged as the main SIO decision­
making processes. Figure 6.6 showed the inter-relationships between the use of 
Holmes, prioritising lines of enquiry and investigative thinking. Investigative thinking 
can be formulated through concepts of NDM with SIO utilising an hypothesis 
formulation and testing mode within a short period in the investigation and then 
prioritising lines of enquiry (6.3.4). This led in turn to the four stages of the 
investigation: Phasing, Starburst, Evaluation and Implementation all of which 
required different decision-making skills. The first two were very much heuristic 
based with the other requiring reframing until a solution had been achieved. The 
interviews revealed two clear pathways through the decision process. One based on 
a more creative approach associated with a democratic style and the other more rule 
bound and reliant on a more autocratic style.
Recognition as in Klein’s (1997). Recognition Decision-making Model (RDM) is at 
the heart of successful decision-making although other processes and structures 
may be crucial for success. Klein describes how decision-makers make decisions 
based on their experience and training. The model contains two functions, “simple 
match” and “evaluating a course of action”. In the case of a simple match the 
decision-maker recognises a situation and a course of action is generated. The 
second phase is taken during more complex cases where the decision-maker 
conducts a mental simulation to ascertain if the action taken will meet any difficulties 
and establish how they will be overcome. This stage is a diagnostic stage.
The matching process requires discretion as real-life situations seldom fit to a 
standard specification. In psychological terms the prescription for responding is 
called a “policy” where a broad class of situations cannot be defined in sufficient 
detail. This happens at the start of murder investigations where the SIO is unsure of 
the theme of the murder and cannot start a feature by feature match against future 
solving factors. The MPS organisational response is to apply the MIT model to 
murder inquiries with all the resources that entails.
Recognition Primed Decision models are concerned with the critical decision-making 
points in events. The purpose is to identify the available options, then consider the 
options actively, assess important information and determine the goal of the decision
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and determine the strategy used to make the decision. Klein showed in his research 
that depending on the expertise of the decision-maker between 40% and 80% of the 
decisions involve recognition in the early stages. As Beach states (1997) “the more 
experience the decision-maker has in the area in which the decision arises the 
greater the role of recognition”.
The present research has shown that the SIOs use selected triggers and 
professional intuition to determine their decision-making processes. The SIO is 
concerned with the social context of the crime and filling the gaps in the information 
gathering stages, partly to identify the theme of the murder (i.e. its class or type). 
The successful SiOs tended to avoid replicated decision-making and tailored their 
decision-making to the type of crime being investigated rather than a generic 
template. The final deliberative stage of differentiated alternatives led to the 
selection of solving factors by reviewing the decision process. As Simon (1945) 
stated “decision-makers reduce information processing demands by constructing 
limited representations of options”. Experts can use their experience to frame 
situations rapidly as SIOs do by framing meaningful patterns and events. NDM 
models assume that the decision situation is usually embedded within a broader 
environmental and organisational context. Adaptive expertise entails a "deep 
comprehension of the conceptual structure of the problem domain. Once there 
appears to be other issues or risks or there are unreliable assumptions then the 
“correcting” stage is entered where more information needs to be collected. This 
stage requires the collection of additional data to resolve ambiguity. The decision 
nodes will be activated when enough knowledge is acquired. Metacognitive skills 
are needed in “the interpretative process of evaluating and revising assumptions”.
The SIOs were defined into different groups according to their clear-up rate, i.e. the 
number of cases they solved during the research period. Eleven SiOs had a 100% 
clear-up rate the majority being “career detectives”, i.e. they had been in the CID at 
each rank of their service. Compared to the SIOs in the “poor” category, i.e. with a 
clear-up rate less than 50% where the majority (six out of eight) were transfers from 
the uniform policing. Successful SIOs were those who choose strategies in the early 
phase of the inquiry and had the ability to quickly make decisions and a period of
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initial activity was followed by a period of review. The “innovative” SIOs were 
creative and flexible in their decision-making processes and looked at all possible 
methods to help solve the crimes. They were consultative in their management of 
specialist teams and sought to use “the creative brain” of their respective teams. 
They, in short, brought a complete “toolkit” of management and investigative skills to 
their inquiries.
Ail of the successful SIOs indicated they used the following strategic themes:
• Witness management
• CCTV
• Forensic
• Intelligence
• Investigative Thinking
• Media
Examination of the interview material with the SIOs shows that the successful SIOs 
were more likely to develop informal contacts with journalists to obtain the best use 
of the media to solve the case without overburdening the MIR. The use of 
“investigative thinking” by the successful SIOs also reflects their wider decision- 
making process and effective use of this increased solvability by a factor of 44.
Investigative thinking relates to the hypothesis setting and verification processes that 
the SIO brought to the inquiry. The more systematic review of the evidence and 
information there was, the more effective compared to simple application of options 
by rote and replicating previous practices without appreciating their discriminating 
power of analysis under different circumstances.
8.7 M e th o d s
The research used a mixed method approach with both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to give a wider picture of the issues under investigation. The research was 
based on documentary analysis from Murder Manuals/Doctrine and involved primary 
analysis from interviews with the 33 SiOs and the expert commentary and secondary
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analysis on the Holmes police database researching the 166 cases within the period 
of the thesis. This proved to be a successful strategy as findings from these different 
sources and methods fed into successive stages of the research as illustrated below 
and this in turn contributed to the identification of the decision-making frame. It 
would have been difficult to have constructed the decision-making model without 
elucidating the knowledge requirements (elicited from documentary sources and the 
expert commentary) and solving factors (elicited from the qualitative interviews and 
quantitative analyses). These methods were deployed to extract appropriate 
information from different sources in order to develop the decision-making model as 
illustrated in the figure below. All of these methods built on the individual findings to 
inform and populate the ultimate findings.
F ig u re  8 .2  T h e  R e s e a rc h  P ro c e s s
8.8 S tre n g th s  I W e a k n e s s e s  o f  R e se a rch
As a serving Police Officer (i.e. a practitioner) the present researcher had easier 
access to confidential material such as the Holmes archive than perhaps would have 
been available to non-police researchers. Similarly it was easier for the researcher 
as a practitioner to access current and recently retired SIOs. This provided a unique
201
opportunity to assess factors associated with resolving these difficult hard to solve 
murder cases. The cases researched represent a cross section of cases of the 
range of murders investigated. These included “normal” disputes, criminal killings 
and missing persons who were believed dead. The MPS allowed unfettered and 
unrestricted access to the core Holmes database and this enabled an analysis of 
cases the interviewed SIOs had investigated.
The access to the SIOs and the Holmes database has ensured that the research 
findings are comprehensive and well grounded. Access was further enhanced by 
the ability of the present researcher to feedback the findings into SIO training and 
provide student SIOs with an understanding of the investigative process. The 
research highlights the risk areas in investigations such as the inexperience and 
sometimes weak response by frontline officers to scene management. The 
knowledge that the present research investigators brings enable a reading of the 
practical implications and interpretation of the data that may have eluded a naive 
researcher. Thus the full implications of the importance of managing witnesses 
through the investigation was fully appreciated. The highlighting of the importance of 
this issue along with other less traditional strands of investigation is one of the 
strengths of the research. As the documentary sources are themselves the product 
of detailed investigation, some the subject of quasi legal or judicial processes and 
verified Holmes data, the sources can be judged reliable. The research illustrated 
under-used strategies such as linking of offences, the use of systematic analysis 
particularly financial analysis.
The research identified that the reliance on the Holmes database provides the 
inquiries with a comprehensive database. Holmes is not however an analytical tool 
or user-friendly. The volume of data and the inputting of that data are a heavy 
commitment. It proved labour intensive to extract the data from Holmes and 
transform for use in SPSS. For these reasons together with the confidentiality issues 
related to the material it was not possible to verify the transposition from the Holmes 
database to the construction of the SPSS research database. Thus there was 
limited opportunity to cross validate the codes used in the coding dictionary largely 
because of the volume of work this would entail.
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The research is London based and therefore lacks a national perspective. Research 
in smaller forces that do not have a permanent murder organisational structure may 
well reveal different investigative issues. The research also reveals that there are 
many crucial issues in the investigations which are outside the control of the SIO. 
The SIO cannot dictate the milieu of witnesses or manage incompetent external 
experts. Neither is the SIO responsible for the tactics of defence barristers during a 
court trial. The research will need updating in the future as investigative techniques 
tend to change in response to new technology.
SIOs reflecting on their experiences may have resulted in a measure of social 
desirability responding. Use of an analogue to the bogus pipeline concept, i.e. 
where there was a belief that the researcher had access to an “object” account of the 
enquiries, may have obviate this to some degree. Some of the interviews were 
conducted with retired officers who were more likely to have been a product of a past 
police occupational culture that is changing. This age bias may have emphasised a 
traditional approach which is a generational issue and not so evident in younger in 
service SIOs.
8.9 S u m m a ry
The research results provide a valuable contribution to the understanding of how 
major inquiries are structured and undertaken. The thesis explains how cases are 
dealt with by the more efficient SIO and elucidates their decision-making and 
management style. The results showed the more proactive, consultative SIO with an 
experienced criminal investigation departmental background were generally the 
more effective. The murders themselves were broken down into particular themes to 
explore if some were intrinsically more difficult to solve than others. The dispute 
cases were the “easier” cases to solve while those involving criminal contacts were 
more difficult, particularly those involving contract killings. All these factors provide 
SIOs with a basis to help understand how their management style affects the case 
and how to prepare their investigative strategies when they investigate such cases. 
The phasing of enquiries along with the prioritisation and allocation of resources to 
support them is a key feature of a successful and cost effective investigation.
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Selecting key solving factors and reviewing the inquiry constantly were critical 
elements of success.
The current research demonstrated the usefulness of reviewing historical issues 
affecting murder inquiries and employing a mixed method design to build up the 
information inputs into a decision-making model.
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C h a p t e r 9 :  P r a c t i c e  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a n d  C o n c l u s i o n s
9.1 In tro d u c t io n
This final chapter will offer some conclusions and establishes principles of good 
practice within major inquiries by deconstructing key elements from the research 
findings.
The practice objectives of the present research were to:
• establish good practice guidelines;
• de-construct key elements within the complexities of investigations of 
Category A and Category B cases;
• indicate the relative efficacy of differing management styles
• Characterise successful SIOs.
The following key elements feature in the good practice guidance:
• Clarity and leadership of Senior Investigating Officers;
• Specific skills of SIOs;
• Systematic management;
• Phasing of enquiries
• Management of the Major Incident Room/ information management;
• Individual investigative strategies for particular themes of investigation
To develop good practice, it is necessary to ensure that these factors are considered 
when establishing principles for the conduct of effective murder investigations.
9.2 G o o d  P ra c tic e
9.2.1 C la r ity  o f  L e a d e rs h ip
The SIO needs to operate within a supportive environment with clear terms of 
reference established with ACPO Gold Groups. The lack of clarity resulting from
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blurred lines of responsibility can create unintended consequences in critical 
incidents. This can lead to confusions of authority responsibility, limits of decision­
making latitude and degrees of control, all of which contribute to a stressful working 
environment and may overcomplicate the line of command. There have to be clear 
lines of communication and management responsibility. Successful SIOs managed 
their teams well by hearing what individual members have to say and allowing them 
to volunteer their own ideas about the inquiry. They also managed upwards, 
keeping ACPO and Senior Management Teams informed and the lines to direct the 
inquiry clear. Similarly the SIO has to provide their team with a clear strategy whilst 
encouraging debate and ideas from the team. The investigative stage of decision­
making requires the SIO to ensure that their strategy is understood and fully 
implemented by their team.
To avoid repeating investigative failings in the future the Police Service has to be 
aware of terms of reference for Gold Groups (see Chapter 5). The limits of each tier 
in inquiries must be articulated and understood by all. There can only be one SIO 
operating with the support of the Gold Group. The training and mentoring of SIOs is 
important to ensure resilience for the Police Service in the future. The Police need to 
encourage and develop separate career paths to ensure that SIOs stay in post, SIOs 
need to gain and consolidate experience which may involve separate payments to 
make it an attractive career path. The active development and mentoring of SIOs to 
ensure that their role is fully understood and supported needs to be in place within 
the MPS. The SIO role is unique and those who perform it need to be encouraged to 
stay in the role for significant periods in time.
9 .2 .2  S p e c if ic  S k ills
Knowledge Requirements
The SIO needs a good working knowledge of police procedure in major inquiries and 
to be fully aware of the Holmes system as well as the MIRSAP protocol. Legal 
knowledge is also important not only in the legal requirements for arrest and 
detention but also the wider legal context of the inquiry. The SIO must recognise the 
spirit as well as the letter of the law and what is acceptable before the court and what 
possible defences may be offered by the defendant. Similarly the SIO must liaise
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with the CPS and be aware of their requirements. The SIOs must have knowledge 
of forensic techniques to conduct effective forensic management and understand 
what is needed at the scene and forensic opportunities throughout the investigation. 
This will involve setting a forensic strategy for arrests and searches as well as being 
aware of issues such as contamination and continuity of exhibits.
Analytic use of Holmes
While Holmes is the core database for UK murder inquiries it emerges that not all 
SIOs understand how the system works. There is presently a training gap in SIO 
development around Holmes management, SIOs should have a good working 
knowledge of Holmes and how it can be used in a proactive capacity. Some forces 
are now employing it in real-time covert operations with a “sterile corridor” to the 
main MIR, (i.e. keeping a distance between the reactive enquiry and the proactive 
operation).
To ensure effective use of Holmes SIOs need to
• “Rotate” the office manager role to ensure that the DSs fully understood the 
Holmes system.
• Ensure that information processing systems turn around information quickly 
and accurately while cross-referencing the inputted data.
• Establish an effective interface between Holmes and the Met intelligence 
system.
Ideally, Holmes should be extended to form a database of all the Holmes accounts in 
a themed format. This would allow SIOs to access data on similar cases to the 
particular type of murder they are investigating. This involves the creation of a 
library of Holmes cases which could then be indexed. This would provide a centre of 
knowledge not currently available. The creation of this “super” database would 
enable SIOs to have access to a diagnostic tool that can both influence and educate 
their decisions. Similarly this could be used to enable review teams and supervisors 
to overview the inquiries. Jones, Grieve & Milne (2008) discuss this in terms of 
“capturing the learning”. One of the most important lessons learnt is “could this 
murder have been prevented”?
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For every addition investigative strategy used there is a doubling of the likelihood of 
solving cases. The key tactics are:
• Investigative thinking,
• Early witness strategy and
• House to house enquiries.
By being proactive an SIO can reduce the length of an inquiry by up to 5 months. 
Systematic and individual investigative strategy failures can be avoided by a rigorous 
review policy of an internal review group. This group should also play an important 
part in the continuous development of SIOs ensuring that they comprehend the 
solving factors and processes for dealing with major cases. There is a requirement 
to define capability in cases that worked well along with those that did not. The 
police need to develop a mechanism for systematic reviews in developing the 
understanding the workings of major cases. This could take the form of an analytical 
product of all the cases investigated to determine the solving factors and decision­
making involved. Thus good practice can be extracted and subject to a continuous 
updating from the cases and develop them. Any such database could form a body of 
knowledge for SIOs to call upon to enhance their understanding of different types of 
cases and act as a diagnostic tool to assist understanding of various classes of 
murders. Ensuring implementation of the SIOs strategy is perhaps the hardest part 
of a SIOs responsibility. The “co-ordinated implementation process” is vital to the 
success of an inquiry. An SIO must deal with a complex set of heuristics to evaluate 
the potential solving factors. The development of hypothesis and the actions 
necessary to implement the policy are indictors of the more systematic approach 
taken by successful SIOs.
Investigative Thinking
Formulation of alternative hypotheses and not allowing an investigative pathway to 
be shut down until there is hypothesis confirmation, following systematic reviewing of 
the assembling evidence is critical. Systematic review of the evidence and
9.2 .3  S ystem ic  M an ag em en t
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information is more effective than simple application of options by rote and 
replicating previous practices without appreciating their discriminating power of 
analysis under different circumstances.
9 .2 .4  P h a s in g  o f  E n q u ir ie s
Murder inquiries need better management of the phasing of major inquiries. There 
should be a quick response to major incidents followed by constant review of the 
information and decisions. The SIO should create phases to his or her investigation, 
prioritising actions and resources and to sustain these over a period of time. The 
initial starburst at the very start of inquiries highlighted the need for agreed protocols 
between the murder teams and Boroughs. Lord Laming in the Climbie investigation 
stated that “good momentum achieved by the initial officers dealing with the incident 
should have been consolidated”. The different phases of the inquiry require different 
decision-making skills from the SIO. As the case progresses the SIO moves through 
the decision-making styles, i.e.:
• drawing on appropriate legal, forensic and procedural knowledge depending 
on the type of inquiry
• being able to access his / her own experience of a particular theme of enquiry 
(and / or draw on the Holmes archive)
• employing systematic analysis to review evidence
9.2 .5  M a n a g e m e n t S ty le
The type of management style and the ability of the SIO to constantly review his / her 
strategy are critical. There is a need to assess future SIOs for their potential 
decision-making processes prior to their initial deployment. The ability to choose the 
correct theme of murder case at the right time is one of the key elements of success. 
Democratic management of the MIT emerged as a critical trait along with the ability 
to manage the different phases of the inquiry over long periods of time. The SIO has 
to have the ability to constantly review all the information and potential evidence 
before him or her, be open to feedback from the team and the ability to use “the 
collective brain of the team”. Key to successful charging of suspects is a flexible and
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creative approach, being proactive and evaluating alternative interpretations as 
evidence amasses.
Central to effective decision-making is the idea of diagnostic inclination in which the 
SIO brings skills and disposition to approach the investigation in a systematic and 
analytic fashion. The SIO diagnoses an unfamiliar situation and designs a course of 
action to deal with it. The heuristics that SIOs develop enable them to utilise a 
framework to understand complex investigations. This enables SIOs to order their 
decision-making. By systemising the decision-making process the SIO can start to 
prioritise lines of enquiry and order the phasing of the case before them. Diagnostic 
inclination embodies a need to assess incoming information, quickly reviewing all 
information and prioritising certain actions. This systematic approach to investigation 
reducing the time taken and the more proactive SIOs reduced the time taken by up 
to 5 months. The good SIO needs an ability to balance all the needs of the inquiry 
simultaneously while responding quickly to ongoing issues within the case.
9 .2 .6  S p e c if ic  In v e s t ig a t iv e  S tra te g ie s
The selection of the correct solving factors for the right theme of murder was shown 
as important for the success of an inquiry. On Page 166 of this research it was 
shown that the successful SIOs indicated that they used the following strategic 
themes:
• Witness Management
• CCTV
• Forensic
• Intelligence
• Investigative Thinking
• Media Strategy
Witness Management
Better management of witnesses may lead to more convictions at court and perhaps 
more likelihood of suspects being picked out on identity parades.
210
There is a need for increasing the number of interpreters as the demographic model 
of London changes. In order to improve witness co-operation, especially among 
ethnic minorities, there should be a witness liaison officer role within the MIT teams. 
A witness management strategy should include taking early statements from 
witnesses and managing witness over the period of the inquiry. The management of 
witnesses over the lifespan of an inquiry is important and the The Trials Unit (based 
at the Old Bailey, they process police cases) felt that this reflected the difficulty with 
witnesses in some cases who changed their minds under pressure from family or 
indirectly from the suspects. This highlights the need for the police to protect and 
monitor witnesses. This can place an enormous strain on police resources which 
SIOs need to be aware of and take into account.
Witness management is particularly significant in the following types of murder 
cases:
• Category A murders
• Criminal killings
• Disputes
• Drug related murders
• Financial
Use of Passive Data
This is the backbone of many modern investigations and they need to be considered 
individually and collectively. The suspects or the victims last financial transactions, 
phone call or movements are key to the investigation. The SIO must ensure that the 
intelligence system can cope with the flow of intelligence and analyse the material.
Due to the increase of technology modern investigations need effective collection, 
evaluation and evidential presentation of passive data as follows:
• Telephone analysis
• CCTV material and
• Financial analysis
These techniques play a significant role in major inquiries. The MIT teams need 
more training in the analysis and collection of passive data.
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House to House Enquiries
Another traditional backbone of police enquiries this factor is highly labour intensive, 
it ties in with witness management and it is important for the SIO to ensure that key 
areas are identified for house to house enquiries and those experienced officers are 
used. This is an area that needs further examination as SIOs commented that 
present arrangements with local Boroughs were not working adequately. Too often 
this was seen as an imposition by local officers and many SIOs felt that experienced 
officers were best to conduct these enquiries and discern discrepancies in witnesses’ 
versions of events. There was a general consensus that a dedicated House-to- 
House team, as per the POLSA teams, would be better than the present 
arrangements.
Liaison with Other Agencies and Experts
Liaison with other agencies and experts is an integral part of modern inquiries. The 
research showed that the successful SiOs were those who tasked the experts 
appropriately and set parameters for them to operate within. To carry out this 
function they had to establish relationships with agencies such as local authorities, 
local healthcare agencies, housing authorities and Immigration and Customs. In one 
case the enquiry team established close links with the Local Education Authority, as 
the suspects were all of school age and attending schools in the local area. The 
culture around sharing information has changed dramatically since the introduction 
of the Crime and Disorder Act, which introduced Multi Agency Protection Panels the 
ethos of sharing information, is now firmly established in police circles.
Offender Profiling
These are of limited use and may best be employed in the investigative thinking of 
the SIO. They represent only 1% of the total solving factors but this is explained by 
the fact that profiling will only be of use in the more complex cases of stranger 
attacks. Behavioural profilers are available through the National Police Improvement 
Agency Specialist Ops. Profiling is still a relatively new tool for SIOs and there 
appears to be wide discrepancies as to how profilers are used. The research shows 
that in some cases SIOs are using profilers in the last resort and not at the time of 
the incident or shortly afterwards where they could have the most impact.
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One example of the use of a profile is as an elimination strategy for suspects. A 
profile provided by the academic psychologist was in the SIOs words “99.9% 
correct”. This profile assisted greatly in the suspect elimination strategy.
Geographical Profiling
This specialism will only be of use in limited cases. The NPIA now have three British 
Police Officers trained as geographical profilers. The OSS has its own Geographic 
Profiling capability. Geographic Profiling is an investigative support technique to 
provide assistance in cases of serial violent crime and attempts to determine the 
most probable location in which an offender resides or works. The profilers require 
five anchor points, i.e. the suspect’s home address, workplace and social areas 
before they can commence a full geographical profile.
Use of the National Police Improvement Agency
This may be available for more esoteric aspects of an inquiry. For example SIO 16
used the “Body Farm” at the University of Tennessee in the USA to analyse a white
substance found at a crime scene, which turned out to be human remains. This 
proved a turning point in the case.
9.2 .7  D e c is io n -M a k in g  T e c h n iq u e s  b y  th e  SIO
The SIO needs to be able to identify and apply the appropriate solving factor as well 
as the simultaneous maintenance of multiple solving factors as critical to the success 
of an inquiry. The need to construct a case with up to 12 potential solving factors at 
one time is a key element of success. The SIO needs to:
• Work through the evaluative stage in the decision frame employing a creative 
management style and prioritising the initial actions,
• Ensure all lines of enquiry are adequately resourced,
• Ensure policy is fully implemented,
• Ensure that all the Holmes actions relate to the SIOs strategy and are 
executed,
• Ensure all strategies are articulated in the SIO decision log,
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• Following this is the investigative stage where the key investigative strategies 
are identified and engage a proactive response.
Move into an evidence processing phase where there needs to be a conscious 
decision to employ analytic strategies rather than simply following the manual and 
engaging in non productive replicative behaviours.
Crucial decision-making skills include:
• Constant review of the inquiry
• Selection of the correct solving factors for particular types of enquiry
• Holding regular office meetings to listen to the views of members of the team 
while retaining overall responsibility for decision-making.
All SIOs have to complete a decision log and this should reflect their decision­
making process. Some use this as a diary; others use it as a reflective tool while 
some SIOs use multiple decision logs for different strategies. The recording of the 
SIOs thought process enables an accurate record to be established of the progress 
of the inquiry. It helps to explain to a court or review team why certain decisions 
were made at particular times. The policy log should act as a chronological 
description of the progress of the inquiry and should reflect the SIOs thought 
process. Maintenance of the inquiry may entail numerous decision logs and they 
may be themed, i.e. Search Strategy, Forensic Strategy etc. The maintenance and 
creation of these logs differs from SIO to SIO and there is a need to emphasise the 
importance of the upkeep of the logs and the consequences of not doing so. This 
needs to be emphasised in Training and at the NPIA. The investigation stage of the 
EKS stressed the importance of the iterations and re framing of the decision-making 
process. The SIO must have confidence in their decision-making ability.
9.3 R e fle c t io n s .
The age range of victims in the research was consistent with the age range of 
victims shown in Chapter 2 that is the 16-30 age groups. The main motive for 
murder involved a dispute or argument. The futility of many of the motives for 
murder highlight the “instant” nature of the crimes and present difficulties for
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investigators as they may appear motiveless with little or no pre planning in the first 
instance. The age range of the victims and suspects appears to be consistent as is 
the type of murder weapon chosen, i.e. a knife or manual methods. The great 
majority of murder victims were white and male (76.5%) 10% of victims were black 
and 5% were Asian. Most (90%) suspects were male with 78% being white and 5% 
being Asian. Passive data plays a key role in murder investigations and the 
collection of CCTV material, phone analysis and financial records show how 
technology has changed the scope of the investigations. However, these are labour 
intensive.
Certain types of crime remain difficult to investigate especially contract killings and 
criminal on criminal killings. These require a wider range of investigative techniques 
and remain a challenge for SIOs. The role of police tactics in investigations is shown 
to be a vital and major part of the successful conclusion of these inquiries. The 
encouragement of separate career paths and the early recognition of potential SIOs 
would do much to ensure that the role is seen as prestigious and worthy. The 
reputation of police forces can rest on how they deal with critical incidents and the 
position of SIOs needs to reflect that importance. The maintenance of permanent 
MIT / MIR teams is needed to provide forces with the necessary resilience. Their 
training and development should reflect the issues mentioned in this research. The 
career paths of ACPO ranks must include deployments as Investigating Officers or 
Senior Investigating Officers to give awareness at the highest ranks of the pressures 
and needs of SIOs. Systematic failures mentioned in Chapter 5 can be partially 
overcome by the development of integrated databases that allow Holmes to link to 
intelligence databases automatically. To further the understanding of these inquiries 
statistical information such as the SPSS packages in this research should be 
developed by police analytical units in conjunction with academic research units. 
The continual updating of the research material would allow SIOs the ability to 
access validated research that would assist their decision-making and encourage the 
understanding of these major inquiries. The development of neural networks that tell 
the SIO what they do not know could be a future improvement enabling the SIO to 
evaluate the information before them. This could compare present Holmes 
databases with past cases to highlight gaps or similarities. A greater awareness of
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the issues that solve and harm Category A and Category B cases should be 
developed and maintained.
9 .4 F u tu re  D ire c t io n s
Careful management of hard to solve cases involves many techniques and solving 
factors. The range of skills required by the SIO involves diagnostic inclination and 
the ability to build cases with the correct choice of solving factors. The SIO needs 
the ability to task experts and has to be proactive in inquiries using investigative 
thinking. The management of the team and leadership skills are required as well as 
sound investigative knowledge. The evaluative knowledge structure in Chapter 7 
showed the processes that the modern SIO has to work through to solve cases. 
This involves the management of witnesses in Category A and B cases. One way 
forward may be to develop a witness liaison officer type role similar to Family Liaison 
Officers to ensure that key witnesses are supported and attend court. Internally the 
Police along with the National Police Improvement Agency could look at the attrition 
rate of witnesses in cases and analyse why they did not attend court. There may be 
many reasons from intimidation, apathy or a lack of understanding of their role. On 
page 31 of this research Welford and Cronin (2000) discussed the increase in 
unsolved cases that are partly due to the reluctance of witnesses to provide 
information particularly in urban areas.
All ranks involved in major investigations have to understand their role and the limits 
of that particular role. There can be confusion between the remit of Gold Groups 
and the SIO role. This needs to be carefully set out at the start of inquiries and 
understood by both ACPO and all ranks have a part to play. Murder Review Team 
reports could highlight this issue and determine examples of good practice. A 
research project could examine the effectiveness of Gold Groups in those inquiries 
which have them. Such research could examine the assistance given to the SIO, the 
impact on reassuring the community and how the Group assisted resourcing the 
inquiry. The Phasing of resources highlights the need for the Gold Group to be 
aware of supporting the SIO over a period of time.
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A future research project would be concerned with detailed analysis of cases over a 
wide period of time. This would assist the full understanding of these cases and 
inform the police on the reason for delays and the failure of certain cases. Research 
on closed cases, i.e. those that have been to court or have been closed, would 
enable the police at all ranks to understand the specific demands of these cases 
over a period of time.
A research database could “track” inquiries over their lifetime and be used to assess 
the peaks and troughs of inquiries. The research would particularly assist in the 
prioritisation of lines of enquiry and the allocation of Holmes actions in the first 
stages of an inquiry. There are implications for the resourcing of inquiries, 
particularly in long running cases.
Criminality has punctured international boundaries and the police have to rely on 
different varieties of international co-operation and the sharing of best practice. The 
changing nature of the population within the UK and the number of Britain’s travelling 
abroad means that SIOs will have to meet extra demands on their teams to cope 
with different cultures and witnesses who may be based outside the UK. The ease 
of international travel also means that SIOs will have to cope with more international 
inquiries. This requires a multi-agency approach from concerned agencies such as 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), NPIA and International Liaison 
Officers within forces. Research needs to examine demographic trends across the 
UK and access the impact of those changes on police resources. Cases with foreign 
nationals usually involve liaison with families abroad, interpreters and issues around 
jurisdiction. These place extra demands on police enquiry teams.
The design of new Information Technology databases could assist modern murder 
investigations by allowing the SIO access to historical data and provide a “neural 
network” to the SIO to help explain what is missing from the inquiry and provide 
guidance for the SIO. Any successor to Holmes could provide this function. An 
artificial intelligence system may be needed to provide an IT back up for SIOs. This 
may assist SIOs in the decision-making process by providing statistical back-up. 
Adhami & Browne (1996) discuss the feasibility and minimum requirements of a 
decision support system for SIOs. They advocate that a combination of sources of
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expertise would be needed to develop a decision support system. A retrieval 
mechanism linked to Holmes with access to an experience base “could significantly 
improve the functionality of Holmes”. Research needs to concentrate on the impact 
of future technology on police databases.
The research has training implications for SIOs with the emphasis on witness 
management, scene management and the retrieval of passive data. Future research 
should carry out empirical work on all of these issues to ascertain the scale of the 
problem and then establish the gaps in training and current procedure.
The UK lacks a facility to formally debrief all cases of murder and thus an opportunity 
is missed to collate this information nationwide. There is a need to debrief all 
aspects of murder investigation nationwide and code the responses. While the NPIA 
provides part of this role there is no link to academia to research the findings on a 
routine basis. The SIO role needs to be seen as a vital role within the police and 
more should be done to identify potential SIOs and develop them.
Access to experienced “super” SIOs may well provide further resilience for major 
inquiries in the future. This is currently being looked at under the Professionalising 
Investigative Practice (PIP). The review process of murders should be further 
encouraged and more could be done to understand the investigative process rather 
than comment on the systems employed.
The underused tactics were the use of analysis, the linking of inquiries and the use 
of financial analysis. These need to be explored and adequate resources should be 
devoted to them. The disparities in the use of Holmes need to be addressed along 
with the lack of training for frontline officers in dealing with major incidents. The 
research has concentrated on the “actual” solving factors involved in these cases 
and has sought to avoid political imperatives. The research has highlighted the 
solving factors and the “correct” management style needed to solve cases. The 
research here shows that development is needed on current investigative processes 
and the police should not simply wait for the next high profile mistake to carry out this 
work.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Features of unsolved cases
Them es
No of 
actions
Tactics
W eapon of 
choice
Tim e
Taken
Venue
Sex/
Race
1 Dispute 302 Forensic Manual 82 Private M/4
31 Dispute 643 Witness mgt Sharp
Instrument
76 M
39 Dispute 769 H2H 39 Private F/1
51 Dispute 1588 Manual 43 Private M/2
73 Dispute Witness mgt, 
Forensic, ID 
parades,
Dispute Private M/2
93 Dispute 378 Manual 81 Public M/3
95 Dispute 692 Wit mgt, Phone, 
Informant
Firearm 75 Public M/1
125 Dispute 6-9 CCTV, Media, Intell Manual 98 Public M/1
126 Dispute 824 Proactive strategy, 
Phone, Forensic
Manual 45 Public M/1
145 Dispute 1104 Informant,
Intelligence,
Firearm 46 Public M/3
146 Dispute 1267 Local Officers, 
Witnesses, Phone, 
Forensic, Intell
Firearm 114 Public M/1
154 Dispute 256 Local Officers, Wit 
Mgt, Forensic, Intell
Manual 13 Public M/3
158 Dispute 451 Local Officers, 
Proactive H2H, 
CCTV, Phone
Manual 25 Private M/1
159 Dispute 504 Liaision with o/s 
agencies, Pathology, 
Forensic, Intell
Manual 207 Not
known
M/3
4 N/K 250 Legal immunity, 
CPS
Knife 58 Public M
147 Not
known
1194 Phone, Rec of 
murder weapon, 
Forensic, Intell
Firearm 126 Public M/3
118 Dispute 235 Proactive, 
Pathology, Phone
Knife 42 Private F/3
Average 65.73
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Them es
No of 
actions
Tactics
W eapon of 
choice
Tim e
Taken
Venue
Sex/
Race
8 Stranger
Attack
2977 Analysis, Media, 
Private CCTV, 
Linked Cases, Surv
N/K 78
33 Stranger
Attack
534 Outside liaison, 
Pathology, CCTV, 
Murder Weapon , 
Forensic,NCF
N/K
53 Stranger
Attack
2627 Consult CPS N/K
9299/4
=2324
9 Albanian 544 Phone Knife 64
13 Contract
Killing
2535 Intelligence Knife 255
35 Criminal
Killing
1866 Proactive strategy N/K 69
1648 129
weeks
14 Missing
person
131 National Crime 
Faculty
N/K 33 Private
19 Misper 220 NCF N/K 84 Private F/1
24 Robbery 275 Witnesses, liaison, 
pathology, intell
Manual 10 Public M/3
92 Robbery N Local Officers Manual 73 Public M/1
121 Robbery 284 Anniversary Appeal Manual 31 Public M/1
25 Drugs 789 Arrest strat, Invest 
thinking, CCTV, 
Forensic, Intell
Knife 39 Private M/1
26 Drugs 405 Invest thinking, 
Phone, Intell
30 F/1
32 Drugs 1108 Firearm Public M/1
50 Drugs 1595 Firearm 54 F/1
90 Drugs 2865 Reward, Forensic,
Crimewatch,
Informant
Firearm Public M/2
110 Drugs 789 Intelligence Knife 32 Private M/3
117 Drugs 663 Proactive, Phone, 
Intell
Blunt
instrument
78 Public M/1
149 Drugs 1222 Intelligence Firearm 61 Public M/3
165 Drugs 475 Covert, Informant Knife 15 M/4
166 Drugs 613 Covert, Phone, 
Forensic, Intell
Firearm 62 Private F/3
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Them es
No of 
actions
Tactics
W eapon of 
choice
Tim e
Taken
Venue
Sex/
Race
1052410 
= 1052.4
46
weeks
60 Financial 768 H2H, Financial Manual 23 Public M/2
79 Trident 1222 Firearm 89
80 Trident Media, Informant, 
Intell
Firearm 11
83 Trident 1234 CCTV, Intell, Firearm 13
84 Trident 1131 Witness mgt, Phone, 
Informant, Intell
Firearm 41
116 Trident 735 Proactive, NCF, 
Media
Firearm 75
38133 Average 56
866
Features of solved cases
Themes
No of 
actions
Tactics
W eapon of 
choice
Tim e
Taken
Venue
Sex/
Race
2 Dispute 222 Sus Interviews, 
CCTV, Media
Manual 54 Public M/1
3 Dispute 275 Arrest Strategy, 
Recovery of murder 
weapon
Sharp
instrument
60 Private M/3
16 Dispute 709 CCTV, Phone, 
Forensic, Intell
Blunt
instrument
46 Public F/3
17 Dispute 292 Invest Thinking, 
Witness Mgt, H2H, 
Phone
Manual 31 Public M/3
20 Dispute 677 Pathology, Intell N/K 37 Private M/1
21 Dispute 144 Invest Thinking Manual 24 Private M/1
22 Dispute 792 Invest Thinking, 
witnesses, forensic, 
Intelligence
Arson 63 Public M/3
23 Dispute 714 Invest Thinking, 
Proactive surv, 
covert, phone, 
informant
Firearm 70 Public M/1
28 Dispute 422 CCTV, Forensic, 
Intelligence
Manual Public F/1
29 Dispute 543 Witness mgt Manual 47 Public M/1
30 Dispute 452 Witness mgt Manual 30 Public M/1
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Themes
No of 
actions
Tactics
W eapon of 
choice
Tim e
Taken
Venue
Sex/
Race
37 Dispute 1145 Pathology, Consult 
CPS
57 Public M/3
38 Dispute 275 Murder weapon, 
Forensic
Sharp
instrument
14 Public M/3
41 Dispute 454 NCF, CCTV, 
Forensic
N/K 25 Public M
42 Dispute 287 CCTV, Forensic N/K 39 Public M/4
57 Dispute 2864 Dispute Blunt
instrument
43 Public M/4
67 Dispute 305 Witness mgt Manual 96 Private M/4
27 Domestic 472 Witness mgt, 
Forensic, Consult 
CPS
190 Public M/2
75 Dispute 248 Invest thinking, 
Witness, CCTV
Manual 16 Public M/1
76 Dispute 337 Witness mgt, 
Suspect confession
Manual 27 Public F/1
77 Dispute 310 Manual 1 Public M/1
85 Dispute 1027 Witness mgt, Intell Knife 62 Private F/4
87 Dispute 824 Intelligence Knife Public M/3
88 Dispute 690 CCTV Knife 37 Private M/1
97 Dispute 308 CCTV, Forensic 34 Public F/4
99 Dispute 274 Forensic, Media Manual 87 Private M/1
104 Dispute 1208 Invest thinking, 
Forensic, ID parades
22 Public M/1
106 Domestic 434 Covert, CCTV, 
Phone
Strangulation 33 Public M/1
129 Domestic 257 Invest thinking Strangulation 61 Private M/1
107 Dispute 582 H2H, CCTV, 
Forensic, Intell
Knife 48 Public M/1
112 Dispute 503 H2H, Covert, 
Forensic
Knife 57 Public M/1
114 Dispute 290 Invest thinking, 
Witness mgt, CCTV, 
E-Fit, Forensic, ID 
parades Analysis, 
Intell
Knife 101 F
115 Dispute 705 Invest thinking, FLO, 
H2H, NCF, CCTV, 
Phone, Forensic, 
Media, ID parades, 
Analyst
Firearm 97 Private M/1
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Themes
No of 
actions
Tactics
W eapon of 
choice
Tim e
Taken
Venue
Sex/
Race
119 Dispute 800 Invest thinking, 
Witness mgt, use of 
informants, Intell
Knife 105 Public M/2
132 Dispute 972 Arrest strategy, 
Invest thinking, 
Witness mgt, 
Consult CPS, Intell
Knife 11 Public M/3
133 Dispute 933 Arrest strategy, 
Phone, Forensic
Manual 25 N/K M/1
134 Dispute 323 Witness mgt, 
Consult CPS, ID 
parades
Firearm 32 Private M/1
144 Dispute 1391 Forensic, ID 
parades, Informant
Firearm 35 Public M/3
155 Dispute 319 Arrest, Invest 
thinking, Witness 
mgt, Phone
Manual 63 Private M/4
157 Dispute 1245 Forensic Knife 57 Private M/3
162 Dispute 195 Witness mgt, 
Forensic, Intell
Knife 47 Private F/4
163 Dispute 511 CCTV, Phone, 
Forensic, 
Crimestoppers, 
Dying delcaration, 
Intelligence
Knife 97 M/3
26725
Average
636
49.5
120 N/K 538 Covert techniques Manual 54
10 Drugs 311 Witness mgt, O/S  
Liaison
Knife 63 Public M/1
64 Drugs 570 Linked, H2H, CCTV, 
Phone
Knife 48 Public M/4
66 Drugs 705 Proactive strategy, 
Informant, Intell
Manual 37 Public M/3
15 Drugs 2563 CCTV, Phone Firearm 114 M/1
102 Drugs 414 Knife 97 Public M/2
109 Drugs 472 Witness mgt, CCTV, 
Intelligence
Firearm 34 Public M/1
113 Drugs 807 Invest thinking, 
Holmes, CCTV, 
Phone, Forensic, 
Media, Intelligence
Manual 68 Public F/1
128 Drugs 401 Invest thinking, 
Proactive strategy, 
CCTV, Phone 
analysis, Forensic
Knife 64 Private M/3
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Themes
No of 
actions
Tactics
W eapon of 
choice
Tim e
Taken
Venue
Sex/
Race
135 Drugs 451 Arrest strategy, 
Invest thinking, FLO, 
Sus interviews
14 Private M/1
143 Drugs 1287 Witness mgt, Phone, 
Intelligence
Firearm 115 Public M/1
150 Drugs 1011 Covert, Rec of 
murder weapon, 
Forenisc, Informant
Firearm 72 Public M/1
151 Drugs 1011 Covert, Rec of 
murder weapon, 
Forensic, Informant
Firearm 75 M
161 Drugs 740 Witness mgt, CCTV, 
Forensic
Knife 55 Private M/1
10743/13
=826.38
856/13
=65.84
11 Op
Trident
544 Firearm 86
78 Op
Trident
412 Witness mgt, Intell Firearm 9
44 Op
Trident
771 Suspect interviews, 
ID parades
Firearm 72
81 Op
T rident
1011 Proactive strat, 
Covert strat, Murder 
weapon
Firearm 72
82 Op
Trident
1323 Witness mgt, ID 
parades, Intell
Firearm 26
12 Criminal
Killing
1757 Invest thinking, 
Pathology, Phone 
analysis, Financial 
analysis, informant
Knife 370
68 Criminal
Killing
783 Proactive strategy, 
Forensic, ID parade, 
informant, Intell
Knife 77
86 Criminal
Killing
706 CCTV, Intelligence Firearm 58
136 Criminal
Killing
3987 Local officers, 
Witness mgt, H2H, 
CCTV, Media, Intell
94
7 Tamil
Killing
1361 Surveillance, Phone Firearm 60
18 45 Tamil
Killing
550 ID parades, Intell Manual 62
27 58 Tamil
Killing
761 Witness mgt, CCTV 43
46 62 Tamil
Killing
912 Arrest strategy Sharp
instrument
57
59 49 Somalian 447 E-Fit, Informants, 
CCTV, Private 
CCTV, ID parades, 
Analysis
Knife 26
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Themes
No of 
actions
Tactics
W eapon of 
choice
Tim e
Taken
Venue
Sex/
Race
61 69 Albanian 1072 O/S Liaison, Phone Firearm 46
13335/13
=1025.76
1158/13 
= 89 
weeks
64 Financial 570 Invest thinking, 
proactive strategy
Knife 37 Public M/4
71 Financial E-Fit, Forensic, 
Intelligence
Manual 59 Private M/4
74 Financial 1255 H2H, Phone 
analysis, Forensic, 
Crimewatch, Consult 
CPS, Financial
Knife 74 Public F/1
94 Financial 416 Invest thinking, 
Witness mgt, CCTV, 
Forensic
Knife 233 Public M/1
98 Financial 539 FLO, Covert, Phone, 
Forensic
Firearm 124 Private F/3
124 Financial 434 Witness mgt, Phone Knife 50 M/1
148 Financial 676 Local Officers, 
Witness mgt, H2H
Knife 106 M/1
151 Financial 313 Witness mgt, Covert Firearm 75 Public M
153 Financial 1123 Use of local officers, 
Witness mgt, H2H
Firearm 68 Private F/3
56 Robbery 525 CCTV, ANPR Manual 10 M/1
63 Robbery CCTV, Informant Manual Restricted Public M/1
70 Robbery 844 E-Fit Manual 157 Public M/3
105 Robbery 423 CCTV, Phone, 
Financial
41 Private F/1
130 Robbery 322 Invest thinking, 
Intelligence, 
Reward, Covert
Knife 12 Public F/1
131 Robbery 151 Invest thinking, 
Witness mgt, Murder 
weapon, Forensic, 
Consult CPS
Firearm 90 Public M/1
137 Robbery 1433 Arrest strategy, 
CCTV, Informant
Firearm 112 Public M/3
140 Robbery 313 Local Officer, 
Witness mgt, CCTV, 
Phone
Manual 8 Private M/1
142 Robbery 621 Local Officers,
Invest thinking, H2H, 
NCF, Phone, 
Forensic
Manual 3 Private M/1
164 Robbery 330 Witness mgt, Phone, 
ID parades
Firearm 27 M/4
596.73 1656/24 
= 69
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Themes
No of 
actions Tactics
Weapon of 
choice
Time
Taken Venue
Sex/
Race
43 Mental
health
287 Linked Knife 51 Public F/3
89 Mental
health
549 Local Officers, 
Forensic, ID parades
Manual 97 Public M/1
123 Mental
health
591 Murder weapon, 
Forensic
Knife 8 Public
139 Mental
health
475 Local Officer, 
Forensic
Knife 100 Private M/3
141 Mental
health
543 Forensic Knife 52 Private M/1
91 Missing
Person
1048 Behavioural 
profiling, Suspect 
confession
9 yrs 
5 mths
Public M/1
103 Missing
Person
827 Local Officers, 
Forensic
Manual 56 Public M/1
122 Missing
Person
1398 Linked cases, Invest 
thinking, Media, 
Financial
Manual 34 Public M/4
5 N/K 655 Local Officers, H2H, 
Phone, Forensic
Manual 72
54 N/K 85 Suspect interview
55 N/K 550 Suspect confession
48 N/K 448 Witness mgt, 
Murder weapon
Firearm 72
108 N/K 776 CCTV, Phone, 
Forensic
Sharp
instrument
61
34 Strangerattack 1690 Arrest strategy, Local Officers, 
Invest thinking, 
Witness mgt, 
Reward, NCF, Beh 
Profiling
N/K Private F
47 Strangerattack 2906 Forensic, Witness, E-Fit
Strangulation 356 Public M
52 Strangerattack 709 23 F
138 Strangerattack 1173 Arrest strat, H2H, Forensic
Knife 12 Public M/1
1619 130
40 Homo-phobic
killing
696 CCTV, Anniversary 
appeal, Witness mgt
Knife 71 Public M/1
96 Homo-phobic
killing
566 Invest thinking, 
CCTV, Murder 
weapon
Manual 75 Public M/1
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Themes
No of 
actions Tactics
Weapon of 
choice
Time
Taken Venue
Sex/
Race
101 Homo-phobic
killing
567 FLO, Witness mgt Manual 191 Public 4
127 Homo-phobickilling
285 Phone, Forensic, 
CCTV
Knife 12 Private M/1
152 Homo-phobic
killing
1104 Forensic,
Intelligence
Firearm 127 Public M/3
16 Honourkilling 565 CCTV, Phone N/K 58 F/1
100 Honourkilling 423 Witness mgt, Forensic, Financial
Arson 28 Public M/3
111 Honourkilling 2531 Invest thinking Knife 143 Public M/1
154 Racist 7691 Invest thinking, 
Witness mgt, Phone
Blunt
instrument
75 Public M/3
36 Arson 1203 Private CCTV, NCF, 
E-Fit
Arson 67
15431=
1736.7
43723 Average: 62 weeks
358
Overall actions 493
S o lv ed U n so lv ed M ean O verall
Average no of actions 
overall 493 mean 737 Mean 1129 843.29
Average no of actions 358 866
Average time taken 
overall 62 56
Average time taken 60 weeks
A p p e n d ix  2
T h em es o f  H o m icid es
Arson 
Abduction 
Contract killings 
Conflict resolution 
Category A, i.e. high profile 
Criminal killings 
Domestic killings
Drug related including Operation Trident
Disrespect killings
Financial
Family disputes
Honour killings
Homophobic
Mental Health
Missing Persons (believed dead)
Multiple Homicides
Police Officer killed on duty
Prison killings
Stranger Sexual attacks
Racist
Unsolved
Reduced theme on SPSS
1 = Dispute / Domestic 
3 = Robbery / Financial 
5= Missing Person
6= Not known 
7= Drugs
8 = Stranger Attack
9 = Mental Health
10 = Criminal / Contract killing
13 = Ethnic Gang / criminal killing
14 = Honour killing
15 = Homophobic racist killing 
19 = Arson
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A p p en d ix  3 
S em i S tructured  Interview  T em plate
One SIO stated that the case ran itself, that the case evolved.
Day Date 
Time place of 
interview
SIO
interviewed
No of cases 
within time 
period
Which Unit 
attached to 
i.e. Trident
Questions
Description 
of SIO
Length of 
service
Age Gender Career 
CID or 
level 
transfer
Mainly 
proactive or 
reactive 
background
Answers by 
SIO
How they 
managed the 
MIT
Investigative
strategies
used
How SIO
prioritises
decisions
Phasing
of
enquiries
Peaks of 
activity
Types of 
cases (see 
Appendix 4)
Cat A or Cat 
B cases
Difficulties 
with types of 
cases
Witness
management
in different
cases i.e.
interpreters,
cultural
differences
Specific 
solving 
factors for 
particular 
cases
Motive How this 
type of case 
was solved 
or end result 
i.e. not 
convicted, 
not charged
Descriptions
by
Interviewer
Management
Style
Decision­
making
process
Phasing
Pressures on 
SIO
described by 
SIO
Internal
Volume of 
work
Resources Use of 
Murder 
Review 
Group
ACPO
intrusion
SIO
workload
External
“outside
drivers”
Media
intrusion
Setting the 
agenda on 
the media
Crime Scene Lack of public 
co-operation
Identity
Parades
Lack of 
forensic 
material
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Main solving 
themes
How many 
used in a 
particular 
enquiry
Main solving 
factors
What the SIO 
does
Investigative
Thinking
Allocating 
Core Roles
Managing
Holmes
actions
How SIO 
manages the 
MIT
Use of DIs Use of 
decision logs
Office
meetings
Establish
Core
roles
within
MIT
How SIO 
ensured 
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Dear SIO
I am presently researching the solving factors in Category A and B cases within the MPS as 
part of an authorised PhD study at Surrey University. This has been authorised by the 
Commander Homicide. The main aim of the research is to find the issues that solve these 
difficult cases and the decision-making processes that SIOs employ during an investigation. 
This research will be confidential and the results will be anonymised. I would like to 
interview you face to face preferably at your office to facilitate access to records. The 
interview will not be recorded but will be on a semi structured basis allowing you to make 
whatever comments you wish in confidence. You will have access to the finished interview 
and research results to enable you to comment on the contents. You will retain the right to 
withhold any information that may be sensistive The results will be kept in a secure 
environment and will remain the property of the Metropolitan Police and Surrey University. 
The overall aim of the research is to improve the understanding of how these major enquiries 
are solved and to assist understanding of the decision-making process. The author has been 
granted access to all relevant Holmes accounts and the research findings from your 
interviews will be compared to the Secondary analysis from the Holmes
Yours sincerely,
Mark Roycroft
